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Preamble
In August of 1998 the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center (CADRC) of the California
Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo (Cal Poly), approached Dr. Phillip Abraham of the
Office of Naval Research (ONR) with the proposal for an annual workshop focusing on emerging
concepts in decision-support systems for military applications. The proposal was considered timely
by the ONR Logistics Program Office for at least two reasons. First, rapid advances in information
systems technology over the past decade had produced distributed, collaborative computer-assistance
capabilities with profound potential for providing meaningful support to military decision makers.
Indeed, some systems based on these new capabilities such as the Integrated Marine Multi-Agent
Command and Control System (IMMACCS) and the Integrated Computerized Deployment System
(ICODES) had already reached the field testing and final product stages, respectively.
Second, over the past two decades the US Navy and Marine Corps have been increasingly challenged
by missions demanding the rapid deployment of forces into hostile or devastated territories with
minimum or non-existent indigenous support capabilities. Under these conditions Marine Corps
forces have to rely mostly, if not entirely, on sea-based support and sustainment operations.
Operational strategies such as Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) and Sea To Objective
Maneuver (STOM) are very much in need of intelligent, real-time and adaptive decision-support tools
to assist military commanders and their staff under conditions of rapid change and overwhelming
data loads. In the light of these developments the Logistics Program Office of ONR considered it
timely to provide an annual forum for the interchange of ideas, needs and concepts that would
address the decision-support requirements and opportunities in combined Navy and Marine Corps
sea-based warfare and humanitarian relief operations.
The first ONR Workshop (Collaborative Decision Making Tools) was held April 20-22, 1999 and
focused on advances in technology with particular emphasis on an emerging family of powerful
computer-based tools. The workshop concluded that the most able members of this family of tools
appear to be computer-based agents that are capable of communicating within a virtual environment
of objects and relationships representing the real world of sea-based operations. Keynote speakers
included: VAdm Jerry Tuttle (USN Ret.); LtGen Paul Van Riper (USMC Ret.); RAdm Leland
Kollmorgen (USN Ret.); and, Dr. Gary Klein (Chairman, Klein Assoc.).
The second ONR Workshop (The Human-Computer Partnership in Decision-Support) held May 2
4, 2000, was structured in two parts: a relatively small number of selected formal presentations (i.e.,
technical papers) followed each afternoon by four concurrent open forum discussion seminars.
Keynote speakers included: Dr. Ronald DeMarco (Assoc. Technical Director, ONR); RAdm Charles
Munns (USN); Col Robert Schmidle (USMC); and, Col Ray Cole (USMC Ret., Program Manager
ELB ACTD, ONR).
The third ONR Workshop (Continuing the Revolution in Military Affairs) was held June 5-7, 2001
and focused on: the changing role of the military in a post Cold War environment; adaptive
interoperable decision-support systems utilizing intelligent collaborating software agents; and, the
transitional period. Keynote speakers included Mr. Andrew Marshall, Head of the Pentagon’s Office
of Net Assessment, and RAdm Jay M. Cohen, Chief of Naval Research, Office of Naval Research
(ONR).
The fourth ONR Workshop (Transformation ...) described in these Proceedings was held on
September 18-19, 2002 at The Clubs in Quantico on the Quantico Marine Corps Base, Quantico,
Virginia.
Copies of the proceedings of past Workshops are available free of charge from:
CAD Research Center
Cal Poly (Bdg. 117 T)
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
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Opening Remarks

as a Foreword to the 4th Annual Office of Naval Research (ONR) Workshop
Good Morning ! I would like to welcome you all to this fourth annual Collaborative DecisionSupport Workshop sponsored by the Logistics Program Office of the Office of Naval Research
(ONR). I am Jens Pohl, Executive Director of the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center at
Cal Poly State University in San Luis Obispo, California. Our Center and Cal Poly has had the
honor of hosting this Workshop since 1999, and I thank you for your attendance this year. I
believe that we have been able to assemble an excellent program of speakers who will share their
expert knowledge and insights with us over the next two days.
Let me say a few words about the purpose of these Workshops. First and foremost, these
Workshops are intended to bring together representatives from three communities that have an
important stake in information technology (IT):
B

The military and civilian users, who use IT as a critical decision-making capability.

B

The government agencies that support the development and integration of IT.

B

And, industry which actually develops most of the IT products.

Second, these Workshops should identify developing trends, technical limitations that require
urgent attention, and opportunities for innovation. In other words, the attendees of each
Workshop should go away with a better understanding of the current state of IT and where IT is
likely to be headed over the next three years.
Third, the attendees (i.e., representatives of the three communities) should have opportunities
for sharing ideas and concerns on a one-to-one, informal basis throughout the duration of the
Workshop. These facilities here at The Clubs at Quantico are particularly well suited for such
informal interactions. And, this is also why we have catered for and integrated the morning,
lunch and afternoon breaks into the Workshop program itself. In other words, we consider them
to be an important part of the program.
I would like to recognize Dr. Phillip Abraham of the Office of Naval Research (ONR), who saw
the importance of these three purposes and through his vision established this Annual ONR
Workshop Series in 1999. Thank you Phil, for your foresight.
The theme of this year‘s Workshop is —Transformation …“. Much has happened since the last
Workshop in June, 2001. Human beings are experienced-based creatures. We feel comfortable
with what we know and have already experienced, and we feel most uncomfortable moving
outside this experience base. In other words, we are singularly adverse to change. However, we
will change, and change with surprising effort and speed, if there are compelling, threatening
reasons for changing. The terrorist attacks of Sep.11th last year have certainly provided such
reasons, and an atmosphere of profound and accelerating change has pervaded many aspects of
our daily activities ever since that cataclysmic event.
I would like to very briefly touch on four major areas of change that are potentially
transformational in scope:
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1.

From data-processing to information-centric software: We are rapidly
transitioning from data-processing to intelligent information management in IT.
The ability to store information (i.e., data with relationships that provide context)
in computer software provides the basis for automatic reasoning and learning
capabilities. Over the next three to six years computer systems will become
sufficiently smart to enter into meaningful and immensely valuable collaboration
with human users.

2.

From centralized to distributed services: For reasons of safety and security we
will be moving to a much more diversified resources and services model. The
greater the concentration of value, the more attractive the target! Under current
threat conditions we simply cannot afford to offer those who harbor ill will
against us high value concentrated targets such as centralized water, electric
power, transportation, and communication hubs.

The other two areas of major change are at least indirectly related to this second area of change:
3.

From singularity to plurality: Networking is becoming a principal agent for
implementing a diversified resources and services model, for two reasons: first, to
provide the necessary connectivity; and second, to fully exploit the opportunities
for the widest distribution of resources and capabilities. And, of course, as we
build these distributed networks we will incorporate a level of redundancy that
will provide an acceptable degree of reliability and graceful degradation.

4.

From hierarchical to flattened organizational structures: The notion of
networking is not restricted to physical communication facilities. Included in this
notion are also the formal and informal human interactions that are the life-line of
our organizational models. These organizational structures are becoming flat and
web-like as the focus increasingly shifts from the organization to the individual.
We have entered an era during which the contributions of the greatly enabled
individual are rapidly becoming the most valuable asset of the organization.

Leaving these brief thoughts with you as we begin our Workshop program, I would like to call on
my colleague and friend Col Tony Wood (USMC Ret.) to introduce our distinguished keynote
speaker this morning, Vice Admiral Jerry Tuttle (USN Ret.).

Jens Pohl, Executive Director
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center,
California Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly), San Luis Obispo
Quantico, September 18, 2002
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Fourth Annual ONR / CADRC
Decision-Support Workshop
September 18-19, 2002, Quantico, Virginia

The Office of Naval Research
and
The Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo

"Transformation..."
The impact of intelligent, collaborative, information-centric software systems on:
... tactical command and control
... logistic command and control
... transportation management
... intelligence analysis/evaluation
Wednesday, September 18:
Time

Activity

7:30

Check-in and Registration Begins
Registration Desk open from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM

8:30 - 8:45

Opening Remarks and Welcome
Dr. Jens Pohl, Executive Director, Collaborative Agent Design Research
Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, California

8:45 - 9:45

Keynote Address: "Transformation vs. Risk Management"
VAdm. Jerry Tuttle (USN Ret.), President and CEO, J.O.T. Enterprises LLC

9:45 - 10:00

Break

10:00 - 10:30

"Transformation... a State of Mind?"
Col. Tony Wood (USMC Ret.), CDM Technologies, Inc., San Luis Obispo,
California

Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
California Polytechnic State University
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
www.cadrc.calpoly.edu
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Wednesday, September 18 (continued):
Time

Activity

10:30 œ 11:00

"The Littoral Combat Future Naval Capability Program"
Col. Thomas O'Leary (USMC Ret.), Program Manager, Office of Naval
Research

11:00 œ 11:30

"The Joint Task Force Wide Area Relay Network (JTF WARNET)"
Raymond Cole, Jr., JTF Warnet Technical Manager, Office of Naval Research

11:30 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 œ 2:00

"The Role of Discovery in Context-Building Decision-Support Systems"
(Demonstration of a Semantic Web application with discovery,
reasoning and learning capabilities)
Steve Gollery, Software Engineer, Jens Pohl, Executive Director,
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo,
California

2:00 œ 2:30

"Exploiting Taxonomic Reasoning in Support of Real-Time Mission
Reachback Processes"
Dr. David Aha, Computer Scientist, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington
DC

2:30 œ 2:45

Break

2:45 œ 3:15

"An Analysis Tool Suite for Management and Reuse of Ontologies"
Mala Mehrotra, President, Pragati Synergetic Research, Inc., Cupertino,
California

3:15 œ 3:45

"Data, Information, and Knowledge in the Context of SILS"
Michael Zang, Software Engineer, CDM Technologies, Inc., San Luis Obispo,
California

3:45 œ 4:15

"Collaborative Role of Data Analysis and Inspection Technology in
Improving Supply Chain Security"
Dr. Larry Mallon, Director, CITT and Dr. John Hwang, Associate Professor
of Business (MIS), Long Beach State University, California

4:15

(CLOSE DAY ONE)

5:00 œ 7:00

Social in Ballroom 3

7:00 œ 9:00

Speakers' Dinner in Ballroom 4 (by invitation)
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Thursday, September 19:
Time

Activity

7:30

Check-in and Registration Continues
Registration Desk open from 7:30 AM to noon.

8:30œ 9:45

Keynote Address: "Homeland Security: A View Through the Eyes of
Janus"
Mr. Steven I. Cooper, Special Assistant to the President, Senior Director for
Information Integration and CIO and Lee Holcomb, Director of Infostructure,
Office of Homeland Security

9:45 œ 10:00

Break

10:00 œ 10:30

"Transformation... CETO Style!
Col. Ki Harvey (USMC Ret.), Deputy Director, Center for Emerging Threats
and Opportunities, Dumfries, Virginia

10:30 œ 11:00

"Transformation...Intelligent Logistics Information Management
Chris K. Neff, Logistics Program Analyst and Ships Operations Program
Manager; Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

11:00 œ 11:30

"3D Battlespace Visualization with Live Video Overlays"
Dr. Peter Burt, Sarnoff Corporation, Princeton, New Jersey

11:30 œ 1:00

Lunch

1:00 œ 1:30

"The Future of Training and STOW (Synthetic Theater of War)"
Dr. Michael P. Bailey, Technical Director, Training and Education
Command, MCCDC

1:30 œ 2:00

"'Pushing the Border Out:' Creation of the 'Virtual' Electronic Border"
Robert Quartel, Chairman and CEO, FreightDesk Technologies, Former
Member, U.S. Federal Maritime Commission

2:00 œ 2:30

"Joint Military/Civilian Incident Command Systems for Homeland
Defense"
Dr. Thomas Bevan, Director, Homeland Defense Initiative, Georgia Institute
of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia

2:30 œ 2:45

Break

2:45

Workshop Wrapup
Dr. Phillip Abraham, Office of Naval Research
(CLOSE DAY TWO)
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xii

Dr. Phillip Abraham

systems on a single navy platform, a
squadron, a battle group, a fleet, &c., that
will result in the highest achievable state of
readiness. A current project, —Mission
Readiness Analysis“, addresses the
challenge of systems integration on a single
platform).

Logistics Program Office
Office of Naval Research
Dr. Abraham is a Scientific Officer at the
Office of Naval Research (ONR). For the
past eight years, starting in 1994, he has
managed the ONR Science and Technology
(S&T) Logistics Program. A major endeavor
during these years was the introduction of
S&T projects in a program that at the time
depended on old technologies. In this he
was guided by the view that the goal of
military logistics is readiness everywhere ,
at all times.
Toward this goal he
introduced state-of-the-art sensors (e.g.,
MEMS), intelligent agents for decision
support systems, and other innovations in
both hardware and processes. Under his
management the Logistics Program has
addressed a host of areas that needed S&T
attention. These included Maintenance
(where sensor monitoring and diagnostics
of systems replaces fixed schedule checkups
and overhauls), Underway Replenishment
(the goal being operation in sea states 3
and higher via technical improvements to
existing crane systems, as well as the
development of new systems that will
eventually replace the conventional cranes),
Amphibious Logistics (Seabasing is the
major goal here and the tools that will
enable the integration of the sea and shore
operations are the SEAWAY and LOGGY
projects that have received support from
both the Navy and the Marine Corps), Naval
Facilities ( the major thrusts in this area
were the operation of the naval bases, the
rehabilitation of the deteriorating naval
piers, the design of modular hybrid piers,
and the design and construction of high
performance ordnance magazines), Decision
Support Systems ( the goal in this area is to
provide to the CO, at any level of command,
a decision system based on state-of-the-art
collaborative intelligent agents and tailored
to the needs of that level), and Integration
(the goal here is the integration of all the

Dr. Abraham joined the Office of Naval
Research in 1989 as a member of the
Mechanics Division where he was in charge
of the ONR 6.1 Structural Acoustics
Program, the goal of which was minimizing
the emission and scattering of sound by
submarines. Based on his own prior work
while employed by Raytheon Co. (see
below), he introduced the idea of working in
the time domain in computations related to
the response of complex elastic structures
to internal and external excitations. This
allowed the computation of the response of
models of submarines with internal
structure in (almost) real time and reduced
the demands on computer hardware. This
work was performed at the University of
Texas (Austin) and Stanford University (Palo
Alto) using the most sophisticated
computational techniques (of the time) for
large scale problems.
From 1982 until 1989 Dr. Abraham was a
member of the Naval Research Laboratory
where he did research on fluid-structure
interactions, and on wave propagation
phenomena. He studied the propagation of
acoustic waves in inhomogeneous and
random media, and showed how to obtain
results, to all orders, for both weak and
strong inhomogeneities. This work, and
work on reflection
tomography, were
motivated by the need to detect passively
or actively targets in regions of the ocean
that are contaminated by random
distributions of
biological and
other
scatterers.
In 1974 Dr. Abraham started working at the
Naval Underwater Sound Laboratory in New

xiii

with experimental results obtained from
high-altitude balloon flights.

London, Connecticut. There his research
dealt with underwater acoustics, focusing
on detection and localization of underwater
targets. Among other topics, he determined
the influence of size on magnetic anomaly
detection (MAD) of ferromagnetic targets
(such as submarines). In addition he, and
Dr. H. Moses, used inverse scattering theory
to generate new families of sound velocity
profiles (in the ocean) for which the wave
equation has exact solutions. These were
useful later on in determining acoustic wave
propagation in the arctic ice cap. This work
also led to concurrent results for potentials
appearing in the Schrodinger equation of
Quantum Mechanics.
One of these
potentials, a nontrivial modification of the
harmonic oscillator potential, has been
referred in the literature as the AbrahamMoses potential.

Dr. Abraham was awarded the Ph.D. in
Physics by the University of Maryland in
1966. His thesis topic was in Solid State
Physics, and it dealt with generating exactly
solvable models of crystal lattices, which
were used subsequently to check
perturbation methods employed in the
treatment of actual crystals. Among the
results obtained was a new method of
evaluating finite and infinite sums that
appear in various areas of physics.
In 1960, Dr. Abraham was awarded the
M.Sc. degree in Physics by the Hebrew
University in Jerusalem, Israel. His Master
Thesis (in atomic spectroscopy) dealt with
the computation of the energy levels of
isoelectronic sequences of atoms in various
configurations.
The results of these
computations reside in the tables published
during the sixties by NIST (then NBS),
under the editorship of Dr. Charlotte Moore.

From 1970 until 1974, Dr. Abraham was an
Assistant Professor of Physics at the
University of Connecticut, where he taught
and worked on Nonlinear Dynamics
problems related to solitons.

Dr. David W. Aha

During 1968-1970, Dr. Abraham was
employed by Raytheon Company in New
London, Connecticut. There he worked on
acoustic imaging in fluid media using an
exact analytic approach for solving wave
equations in the time domain.
A
concurrent laboratory experiment yielded a
visual image, on a TV screen, of an
insonified, submerged object. At that time,
it was the first such image generated with
acoustic waves.

Computer Scientist
Naval Research Laboratory
Dr. David W. Aha leads the Intelligent
Decision Aids Group at the Naval Research
Laboratory's Center for Applied Research in
Artificial Intelligence (AI), located in
Washington, DC. His group's projects,
concerning the research and development
of decision support tools, use a variety of
AI-related methodologies and techniques
(e.g., mixed-initiative planning, case-based
reasoning (CBR), knowledge management,
machine learning, textual data mining).
With respect to these interests, he has
published over 80 times in scientific journals
and conferences, has given keynote
presentations at several international
(technical) conferences, has (co-)organized
eleven international conferences/workshops

In 1966 Dr. Abraham was granted a
Postdoctoral Research Associateship by the
National Research Council. Located at
NASA‘s Goddard Space Flight Center, he
worked on propagation of charged particles
(originating from solar flares) through the
interplanetary magnetic field. The results of
the theoretical work matched quite well
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Dr. Thomas E. Bevan

(e.g., ICCBR'01), has served on the editorial
boards for three journals, and has served
on many AI conference program
committees.

Director, Homeland Defense Initiative,
Georgia Institute of Technology
In 2001, Dr. Thomas Edward Bevan was
appointed by Georgia Tech President G.
Wayne Clough to the newly created position
of Director of Homeland Defense at the
Georgia Institute of Technology. In this
position he is responsible for applying
Georgia Tech technology to Homeland
Defense and counterterrorism.
Dr. Bevan
is also Director of the Center for Emergency
Response Technology, Instruction, and
Policy (CERTIP) at Georgia Tech. Dr. Bevan
founded CERTIP three years ago as a
public-private partnership to foster basic
and applied research to enhance emergency
response and consequence management for
both natural and human-caused disasters of
mass destruction. CERTIP is funded in part
by the U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory and the Marine Corps Systems
Command in Quantico, Virginia. Research at
CERTIP focuses on chem/bio terrorism and
natural disasters. Dr Bevan also serves on
the Emergency Response Task Force which
is involved in creating, updating, and
coordinating campus security policies and
procedures that are applicable to the entire
campus, including the updating of the 1996
Atlanta Olympic Games security policies and
procedures.

Dr. Michael P. Bailey
Technical Director, Training
Education Command, MCCDC

and

Dr. Michael Page Bailey currently serves as
the Technical Director for the Technology
Division, Training and Education Command,
Marine Corps Combat and Development
Command, Quantico, Virginia. He graduated
from the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill with a Ph.D in Operations
Research in 1988, and became an Assistant
Professor of Operations Research at the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California. He was promoted to Associate
Professor in 1993 and tenured in 1994.
In 1995, he sabbaticaled at the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, Assessments
Division, OPNAV-N81 as a visiting scholar.
There he served as operations analyst in
support of the Quadrennial Defense Review
until 1997, whereupon he joined the Marine
Corps as Principal Analyst, Modeling and
Simulation. In December 1999, he joined
the Marine Corps' Training and Education
Command as Technical Director. In
December 2000, the Marine Corps formed
the Training and Education Technology
Division, with Dr. Bailey as its head.
Technology Division is responsible for
requirements, policies, and sponsorship of
all technology applicable to Marine Corps
individual training, unit training, exercises,
and ranges. These technologies include
interactive multimedia distance learning,
weapon system and crew training
simulators, simulation, interactive gaming,
instrumentation, and classroom technology.

Dr. Bevan is also the Associate Laboratory
Director of the Electro-Optics, Environment,
and Materials Laboratory (EOEML) at the
Georgia Tech Research Institute. In this
capacity, he provides management and
leadership for a 200-person laboratory that
oversees and conducts research in a wide
variety of business areas including the
environment, opto-electronics, undersea
acoustics, and food processing. Dr. Bevan is
responsible for customer contacts with
agencies in Washington, D.C. and private
industry.
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Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. In 1983
he joined the Sarnoff Corporation (formerly
David Sarnoff Research Center).

Dr. Bevan graduated cum laude as an
undergraduate Psychology major at
Dartmouth College. He was a distinguished
military graduate at Dartmouth in the Army
ROTC Program. In 1973 Dr. Bevan earned
his Ph.D. in experimental Psychology from
Princeton University. After graduation, he
worked as a program manager for the
Command and Control Division of Science
Applications International Corporation in
Arlington, Virginia where he worked on
several DARPA programs. During the next
eighteen years, he developed, managed
and supervised special programs in the
radar laboratory and in the imagery
applications business area at the
Environmental Research Institute of
Michigan, also based in Arlington, Virginia.
In 1999, he relocated to Atlanta to join
researchers at the Georgia Tech Research
Institute.

Dr. Burt has pioneered a number of
multiresolution techniques for real-time
vision and is the author of many technical
papers in this area. He received the David
Sarnoff Award for Outstanding Technical
Achievement in 1992.

Raymond Cole, Jr.
JTF WARNET Technical Manager
Mr. Cole has worked for over thirty years at
the Naval Research Laboratory in the area
of Information Technology. He heads up
the Integrated Communication Technology
Section of the Communication Systems
Branch. He is the Technical Manager for
JTF WARNET which is a two year effort to
field an Operational Prototype to PACOM
that will provide a translation and
communication capability that will enable
joint fires and maneuvers.

Dr. Peter Burt
Sarnoff Corporation
Dr. Peter Burt is managing director of the
Vision Technologies Business Unit at Sarnoff
Corporation. This activity is devoted to the
development of advanced technologies for
the real time analysis of video for such
applications as vehicle guidance and
surveillance and targeting. It has pioneered
innovations in embedded processors as well
as real time analysis algorithms.

Steve Gollery
Software Engineer
Collaborative Agent Design Research
Center
Steven Gollery is employed as a Senior
Software Engineer at the Collaborative
Agent Design Research Center at the
California Polytechnic University, San Luis
Obispo California. Mr. Gollery has been
developing software for twenty years,
beginning with assembly-language programming for the 6502 on some of the
earliest home computers, an experience
that he does not look back on with
nostalgia. He continues to be engaged by
the relentless pace of change in the
software industry, and believes that the
emerging web service standards will be a
driver for ever more rapid innovation.

Dr. Burt received the B.A. degree in physics
from Harvard University in 1968, and the
Ph.D. degree in computer science from the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in
1976. As a Postdoctoral Fellow he has
studied both natural and computer vision at
New York University, Bell Laboratories, and
the University of Maryland. He conducted
research in sonar, particularly in acoustic
imaging devices, at the U.S. Navy
Underwater Systems Center. He was a
member of the engineering faculty at
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Steven I. Cooper

Computer Professional (CCP) from the
Institute for the Certification of Computer
Professionals (ICCP). He also served in the
Naval Reserve during the Vietnam Era.

Special Assistant to the President
Senior Director for Information
Integration and CIO, Office of
Homeland Security

Dr John F. Halldane

Mr. Cooper joined the Office of Homeland
Security in March 2002. He brings more
than twenty years of experience as an
Information Technology professional, most
recently as CIO, Corporate Staffs, and
Executive Director, Strategic Information
Delivery for Corning, Inc. in Corning, NY.
Prior to that he was Director, Information
Technology for Eli Lilly & Company in
Indianapolis, IN. Mr. Cooper held several
senior level technical and management
positions with CSC, MAXIMA, and CACI prior
to forming his own consulting organization,
Strategic Information Concepts.

Planning and Environmental Systems
Consultant

His primary areas of expertise lie in
Information Integration, Strategic Information Delivery, Information Technology
Architecture, Enterprise Application Integration, Application Development, Information Technology Metrics and Value
Assessment, and Process Architecture and
Reengineering.

During the oil embargo Dr Halldane was a
Senior Physical Scientist with the Federal
Energy Administration which was radiply
created to meet that crisis and could be a
model for our national security
administration today. He was Chief of the
Psychophysics Section in Building Research
at the National Bureau of Standards
involved with people's perception in
buildings, Colorimetry, tire noise for the
DOT, thermal transfer in TriService
contracts, lighting in coal mines for BOM.
He was a Visiting Professional in daylighting
programs at the Solar Energy Research
Institute; military dining halls for the
Construction Engineering Research
Laboratory and energy conservation
measurement at the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory. Consultant for sound
measurement with OSHA.

Dr Halldane is an interdisciplinary systems
consultant developing freeways with towns
in SE Asia, urban design, business planning,
matrix management systems, contingency
planning with trend analysis, predicting
building collapse and technology
assessment. He provides integrated
professional services to plan-incorporatefinance-design-build-operate-manage
projects. Provides expert testimony in
technology assessment cases.

In his role within the Office of Homeland
Security, Mr. Cooper will be responsible for
guiding the development of information
integration architectures and roadmaps that
will integrate the information —stovepipes“
within the federal government and will
enable the sharing of homeland security
information with state, local, and relevant
private sector entities. This will be achieved
by integrating new and existing sources of
essential information via proven and
emerging technologies and in full
compliance with our broader values of
privacy, civil liberties, and openness.

Recently he returned from over a decade
working out of Singapore around SE Asia.
He was a Professor and Senior Research
Fellow with the Institute Sultan Iskandar for
Urban Habitat and Highrise, Universiti
Teknologi Malaysia, involved as a town

Mr. Cooper holds a BA degree from Ohio
Wesleyan University, and has held
professional certification as a Certified
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planner and urban designer for four cities
and the Muar District and in Architecture at
the National University of Singapore. Team
founder of the South East Asia Centre for
Environmental and Urban Management
known for the annual Leadership Seminar
and Urban Monograph Series. He was a
Professor in Environmental Design at
CalPoly Pomona, UC Berkeley, U.British
Columbia and lectured in Architectural
Science at U.Sydney and Architecture at
U.Newcastle. He developed and lectured in
Facility Management Systems, presented 2day Seminars in Singapore, Hong Kong and
Kuala Lumpur; and with the MMC
Professional Centre in Singapore.

Prior to his employment with the Potomac
Institute, Mr. Harvey was a senior systems
analyst at VisiCom Laboratories where he
was responsible for Wargaming, Simulation,
and Command and Control systems. In his
five years at VisiCom, Mr. Harvey worked as
a subcontractor on several projects
including: the Communications/Navigation
Integrated Product Team for the Marine
Corps‘ Advanced Ambhibious Assault Vehicle
(AAAV); the —Extending the Littoral
Battlespace," Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration sponsored by the Office of
Naval Research; and the Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) Staff Training Program
(MSTP) at the Marine Corps Base Quantico.

Dr Halldane has degrees from New Zealand;
a PhD (Architecture/Visual Perception),
B.SC. (Applied Mathematics. Physics),
Dip,T.P. (Town Planning), B Arch with Hon
(Architecture). He was a registered architect
FRAIA, ANZIA; a lighting engineer MIES;
psychophysicist (HFS). Dr Halldane is a US
Citizen has published over 130 extensive
articles on interdisciplinary topics.

From September 1970 to April 1994, Mr.
Harvey held various positions in the U.S.
Marine Corps, including:
B

B

B

Col. Ki Harvey, (USMC Ret.)
Deputy Director
Center for Emerging Threats and
Opportunities

B

Ki Harvey is currently the deputy director
for the Center for Emerging Threats and
Opportunities (CETO), a Marine Corps think
tank that examines emerging threats to
national security. Mr. Harvey oversees
business administration and contract issues,
in addition to managing the operations
staff. Previously, he was assigned as an
IPA (Intergovernmental Personnel Act) from
the Potomac Institute to the Office of Naval
Research as Head of System Engineering
and Integration for the Extending the
Littoral Battlespace Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ELB ACTD).

Program Manager, Marine Corps
Systems Command (December 1989
- April 1994)
Commanding Officer, First Light
Antiaircraft Missile Battalion (March
1987 - May 1989)
Commanding Officer, Second Low
Altitude Air Defense Battalion (April
1985 - February 1987)
Aide-de-Camp,
Commanding
General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
(June 1983 - June 1984)

Mr. Harvey has an M.A. in Human
Resources Management from Pepperdine
University (1978) and a B.A. in Political
Science from Tarkio College (1970).

Dr. John Hwang
Assoc. Professor of Business (MIS)
Long Beach State University, California
John D. Hwang received his B.S. in electrical
engineering from University of CaliforniaBerkeley; M.A. and Ph.D. in mathematics
from Oregon State University.
Before
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business located in Cupertino, CA.which will
celebrate its 10th anniversary next year.
Since its inception in 1993, Pragati Inc. has
been performing high-end artificial
intelligence research for mainly government
clients such as, DARPA, Air Force, Navy,
NSF, and Department of Transportation.

joining the faculty at California State
University - Long Beach in 1999, he was
General Manager of Information Technology
Agency, City of Los Angeles, California.
His 30-year career in the U.S. federal
government included posts in Department
of Defense in developing strategic
command-and-control systems; Executive
Office of U.S. Vice President, leading a team
to re-invent the US transportation systems;
and Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Washington, D.C., where he was
Executive Associate Director to apply
Information Technology to enhance
emergency preparedness and response.

Ms. Mehrotra has an M. S. degree in
Computer Science with concentration in
artificial intelligence and parallel computing
from the College of William and Mary in VA.
In addition she also has an M.S. in Nuclear
Physics from Delhi University, India. Her
B.S. degree was in Physics (Hons) from
Calcutta University, India. She has been
the recipient of several SBIR awards from
NASA, NSF, and AF.
As an on-site
contractor at Systems Validation and
Methodology Branch (SVMB), NASA Langley
Research Center in Hampton, VA from Õ8993, Ms. Mehrotra developed various
methodologies for software engineering of
knowledge-based systems. She has been
the main architect of the Multi-ViewPoint
Clustering Analysis Tool, MVP-CA tool which
partitions large and complex knowledgebased systems into meaningful units for the
purpose of analyzing them. MVP-CA tool
was used in analyzing IMMACCS (Integrated
Marine Multi-Agent Command and Control
System, sponsored jointly by the Marine
Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) and
the Office of Naval Research (ONR)). Under
current ONR funding she is spearheading an
effort to build a facade creation toolkit
(FCT) for manipulation of ontologies in
knowledge based systems such as
IMMACCS, SILS (Shipboard Integration of
Logistic Systems), and OTIS (Ordnance
Tracking Information System), for the
purpose of reusing these ontologies.

Dr. Larry Mallon
Attorney at Law
Director CITT, Long Beach State
University, California
Lawrence G. Mallon received his B.S./B.A.
from Georgetown University; his J.D. from
Emory University; and his LL.M. in ocean
and coastal law from the University of
Miami. He is admitted to practice law in
Georgia, District of Columbia, New York,
and California. Since 1987, he has been
Managing Principal in Lawrence G. Mallon &
Associates, San Clemente, California,
providing legal and international business
consulting services. Prior, he was Maritime
Counsel to the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries of the U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC. He has
served as Congressional observer to United
Nations International Maritime Organization,
and Third United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference.

Mala Mehrotra
President, Pragati Synergetic
Research, Inc.
Mala Mehrotra is the founder and President
of Pragati Synergetic Research, Inc., a small
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Christopher K. Neff

the Navy Comptroller, the Pacific Fleet
Commander, and Commander Naval
Logistics Command, Pacific. His privatesector experience includes property
management, condominium asset management, hotel operations management,
property development, and comptroller.

Logistics Program Analyst and
Ships Operations Program Manager
Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
Chris Neff has served as the principal
logistics program analyst for the U.S. Pacific
Fleet since May 1999. During this period he
has been responsible for identifying
material, services, information management
needs and resources necessary to support
the Pacific Fleet‘s Aircraft Carriers, Surface
ships, and Submarines.
He has also
provided both functional and technical
support to fleet support agencies in order to
increase information accuracy, streamline
processes, and enhance decision support.
He has provided the Office of Naval
Research and associated contractors with
logistics-related process improvement ideas
and placed emphasis on those areas which
will provide the greatest value. Prior to
assuming his current position Mr. Neff
served as the principal Base Operating
Support (BOS) program analyst for facilities,
equipment and base support services
throughout the Pacific Fleet area of
responsibility from Nevada to the Indian
Ocean.

Col. Thomas M. O'Leary (USMC
Ret.)
Program Manager, Office of Naval
Research
Mr. O‘Leary currently is the Program
Manager for the Littoral Combat Future
Naval Capabilities program at the Office of
Naval Research.
He is on an IPA
assignment from the Potomac Institute for
Policy Studies where he is a Senior
Research Fellow.
Prior to joining the
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, he was
a Research Staff Member at the Institute for
Defense Analyses where he was the Task
Leader for the Joint Study on Effects Based
Operations. Prior to joining the Institute for
Defense Analyses, he was a Marine Infantry
Officer and served in a variety of staff billets
and commanded at the company, battalion,
and MAGTF levels. He received a Bachelor
of Science degree from the Georgia
Institute of Technology, a Master of Science
degree from the University for Southern
California, and a Master of Arts degree from
the Naval War College.

Mr. Neff enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1969,
achieved the rank of E-5 prior to being
selected for the Navy‘s Enlisted Scientific
Education Program (NESEP), where he
earned a Bachelor of Engineering degree in
Computer Science at the University of New
Mexico. In 1975 he was commissioned and
assumed duties as the Electronic Material
Officer on the Pacific Fleet Frigate USS
Davidson subsequently became Supply
Officer on the San Diego-based USS
O‘Callahan. His 21 year Naval Career
included assignments as Accounting Officer,
Financial Management Officer, Financial
Systems Project Director, Fleet Budget
Officer, and Comptroller on the staffs of the
Commander, U.S. Surface Force Pacific
Fleet, Chief of Naval Operations, Officer of

Dr. Jens G. Pohl
Executive Director, Collaborative
Agent Design Research Center, and
Graduate Coordinator, Architecture
Department, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo,
California
Dr. Jens Pohl holds the positions of
Professor of Architecture, Executive Director
of the Collaborative Agent Design Research
Center (CADRC), and Post-Graduate Studies
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Coordinator, in the College of Architecture
and Environmental Design, California
Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly), San
Luis Obispo, California, US.

The Integrated Marine Multi-Agent
Command and Control System (IMMACCS)
was successfully field-tested as the
command and control system of record
during the Urban Warrior Advanced
Warfighting Exercise (AWE) conducted by
the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
(MCWL) in Central California (Monterey and
Oakland) during the period March 11 to 18,
1999, during a live fire Limited Objectives
Exercise (LOE) held at Twentynine Palms,
California, in March 2000, and during the
recent Kernal Blitz Exercise held on the
West Coast in June 2001. The Integrated
Computerized Deployment System
(ICODES) was designated by the US
Department of Defense as the ”migration
system‘ for ship loading in July 1995.
ICODES V.3 was released to the US Army in
1997 and ICODES V.5 is being released to
the US Marine Corps and US Navy this year
(2002).

Professor Pohl received his formal education
in Australia with degrees in Architecture and
Architectural Science: B.Arch. (University of
Melbourne, 1965) M.Bdg.Sc. and Ph.D.
(University of Sydney 1967 and 1970). He
taught in the School of Building at the
University of New South Wales in Sydney,
Australia, until the end of 1972 and then left
for the US where he was appointed to the
position of Professor of Architecture at Cal
Poly. Following several years of research
and consulting activities in the areas of
building support services and information
systems, Dr. Pohl‘s research focus today lies
in the application of distributed artificial
intelligence methodologies to decisionsupport systems in engineering design,
logistical planning, and military command
and control.

Dr. Pohl is the author of two patents (US),
several books, and more than 80 research
papers. He is a Fellow of the International
Institute for Advanced Studies in Systems
Research and Cybernetics, and was
awarded on honorary doctorate by the
Institute in August, 1998, during the
InterSymp-98 conference held in BadenBaden, Germany. Professor Pohl is a Fellow
of the Royal Australian Institute of
Architects, a Fellow of the Australian
Institute of Building, a Member of the
American Institute of Constructors, and a
member of IEEE.

Under his direction the Collaborative Agent
Design Research Center at Cal Poly has over
the past 11 years developed and
implemented a number of distributed
computing applications in which multiple
computer-based and human agents
collaborate in the solution of complex
problems. Foremost among these are the
ICDM (Integrated Cooperative Decision
Model) and TIRAC (Toolkit for Information
Representation and Agent Collaboration)
frameworks which have been applied to
engineering design (industry sponsorship:
ICADS - 1986 to 1991), energy conservation
(US Dept. of Energy sponsorship: AEDOT 1992 to 1993), logistical planning (US Army
(MTMC) sponsorship: ICODES - 1993 to
present), military mission planning (US
Marine Corps (MCWL) sponsorship: FEAT,
FEAT4 and IMMACCS - 1994 to present),
and facilities management (US Navy (ONR)
sponsorship: CIAT, SEAWAY, and LOGGY 1996 to present).

Donald R. Quartel, Jr.
CEO, FreightDesk Technologies
Rob Quartel (Donald Robert Quartel, Jr.) is
a former Member of the US Federal
Maritime Commission, and an internationally
recognized expert in US national maritime
and transportation policy. He currently
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Dr. Gordon Schacher

serves as Chairman and CEO of FreightDesk
Technologies, named by Forbes Magazine in
2000 as —one of the ten best“ in logistics on
the web. The company is a lead developer
of internet-based Transportation Management System applications for international
cargo management. It provides its software
solutions to shippers, 3PL‘s and other
transportation providers for the comprehensive execution of international freight.
Mr. Quartel‘s experience spans a wide range
of energy, transportation, safety and
environmental regulatory matters and a
number of public-private ventures including
mass transit, high-speed rail, highway,
aviation and port development projects. He
is a prolific and sometimes controversial
writer and speaker, frequently cited in the
media and called upon by the United States
Congress for expert testimony; and he was
the leading proponent of international liner
shipping deregulation, which passed in
1998. He has been a Lecturer at Yale
University‘s Graduate School of Management, teaching a course on Transportation
Strategy and Management; and continues
to serve as a Member/Advisor to the Army
Science Board on Strategic Sealift and
—Army After Next“ issues. Mr. Quartel is
also a Member of the Board of Advisors to
the Woodrow Wilson International Center,
sits on the board of the Global Electronic
Trade Association, and was a member of
the Bush-Cheney Transition Advisory
Committee to the US Department of
Transportation. He has taken an active role
in developing a public policy response to the
issue of international container security, and
was the first to publicly describe the
concept of —pushing the borders out“ via a
—virtual“ electronic data border that would
allow government officials to profile cargoes
prior to embarkation to the United States.

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California
Dr. Schacher's formal education was in
Physics, principally solid state. After joining
the Naval Postgraduate School, he
transitioned into radar attenuating
materials, then electromagnetic propagation
in the atmosphere, followed by transport
and diffusion with emphasis on chemical
and biological warfare. During this work he
was Chief Scientist on 11 research cruises.
His current work is in operational field
experimentation, the design and implementation of operations and systems
analysis experiments with operating forces.
His focus is on information systems and
supporting knowledge structures. He was a
member of the scientific panel that
developed the remote sensing algorithms
for the SEASAT satellite, and was recently a
member of the DoD Independent Scientific
Panel for Chem/Bio Modeling and
Simulation. At NPS he was Chairman of the
Physics Dept., Dean of Science and
Engineering, Dean of Faculty, and recently
was Director of the Institute for Joint
Warfare Analysis. He is the author or
coauthor of approximately 150 research
papers and reports.

VAdm. Jerry O. Tuttle (USN Ret.)
President and CEO, J.O.T. Enterprises
LLC
VADM Jerry O. Tuttle was born in Hatfield,
Indiana; awarded the American Spirit Honor
Medal upon graduation from Enlisted
Recruit Training in March 1955; selected for
the Naval Aviation Cadet (NAVCAD)
Program; and designated a Naval Aviator
and commissioned in October 1956. He was
Navy's Gray Eagle signifying the earliest
designated Naval Aviator on active duty.
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(AFCEA), the 1991 American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)
Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence Award for his contribution to
the overall effectiveness of C3I Systems,
and the AFCEA 1992 Jon L. Boyes Award for
major contributions to that international
organization. He was chosen as one of
Federal Computer Week's 1991 and 1992
Federal 100. He received the Washington
Space Business Roundtable, 1993
Excellence in Government Award. He was
inducted into the Government Computer
News Information Resources Management
Hall of Fame in 1993 and has been selected
to receive the 1994 America Astronautical
Society Military Astronautics Award.

His career has included assignments to the
staff of the Commander Naval Air Force,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet; Attack Squadrons FORTY
FOUR, FIFTEEN, ONE TWELVE, ONE
SEVENTY FOUR and EIGHTY ONE; Fighter
Squadron ONE TWELVE and the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations. He has
served as Aide and Flag Lieutenant to the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. He
has commanded Attack Squadron EIGHTY
ONE,
Carrier
Air
Wing
THREE,
replenishment ship USS KALAMAZOO (AOR
6), aircraft carrier USS JOHN F. KENNEDY
(CV 67), Carrier Group EIGHT and Carrier
Group TWO/Battle Force SIXTH Fleet. He
has served as Special Assistant to the Chief
of Naval Operations and as Deputy Director
for Intelligence and External Affairs at the
Defense Intelligence Agency. VADM Tuttle
was the Naval Inspector General from
August 1984 to November 1985, after which
he was Deputy and Chief of Staff for the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. In
May 1987, he was assigned as Director,
Command, Control and Communications
Systems, The Joint Staff. In May 1989, he
assumed his assignment as Director, Space
and Electronic Warfare.

VADM Tuttle retired from active duty on 1
January 1994.

Col. Anthony Wood (USMC Ret.)
Vice President, CDM Technologies,
Inc., San Luis Obispo, California
Colonel Anthony A. Wood (USMC Ret.)
joined CDM Technologies in 1998 after 31
years in the Marine Corps. In 1995, he
created the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory and served as its first director
from 1995 to 1998. Colonel Wood also
holds the position of Director of Applied
Research with the Collaborative Agent
Design Research Center at California
Polytechnic State University.

VADM Tuttle's personal decorations include
the Defense Distinguished Service Medal;
Distinguished Service Medal (2); Defense
Superior Service Medal; Legion of Merit (4);
Distinguished Flying Cross (3); Meritorious
Service Medal (2); Air Medal (23) - five
individual and 18 strike/flight awards; Navy
Commendation Medal (4); and various
campaign awards. He flew over 220 combat
missions over North Vietnam, logged more
than 500 jet flight hours, and has more
than 1,000 arrested carrier landings. He
received the 1978 Navy League's John Paul
Jones Award for inspirational leadership, the
1983 Association of Old Crows Award for his
contributions to electronic warfare, the 1989
AFCEAN of the year in recognition of his
contributions to the Armed Forces
Communications and Electronics Association

In the course of his service, he has been
responsible for a number of unique
conceptual and practical contributions to
joint warfare, naval expeditionary warfare,
and our military posture in the Pacific. In
1968, he served his first tour in Vietnam as
a platoon commander and then advisor to
the Korean Marine Corps Blue Dragon
Brigade. In his second tour in Vietnam in
1974-75, Captain Wood commanded a
joint-contingent executing clandestine
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mission in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In
January 1975, Maj General Homer Smith,
USA, the Defense Attache in Saigon, had
him transferred to the Defense Attache
Office, where has was directed to secretly
develop a plan for the evacuation of
Saigon. Capt. Wood then executed that plan
in April of 1975. Col. Wood has since served
in a succession of infantry and reconnaisance command billets and several staff
assignments.

Col. Wood‘s decorations include the
Distinguished Service Medal (multiple
awards), the Legion of Merit, the Bronze
Star with Combat V, the Meritorious Service
Medal, the Joint Commendation Medal
(multiple awards), and the Combat Action
Ribbon (multiple awards). At the time of his
retirement in June 1998, Colonel Wood was
the only Colonel or Captain on active duty in
any service to have been twice awarded
the Distinguished Service Medal.

As the principal author of the US Navy and
Marine Corps —Maritime Prepositioning
Concept“, he developed a detailed concept
and then supervised the implementation of
a national strategic response capability
based on forward positioning three
squadrons of specially configured climate
controlled ships. Each of these squadrons
contained prepackaged supplies and
equipment sufficient to support a force of
15,000 Marines for thirty days. While
serving as Chief of Staff Marine Forces
Pacific, Colonel Wood was dispatched to
Russia in 1993. There, over a two-week
period of negotiations, he successfully
concluded a major tension
reduction
agreement and multi-year exercise program
with the Russian General Staff, the
Commander Russian Pacific Fleet in
Vladivostok, and the Commander Russian
Far East Military District in Kharbovsk.
Designed to relax tensions and reduce the
risk of nuclear incidents in the Pacific
Theater, the agreement has since been
extended.

Michael Zang
Software Engineer
CDM Technologies, Inc., San Luis
Obispo, California
Mike Zang is a Senior Software Engineer at
the Cal Poly Collaborative Agent Design
Research Center. He currently provides
technical leadership for the Mission
Readiness Analysis Toolkit of the ONR
sponsored Shipboard Integration of
Logistics program consults on a number of
other concurrent projects at the center.
Mike began his career at the research
center as a core developer on the ICODES
project then went on to be the technical
leader and principle system architect for the
ONR sponsored maritime logistics projects:
CIAT, COACH, and OTIS. He introduced the
use of case base reasoning at the center
and is currently working in collaboration
with the NRL's Intelligent Decision Aids
Group, a part of the Navy Center for Applied
Research in Artificial Intelligence, to extend
this technology for the mutual benefit of
both organizations. Mike‘s primary interests
are in applied artificial intelligence and
ontology development.

Colonel Wood‘s last billet was as founding
Director and Commanding Officer of the
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory from
1995-1998. Unique in its concept-based
approach as well as its projection of a very
different and non-traditional post cold war
future, the laboratory spear headed Marine
experiments to recast military capabilities in
a mold appropriate to emerging future
requirements.
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Section A: Transforming the Forces

The textual portions of some of the papers in this section are
based on audio recordings that have been transcribed and
edited by members of the Conference Organizing Committee.
These papers typically consist of two sections: the textual
transcription of the audio recording; and, a set of PowerPoint
slides.
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Transformation VS. Risk Management
Fourth Annual ONR Workshop
VAdm Jerry Tuttle (USN Ret.)
President and CEO, J.O.T. Enterprises LLC
Fairfax, Virginia
Good morning! Consigieres, former colleges, masters of the transformation age, dear friends,
you who await induction into the Pantheon of American Heroes and are marinated in patriotism,
warriors, you who have more degrees than I do college credits, ONR and Collaborative Agent
Design Research Center‘s (CADRC) sagacious masters, ladies and gentlemen.
I possess neither that eloquence of diction, that poetry of imagination, nor that brilliance of
metaphor to tell you how much I am pleased to be here, although I do not have a clue as to what
I am to say. Because not since that certain kiss at Gethsemani has an audience witnessed a
similar betrayal, albeit totally unavoidable. As you are all ineluctably aware, Admiral Herb
Browne was to give this keynote address and kick off this extraordinarily important Workshop
and only the awesome power of Mother Nature has precluded him from being here. On his
behalf, I express his profound disappointment, and I share in your disappointment.
You cannot understand what is really meant, until you have heard it described with the power
and imagery of Herb Browne. Herb asked me yesterday if I might substitute for him today,
which I readily agreed, because firstly I admire what this forum does and its sublime results,
secondly, I am proud to have participated in the past in your Workshops, and lastly and most
importantly because Herb asked me. I hold him in the same lofty esteem as Mother Teresa. I am
akin to a bush league player pitch hitting for Bobby Bonds. Please marvel at and savor his
amazing resume that he has amassed. Although I burped him, I also benefited from his genius.
This annual pilgrimage has become like the county fair as it gets bigger and better every year.
When I look in my wake, I am stunned into awe by the panoply of speakers and the brilliance,
which they represent. Nevertheless, I am inspired by your confidence, or at least Herb‘s, awed
by the responsibility, but resolved to succeed. Besides, there is some luck in not getting what
you thought you wanted, -- but getting what you have, -- which once you have gotten it, -- you
may see it is what you would have wanted had you known. Ponder that thought for a moment.
Transformation is the current intellectual fashion and discussion topic and has been around
subliminally for many years under the perfumed sobriquet of Revolution in Military Affairs,
birthed and nourished by the icon, Andy Marshall. Sagaciously, he has for years with great
clarity envisioned the necessity to transform our military anatomy toward a faster, more agile,
more balanced, more lethal, better informed and more interoperable forces in the endless and
relentless pursuit of shared perfect knowledge for which to wage immaculate warfare. He has
masterfully harvested the best ideas from the best minds that this great country has to offer. I
place in evidence as exhibit one this audience with its celestial knowledge, wide sphere of
interest, commitment, vast experience and extraordinary intellect.
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Andy has been flawless, except for his position on carriers in which he is totally incorrect. The
aircraft carrier with the long lance of naval air is the most awesome, malleable and versatile
weapons system on earth and the proteus of all weapons systems. It is a hybrid creation, which
enables us to conquer land, sea and air simultaneously. It is the quintessence embodiment of
presence, power, and precision. But, enough on that issue for fear that you detect a bias.
However, it remains a mystery to me why he rejects the obvious and not succumbs to the
straitjacket of reality. But, not since that certain stroll across the Sea of Galilee has anybody else
been perfect.
Upon the arrival of our current brilliant, courageous, inspirational and energetic Secretary of
Defense, the transformation journey commenced. I can make that statement now that I am out of
uniform, of which I could never get back into, without being thought a sycophant, and because I
do so without any calculations of profit or loss, relying solely on my conscience. As we
commence our journey into the future on the wings of transformation, may it be a journey that
we can look forward to with unbridled enthusiasm and a journey that we can look back upon
with pride of accomplishment and with confidence in our security.
There are three ways to change a culture. One is to change the people; two, change the rewards
system and thirdly, experience a cataclysmic event. SECDEF courageously was addressing the
first two ingredients, but was working against the inert mass, the bureaucratic indigestion and the
resistance to change and frankly had not enjoyed too much success, even as capable and
charismatic as he is. But, on that horrific day leeward of over a year ago, the third nutrient for
transformation was given an overdose and the world was changed forever.
The rate of transformation took off exponentially and gave time for the leadership changes that
SECDEF had made and the obvious rewards that would accrue those with the proper vision to
achieve traction and ensured SECDEF a justifiable chapter in the book of world hero‘s vis-à-vis
a footnote in history. On that solemn day, we recognized a new enemy, that was in reality an
epiphany, that was ubiquitous and global and ushered in a variety of threats that were as
challenging to our imaginations as much as to our resources.
So what is —transformation.“ Let‘s go to the source for the definition, because if he did not coin
the term, he certainly redefined it? In the Monday, 16 September issue of —Transformation
Trends“, crafted and promulgated by my dear friend Art Cebrowski, for whom the term
—warrior“ should be reserved, and who resides on the other side of Pluto intellectually; Secretary
Rumsfeld is quoted as saying: —I‘m frequently asked to describe transformation, and I can say
this. Transformation is not a single thing to be trotted out and looked at and inspected. Simply
put, transformation is change. It‘s change in the way we fight, in the way we train, in the way
we exercise, but especially it‘s a change in the way we develop leaders and, most important, in
the way all of the services work together.“
With that, let‘s launch into the fray. I would be less than honest, or a friend, if I did not address
some of the issues that Herb had intended to cover some of which I actually agree. Imprimis,
Herb reminded me that I would be followed by the oracle, Tony Woods, elegantly articulating
his masterpiece —Transformation a Mindset.“ He then hastened to add that his salient point was
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that he had concerns that we will not transform DOD, if we apply Risk Management to
experimentation. He opined that to continue to work in a risk adverse environment and even risk
management is a pipe dream and that for us to transform, experimenters must be allowed to fail,
because in an experiment, failure is impossible and an oxymoron. He was to recommend that
there be made a formal distinction between Experimentation and Demonstration.“ This issue has
been debated for years and the time has come to put it to rest on Herb‘s side of the bed.
Permit me to seize this moment to suggest to you that we are at zenith, with the widest aperture
of opportunity ever, for transformation with less risk than has been witnessed before on earth,
but this aperture will rapidly shrink. We apodictically are the strongest military forces on Earth.
In fact, we spend nearly as much on weapons as the remainder of the world combined and
frankly could conquer the world if it became necessary. But, we would be motivated by far
different reasons than what other nations would aspire. We seek not to build empires, but to
create peace, prosperity and freedom. The greatest risk that we face is not to transform. It is an
incredibly exciting time. We have supposedly mobile units that are not even transportable. But,
we also have a Coast Guard that is rapidly approaching block obsolescence, but under the
brilliant leadership of RADM Pat Stillman and the Deep Water Program, it will emerge as the
most modern Navy in the world and the second largest.
Herb proceeded to espouse his concern that many in DOD will make token, or marginal, changes
to antediluvian systems and ways of doing things and limn it as transformational. As a result, he
had trepidation‘s that a decade hence we would have the same appearance as today. I have an
abysmal schism with these concerns. The former concern I am in violent agreement and echo
and amplify his concerns, but our military 10 years from today will be very much different and I
offer the contrast between Desert Storm and the Afghanistan campaign as evidence to support
my position.
Herb also believes that Navy made a grievous mistake in institutionalizing experimentation and
moving it to the Naval War College in Newport and that the action was a major setback.
Furthermore, he believes that supporting experimentation between John Paul Jones and Mahan
lectures requires a logic transplant. I guardedly concur because what it takes to solve real-world
problem calls for a wider range and integration of skills than is furnished in discipline orientated
textbooks, classes and Ph.D., dissertations.
Never have I been prouder of our military than in Enduring Freedom. Our ineffable warriors
went half way around the world and achieved in nine weeks, what the Soviets failed to do in a
decade, with the enemy under his belly. Were mistakes made? Indubitably! But, not those
made in Desert Storm. Why? Because of our extraordinarily intelligent and educated service
personnel, who unhesitatingly and unashamedly, critically analyzed lessons learned and found
solutions to the challenges so that they might not be practiced in the future. But, most
importantly it is the unique freedom that we enjoy in this great nation to openly debate
differences, a society that serves as the reservoir from which only the best are called and
privileged to serve. Those so magnificently represented here today. It is our system; it is our
people, who permit us to reside in a very much different galaxy than the rest of the world.
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Several years ago, I had the honor of addressing the Hellenic Ministry of Defense in Athens,
Greece, and whereas I have spent minutes drafting this diatribe, I had spent days crafting my
remarks for that occasion and was reasonably proud of my product. It was in all humility a fine
speech, but it was wrong for the audience, as they did not capture what I was communicating and
it was not a language issue. It occurred to me that they had looked across the Aegean Sea
through a straw for so long that they had become badly dated and was a scintillating example of
a military that screamed for transformation. This experience convinced me that this country
would never be defeated, because of our system and the long continuous line of those who have
answered their nation‘s call, witnessed the evil of war and would never permit this country to
atrophy. Transformation is the current prescription.
Having exhausted my knowledge of the message that Herb had wished to deliver, please indulge
me as I briefly address another major transformation and one in which I am more familiar. That
being the transition from a platform-centric information architecture age to a network-centric
model as the crucible of technology churns out one astounding product after another for which to
build the infrastructure. The collaborative decision-support systems that will be presented by the
quintessential professionals during this conference will accrete I confidently predict to reside on
the network, be dynamic and involve most if not all participants on the network, some
unknowingly. We have already witnessed major organizational and culture changes and this
Network-Centric transformation has just commenced and has not approached terminal velocity.
Dr. Pohl‘s —Major Transformation Imperatives“ are a Rembrandt and my envy.
We will witness collaborative decision-support systems being integrated with the cooperative
engagement of targets. Whereby a shared common operation picture will allow the optimum
shooter in a force to develop and fire the optimum weapon on a target, even thought the shooting
unit may not have an onboard detection of the target at the time of weapons launch, mid-course
guidance or kill. Cooperative planning, modeling and simulation, rehearsal, execution, and
continuous post strike analysis systems will all be integrated in a manner that will mandate
parallel and continuous processing of information at every node/module/way-station, with shared
information. The traditional linear flow of information in the calculus for 6.5 mach interceptors
will become but romantic memories. For ONR, I adroitly invite to your attention that you are
still introducing linear information systems.
What network-centric brings to the altar is that any and all information becomes instantaneously
a network asset, continuously available to all on the network. Controllers like found in video
games will enable faster and easier manipulation of information in multiple dimensions for
analysis and provide the ability to predict events, behavior and collaborative environments,
visualization and pattern recognition and myriad other capabilities.
All of the services are reorganizing to implement network-centric warfare, but there remain few
that have the range and depth to fully envision the full implications or its unfathomable potential.
But, it matters little because the transformation will realistically be evolutionary, not
revolutionary.
Network-centric warfare is a work in progress and will evolve I confidently predict. Although
discussed for some time, it has only recently been fully understood and then by only a few.
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Efforts are underway to expand the concept of network-centric warfare from a purely technical
world to the operations doctrine domain. Network Centric Warfare is applicable to all levels of
warfare and contributes to the coalescence of strategy, operations, and tactics. It derives its
powers from the robust integration and coordination of a well-informed, but geographically
dispersed force. The sublime 31 August address by the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, General
Myers, demonstrated a level of understanding, knowledge and appreciation for the power of
Network-Centric Warfare by a four star flag officer that would have been merely an illusion in
the recent past.
The enabling elements for Network Centric Warfare nourished by collaborative decision support
systems are:
B
B
B
B

(1) a high performance information grid that is survivable and enduring against the full
spectrum of physical and information operations threats;
(2) integrated sensors capable of generating high levels of battle-space awareness
synchronized with military operations;
(3) value-adding command and control processes; and
Finally, (4) weapons reach and maneuver with precision and rapid response.

Network Centric Warfare will accrete continuously as the advantages of including an ever
increasingly number of platforms with their sensors, or islands of information, to the network,
greatly facilitated by the introduction of programmable, wide-band, secure, open architecture
communications system. These terminals can be configured for use on ground, airborne or
shipboard platforms, can send reliable voice, data and imagery and video simultaneously and
will permit automatic routing on the network. These software programmable, multi-band, multimode digital radios will provide increased interoperability, flexibility and adaptability to support
the full spectrum of varied warfare mission requirement. Because of this new capability,
simultaneous networked voice, video, and data operations with low probability of intercept over
multiple frequency bands will be realized. These networks will be capable of providing short-tolong range, both terrestrial and satellite communications, information exchange of voice, video,
and data, at extraordinarily high data rates.
However, our archaic budgeting and programming processes remain platforms and weapons
systems focused. But, there is a growing awareness of this condition and a respect for the vital
contribution that Network-Centric Warfare has to offer and that it is a dimension of warfare that
will have a galactic effect on how conflicts are resolved. Accordingly, dynamic changes are
being made to the acquisition process and I am confident that the right things will result.
We are indeed surrounded by fantastic opportunities brilliantly disguised as unsolvable
problems.
Democracy flourishes, freedom rings and America sleeps easier in the knowledge that we have
the world‘s finest warriors, best trained and best equipped. Whenever freedom is threatened,
when America‘s future is on the line there you will find, with the reliability of gravity, the most
awesome military force ever assembled ready to respond. They will issue an invitation to the
rest of the world to join the fray when they can and leave with they must, but in the event of
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regrets, they are prepared to take care of business alone. Transformation will have made a major
contribution.
You have honored me by your kind attention and the gift of your time. Thank you! A —thank
you“ filled with more genuine emotion than the words were ever intended to convey. May your
thoughts continued to be cherished in nature, giving in character and reflective in stature and
may you experience all the beauty of God‘s hand and relish in the knowledge that you are a
major part of it. May the most that you wish for be the least that you receive and may your worst
tomorrow be better than your best yesterday. God bless you and God bless America.
Questions from the audience:
Question: Admiral, what do you think about the command and control scheme in Tampa as
compared to a forward base CINC?
VAdm Tuttle: Well, not because of technology or the capability, but more in culture than
anything. I would want them closer to the area of contact, but I don‘t want the INTEL officer
competing with a soccer game. In other words, the time zone changes… you have to deal with
reality and in my estimation it‘s not the technology, and it‘s not the latency of the reach-back.
It‘s no longer even a bandwidth, but in my estimation, the person with the ultimate responsibility
has to be… I say… closer to the combat… and again, it‘s primarily in recognition of innate
human nature. Whenever they‘re getting up, you're going to bed or vise versa. And you have
the family life and all these things if you‘re going to adequately support him. The biggest debate
that will come out of Afghanistan in my estimation is: Who pulls the lanyard? This debate has
been going on since Hannibal came across the Alps, and I‘ve always been mistaken. You talk
about risk management, I‘ve been fired more than any military officer in the history of the
DoD… because I took risks. You don‘t agree with that answer… obviously.
Participant: I do agree with your answer, Sir.
Question: Secretary Marshall's vision was a (vision of) shared perfect knowledge for
immaculate warfare. That concerns me, if we're building for that, because history, current
events and science all say you'll never have perfect knowledge of a complex system.
VAdm Tuttle: I say, seek it… relentless pursuit.
Question: Sir, my concern is if you seek perfect knowledge (you would) build a different system
than if you accept uncertainty and build your system with that as part of your going in
assumption.
VAdm Tuttle: No, I don‘t agree with that at all. First of all, you make a decision even if your
(only) 30% solution depends on the situation. You can‘t escape the fact that everything you
know is based upon experience and everything. Every decision you have to make is based on
uncertainty. One needs to seek the most perfect knowledge… that doesn‘t mean that you have to
achieve it… but you seek it. And the way you do this is not by using linear systems anymore.
Our enemies must not be ourselves. We should not… and we should debate and discuss and
disagree, but we should not enter into energy sapping activity. That was Herb‘s (VAdm
Browne) trepidation. Based upon our experience, 39 years in my case… based upon our
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experience because that‘s our heritage… what we were raised with… that was where we were
birthed. What I‘m trying to communicate here today is that this country (needs to be willing to
change). Look at all the fallen empires (that fell because) they refused to change. We have the
option. We have the intellect… and I just think… I‘m so bullish on this country that we‘re going
to change… even you… (laughter)… and we owe you a great debt of gratitude colonel, even if
you‘re wrong (laughter).
Question: Sir, we've been focussing on collaborative decision support systems. I'd like to get
your views on collaborative decision making at the highest level of the government.
VAdm Tuttle: Well I‘ll tell you one thing, I am an apostle, an evangelist and a cheerleader for
collaborative planning. And I learned this the hard way in a survival mode in the private sector.
I didn‘t even appreciate it when I was on active duty. The power of collaborative planning is
awesome. And it got so in this one company I was in, I could turn out a proposal with about six
people in the room and this young lady… she could hear all these things and really say what we
old devils meant... and the power of that was stunning to me. Now whether we practice it
enough I don‘t know. But collaborative planning requires one thing, DNA. Trust is the DNA of
any relationship. So whoever you have doing the collaborative planning must trust each other…
not agree… but they must accept it to their matrix and the calculus of the debate. The power of
collaborative planning is more than exponential. As I said (before) I used to put in a proposal
practically overnight because we‘d bring in five or six people that were educated from different
backgrounds… and we would actually put it on (a screen) and scroll it back and forth and take
out the variance and come to closure on it… enough of that. Does that answer your question?
(Let me add) another thing… technology enables. And I know that this is a variance for the
uniformed people. I wanted my boss to know what in the hell I was doing, but I didn‘t want to
take the time to tell him all the time. I didn‘t want him running my business. A lot of this came
from the missile crisis when President Kennedy was telling the USS Kennedy to do the intercept
and the blockade. It also goes back to Vietnam of which I am a product… where Lyndon
Johnson was picking out the targets for us to bomb. I am also conditioned by the December
strike into Lebanon where the people didn‘t even know what time of day it was… (and yet) they
made a decision so that the Chairman (Joint Chiefs of Staff) could get the word when he landed
at Tampa. I don‘t want any of that. I want them to know.
Question: General, could you comment on how the enemy drives the need for transformation.
VAdm Tuttle: Well, striking example for this is terrorism. In 1999, I was at variance with the
Defense Science Board which is an awesome, highly intelligent group. How to write that
terrorism was the least understood, least studied, (and) most likely to occur (kind of)
asymmetrical warfare? Asymmetrical economics… that maggot has cost us far more than 3000
souls. He‘s cost us a staggering amount and will continue (to do so). However, if you‘ve got
two parking tickets, we‘re going to get you. Because the American people are the greatest
problem solving people in the world. The only problem is we keep solving the damn thing after
the solution‘s been found. We just keep (0n)… you know… complaining about the same thing.
That‘s why we need… Jack Sheehan had the best description of this... what the world witnessed
from the television with a Coors Light. Whenever they went into Al Queda‘s headquarters at
night… incidentally we‘ve only rented the night, we don‘t own it. But we went in (over an)
unfathomable distance, at night, took out all their INTEL and didn‘t get a scratch. America‘s
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expectations (in respect to) casualties are unrealistically low. And sadly, wherever it will occur
and whenever it is, that we‘re going to lose people it will shock us again.
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Transformation: A State of Mind?
Col. Anthony Wood (USMC Ret.)
Vice President, CDM Technologies, Inc.
San Luis Obispo, California

We live in a period of rapid change. Because we are who we are – Americans surrounded by
technology and accustomed to identifying change primarily in terms of its advances – we often
view change as either a result of technology or something that is susceptible to examination
wholly through technology. That is a mistake. While there can be no denying that technological
change is relentless, powerful cultural, social, and economic forces are reshaping the post Cold
War world. In comparison with the deadly but predictable symmetry produced by four decades
of Cold War, the contemporary global canvas is being seamed together as a “crazy quilt” of
regional and cultural clashes in values which are championed by both national and transnational
movements. While traditional national militaries such as those in North Korea, Iraq, and Iran
remain very visible players, they are the last of a class of international villains whose passing we
may regret. Increasingly their place is being usurped by paramilitary, terrorist, and criminal
elements who are drafting their own scripts and redefining the use of force and violence. These
will be defeated eventually if for no other reason than their ethos of random violence has no
lasting basis in the general population. However, defeat could be a long time coming.
A first step in preparing ourselves for this new reality is to recognize certain truths:
•

•

•
•

•

•
•

•

The notion of a traditional gross battlefield involving the clash of large conventional
forces a la the Cold War is more likely a fondly remembered dream than a basis for
military design.
There are few valid precedents to the emerging conflicts. Further, our potential
opponents have little regard for tradition and process, or the predictability which it may
foster.
We are a product of our own success with coalitions and alliances. As such, we may be
the only player on the field who observes traditional “rules” in the coming conflicts.
When we hear the labels “terrorist” and “criminal” we often picture some sort of thug, a
sub-species. We need to unlearn this cultural block; our new enemy is clever, inventive,
and committed, and often willing to die for his or her cause.
We are still searching for the technological “silver bullet”. We must critically examine
the new situation and our requirements. And we should carefully recognize the
capabilities and limits of technology on this new “battlefield”.
The human brain is also a powerful processor. We must develop a new class of
intelligence specialists whose bright nimble minds will be worthy successors to Spock.
Scale and a fascination with process can be fatal to rapid nimble action. Perhaps we need
to adopt a nineteenth century British notion and concentrate more on determining the
smallest effective package to achieve our objectives.
There are powerful forces and influences intertwined in the DoD acquisition world and
in its most obvious process, the POM. There are powerful forces and influences at work
in the international arena whose objective is our destruction. Both are evolving according
to wildly different priorities and at opposite velocities. The resulting reality is that
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transformation will have to be continuous and uneven. Its progress will be shaped by
several tensions; the conflict between advocates of change and entrenched internal
institutional and commercial interests; the emergence of difficult new threats and public
demand for quick and effective counters; and the tensions stressing our own institutional
military mold.
Our Relationship With Technology
I‘m in a somewhat uncomfortable position this morning as a man who is involved in the
development of information technology, or at least the design of it. With that I‘m going to talk
about us and our relationship to technology as it affects our response to change. As I speak, I‘d
like you to think about four things. The first is generations. In 1969, like a lot of people, I went
to Southeast Asia the first time as a Second Lieutenant to serve in I Corps. In 1974 I went back
as a Captain in charge of a joint special operations unit with a different group of people.
Actually a different generation. In 1987, around the straits of Malacca and in the Philippines, I
participated in a series of small unheralded and little discussed operations with another
generation using a new generation of technology. Then in 1997, as Commander of the Marine
Corps Warfighting Lab, I served with a young MAGTF commander (Colonel Tom O‘Leary) as
he deployed and employed an experimental force composed of Marines from this generation. He
was faced with a 3,700 square mile battle field, new prototype technology, an experimental
training program, a set of clunky collaborative decision support tools. In the end that 800 man
force, more than held its own against a fine conventional regiment. The two forces fought on an
instrumented battlefield for 10 days and nights, commander against commander, force on force
supported by Vice Admiral Herb Browne, Commander Third Fleet. This first major event of the
Sea Dragon program led to continuing change in the Marine Corps. I served with multiple
different generations between 1968 and 1997.
The second thing I’d like to ask you to consider as I make my remarks are the terms art and
science. War is a conflict, an uneasy combination of art and science. It’s continuously uneasy.
I’m going to spend a lot of time today talking about the imbalance, perhaps the extreme
imbalance that currently exists between the two components in the US Armed Forces and in the
defense establishment overall.
The third consideration I’d like you to keep in mind is the word collaboration. Admiral Tuttle’s
remarks captured it far more eloquently than I can, but in fact, it is only through collaboration
between intelligent well-trained men and women and new technology that we will achieve
transformational change. If collaboration isn’t built into the employment concepts and the
design for new systems we’ve missed the boat. There is good reason to think about it from the
very beginning. Consider that intuition, conceptualization, and empathy are uniquely human
skills while endless memory and detail tracking are skills that belong uniquely to the computer.
Design an architecture that joins the strengths of both and the results will be phenomenal.
Finally, the last thing I’d ask you to think about is roles. Generations and where we are today
was the first. The second was the uneasy relationship between art and science in war. The third
was the collaborative relationship required in designing and employing new systems and new
concepts, and the last is roles. In our military we have conservers, men and women who
conserve the military institution. They run the (military), they run the service headquarters, they
12

run the service education establishments. They conserve and foster the institution. We have the
operators, the unified combatant commanders and their components, the key forces all over the
world, whose single mission is to be ready now. We sometimes forget that when we ask them to
host experiments using the operating forces as stages. Remember what their mission is -- ready
now. Not in five years.
In addition to conservers and operators we have the innovators, a small group in the defense
establishment. Here, the war fighting laboratories are the principal representatives but there are
important pockets of innovators in the operating forces.
As I stated at the start, I am a little uncomfortable with what I’m about to say. Uncomfortable
because I am a product of the proud and successful establishment that I believe must change. At
any rate, as I proceed I’d ask you especially to keep roles in mind, because these are a key
element of the institutions invloved in transformation. We have to put some rigor in the
discussion of transformation. There is nothing worse than hearing a young Captain or a young
Major or a Lieutenant Commander say we’ve got to rip the POM apart and fix it, then get
Capitol Hill out of acquisition, and let industry suggest the solution . Let’s be realistic. None of
that is the solution. A long term change in direction has to begin with rigor in the examination of
the problem. Then, I think, transformation can in fact be possible.
A New Battlefield
Things have changed. Here are only a few of the comparisons. The battlefield that we inherited
from the Cold War (and the battlefield that much of our targeting and many of our systems are
still designed for) was a huge battlefield. It was characterized by mass in every respect. Our
focus was strategic. In contrast, now it is operational and tactical. In the Cold War we had a
single large primary enemy. Now we have enemies all over the world, in every shape, size and
color.
Today, in place of gross fires, we’re very interested in accuracy and effects, precision. How
about precision intelligence and cultural knowledge as equals with force ratios and order of
battle? Previously we had few rules. In fact the only rule was to stop them on the North German
border and survive. Today we live on a battlefield governed by rules of engagement (ROE).
Previously we had a traditional alliance, NATO, around which all else revolved. Today we have
the alliance du jour, the alliance of the moment. Finally, our previous employment focus was on
corps and fleet, on the strategic and the high operational level of war.
Arguably, one factor in the collapse of the former USSR was realization of the huge (and
growing) technological lead possessed by the west. However, while it served us well then, much
of its legacy does not. The negative part of that legacy is expressed in our attitude toward
technology and change. Change is a result of technology. Change can be detected primarily
through technology. New technology will solve the problem and we will automatically win. In
other words, the guy with the superior technology will automatically win. These are views that
most of us in this room at one time or another have held or have at least unconsciously adopted.
They don’t serve us well any longer. They ignore many of the parts of the problem that have to
do with the art of war, which is uniquely human.
Some Conclusions:
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My first conclusion is that we have a huge imbalance between the science of war as represented
by the current technological focus and the art of war represented by the time, effort, and
resources we expend on developing rigorous analysis and decision skills. It’s time for the art of
war to be ascendant. It’s time to concentrate on re-balancing technology with rigorous thinking.
We can only do this by improving education, and the training. Our goal has to be a “sea change”
in the ability of battle leaders at all levels to analyze and think through the problem, and to
intelligently exploit technology to help us solve it. At the moment there is an over-dependence
on technology at the expense of clear thinking. War is about two persons who disagree violently
and whose wills are opposed. So the target… the immediate targets may be on some battlefield,
but in fact, what we’re after is to change the other guy’s head gasket. Technology must be
assigned a subservient role… subservient role to thinking and planning is where I think we’re
going to have to go. Now think for just a minute… we spent probably hundreds of billions of
dollars trying to figure out how to bomb a HUMVEE in the middle of a desert at noon, but we
only hit it once out of five times. Imagine trying to identify the attitudes of a group of militant
terrorists in an urban environment relative to the threat that they pose. I mean on one side we’ve
got this complex equation that we haven’t been successful in solving through technology (i.e., of
targeting the 1990s battlefield). And we’re still doing a lot of that. And on the other, we’ve got
this contemporary battlefield that has to do with (i.e., the terrorists’) motivations, what their
culture is, and where they’re going, funding sources, state sponsors, and more. Subtlety,
invisibility, discretion, and cultural knowledge are some of the characteristics of the battlefield
that we’re facing. “What is the problem” is always the first question. Let’s ask it, and let’s
answer it.
That leads me to my second conclusion. Perceptions are paramount. Above all else warfare is a
contest of wills. Future generations of leaders need to be raised in that frame… a conflict of
wills. How will that conflict of wills manifests itself? Urban terrorism on a horrific scale as we
had on 9/11? Waves of popular unrest such as those shaking Pakistan? The suicide bombings of
the intefada? All are the manifestations of a conflict of wills. I think future captains and majors
will go…must go to war better equipped to spot the conflicts and deal with their manifestations.
My guess is that they will be grounded in the culture and thinking of the people among whom
they will operate. Future mission analysis and campaign planning will have to be heavily
oriented on the discrete, the subtle, and the difficult details of culture and conquest.
We have some unlearning to do Thugs, and other labels get in the way of clear thinking –of
analyzing who the enemy is and what he really needs. We can leave those (labels) to journalists
and politicians. It’s OK to respect your enemy. If you don’t, you’re a fool. It’s not OK to
underestimate him, or to apply a street label to him to keep you from seeing what his capabilities
are. Today in Pakistan, as many of you know, there are a lot of Islamic schools which are often
characterized as terrorist cradles. The schools probably are in many respects. What else are they
though? It might be a good idea to also understand that these religious schools are the only way
many poor families can educate their children. Terrorist cradle? Yes. Popular symbol of a better
life? Also yes. It might be important to understand both aspects before you go in to actually do
an operation. As we do this more discrete and more difficult targeting of minds, as well as
targeting of physical targets, rigorous analysis and sharp decision skills supported by technology
are essential.
So, onto another conclusion. We may regret the passage of some of the post cold war regimes…
strange as that sounds… we may regret it if only because they’re obvious and their actions more
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predictable. We are moving farther and farther into a far less predictable, far more subtle and far
more sophisticated set of battlefields. As we do so we don’t want to forget that the other guy is
clever, inventive and committed… and probably brave as well.
Tradition and precedent. I know I’m going to tread on toes. Tradition and precedent are
invaluable for that group of men that I discussed. You remember I talked about the force
employers, the operating forces… and I talked about the innovators. And I talked about the
conservors, the men and women and institutions that preserve and sustain the services. The
symbols of tradition and precedent are an important part of that. However, I submit that other
there are very few lessons from the Civil War that are of much utility on the current battlefield.
Formal conflict, large masses of men, industrial warfare, sure Lee’s thinking was great (and his
understanding that it was a conflict of wills), but that’s about as far as you’re going to get for
parallel. Mobility? Maybe. I’m a student of history and I think that it has lessons. However, the
point is that the art hung on the hallway walls in our war colleges is an important indicator of our
thinking.
We’re cradled in tradition and precedence and there are few close precedents to the emerging
conflicts. Now I said, Tony, ask yourself that question. I said, OK let’s look at the small wars of
the 1930s. The Marine Corps was in Nicaragua and Central America for 13 years. Governed two
countries during that period. A lot of people don’t realize that. Very few people also know that
a Marine Brigadier General led the bonus marchers against Douglas MacArthur in the streets of
Washington under President Hoover. So maybe there are some precedents. Let’s say that the
small wars were a precedent. Really? How many people even knew that the small wars were
going on in the United Stares? Hardly anybody. There wasn’t any information revolution in the
twenties and thirties. The battlefield wasn’t public. It wasn’t global. Did the people in the
country even know the war was going on? Only where it was actually getting hot. So what’s the
precedent out of the small wars for the current situation? Not much… not with global terrorism
and not with criminal connections. Not much when you’re not sure how the funding is flowing
between people who are growing coca, marketing cocaine, buying guns and unseating
governments. In short, not a lot of precedent. So we need to be careful about tradition and
precedent. We need to establish the educational foundations for a generation of men and women
who will rigorously examine this new global canvas and then exploit technology to assist in
dealing with a far more sophisticated and complex battlefield.
The consequences of dominance. Our legions are everywhere and they’re unopposable. These
are the finest men and women I’ve seen since 1968 in combat and otherwise. ’68, ’75, ’87…
years in which I served with young Americans… and again in Hunter Warrior with Colonel
O’Leary, probably as close as you get short of the real thing. And yet, getting here we’ve
created a worldwide network of very large staffs… frequently with an inward focus. How many
of you have seen a very large command staff or another headquarters that is almost wholly
focused on itself and its concerns? All of us. It happens. It’s human. Huge staffs. And part of
it, of course, is simply maintaining the appearance of power, which is important. But it can get in
the way of our focus… and it can lead to the supremacy of process and planning over substance.
Admiral Tuttle mentioned it several times this moring. We could process ourselves right into the
ground and plan ourselves right through it. That doesn’t mean we can execute. What is really
becoming important in terms of the information technology that supports the operating forces, is
subtlety, agility and discrete focused support. This frequently can get submerged in the
consequences of dominance… large headquarters and huge staffs.
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As the Empire retreated, the last thing the British pulled out were general officers and bands. It’s
true. That’s how they retreated… that’s how they rolled up the empire. They understood the
use, the economical power of symbols. We may need to take that lesson in another respect, I
think. Maybe what we should be concentrating on is using information technology to support
employing the smallest force that can do the job at acceptable risk. That could lead to a whole
new set of tactics and concepts in warfare including an emphasis on the importance of
conceptual thinking rather than instant dependence upon technology and “templates”. It is
rigorous conceptual thinking and decision skills supported and fostered by renewed training,
education that will keep our legions in the dominant position they occupy today. But what about
technology you ask? Does anybody here seriously think that this technological juggernaut we’ve
got going is even going to slow down? It’s not. On the other hand, because the technology part
is so much more dominant, involves so much more money, and (generates) so much more visible
interest, it’s going to take some real effort to move the art part of the art and science relationship
forward.
In 1990 when I was serving at CINCPAC, I went in to see Admiral Larson and I said: —Admiral,
the Marine Corps owns exercises, the Navy owns exercises, the Air Force owns exercises, and
the Army owns exercises… and you don‘t own any. The CINCPAC staff doesn‘t write the
objectives and define the purpose of a single exercise in the Pacific.“ Well, we went through that
for a couple of days and he said, —You‘re right.“ I said, —Why don‘t we build an exercise to test
a joint task force, Admiral, and an exercise that tests power projection at a joint level?“ And he
did. The point is that the design of experiments and control of their execution must be closely
held. Otherwise we all to slip back to our familiar zones. The design is critical. But control…
why is control so important? Because as Colonel O‘Leary and his guys found out, and as we
Marines found out in Hunter Warrior during 10 days and nights of free flow play, you have to be
able to win and lose without interference… otherwise you don‘t find out what really works.
So if we‘re going to get past demonstration, we‘re going to need some top-down leadership.
And then I think we‘re going to have to create some kind of an upward track that allows new
thinking to be rewarded… and we‘re going to have to connect it to promotions and resources
because those are the sources of power in the establishment. Now I know this probably doesn‘t
sit all that well, wouldn‘t it be terrific if annually OSD sponsored a —present and defend“ blue
ribbon forum where new military concepts… that did not, by the way, go through the chain of
command or the service educational hierarchy but went straight to OSD for review… would be
presented and defended in front of a jury? I‘ve done this a couple of times with the British in
NATO forums… ruthless and rigorous forums in which to wring out a concept. Its really a great
way to find out if there‘s really something there. And the two or three men or women who come
out on top could be submitted by the Secretary of Defense for accelerated promotion. Why not?
We promote program managers every day… even those with failed programs. How about
promoting good thinking? And then, tie it to resources. If something is good enough, then OSD
should have the capability to commit some resources to it. Kind of what Admiral Cebrowski is
doing now for transformation… to make it happen. The art part of the art and science of war is
going to have to receive the same kind of resourcing and process support that the science part is
receiving. I am afraid that right now the science piece has sucked most of the oxygen out the
room.
As we move through this business of transformation, we’ve got to remember who we’re talking
to. We forget this all the time. If you’re in the operating forces, how long is your horizon? A
year? Eighteen months, maximum. And you’re working 18-hour days and most weekends
16

already. They are busy out there. So if I walk in and propose a five-year experiment… an
experiment that’s going to bring new capabilities maybe in five years to an operating force
commander, what am I doing? I’m violating his planning and visualization horizon. He is not
going to be there when it matures, and secondly that’s not his primary responsibility. So what
am I saying? Am I suggesting that we shouldn’t be conducting experiments in the operating
forces? No I’m not saying that. But I am saying that we absolutely have to recognize that
experimentation is not the primary mission of the operating forces. Their mission is readiness
right now. And they’ve got a huge number of tasks for which they must train already. We need
to keep that in mind when we talk about planning and executing experiments. Frequently the
pressures in the operating forces reduce experiments to demonstrations. But I submit to you that
demonstrations are often a waste of energy. At any rate, as we design these notions of how to
improve ourselves for the emerging battlefield we need to carefully consider who we’re talking
to and what their concerns and time horizons really are.
To summarize, we face an overbalance toward warfare as a science; we face an over-reliance on
technology at the expense of clear thinking and analyic skills; and, we face an over-emphasis on
tradition, evolution and precedence at the expense of a better understanding of the contemporary
world situation. Interesting isn’t it? What a strange trio. An over-reliance on science and
technology and an over-emphasis on tradition and precedent? How do you put those bed fellows
together? Well, that’s pretty much where we are. Meanwhile, things are evolving at wildly
different rates of evolution and for wildly different reasons. So, what are we faced with? Well
first of all, we’re just going to have to recognize that an awful lot of the heritage we’ve got
comes from that cold war battlefield presented in the very first slide. We’re all infected with
Cold War thinkng because that’s where we were raised, and it may not be very suitable for what
we’re getting into. Rather than continue to build cold war concepts and systems just because we
know how to do it we should be building a whole new class of officers and NCOs, cultural
specialists, and discrete subtle collaborative decision support that complements rigorously
trained minds. In short order we’ll be using the tools we’re going to give them to advise
commanders in a manner that looks closely resembles Spock on the bridge of the Enterprise.
Maybe that’s the vision we ought to have. And let’s not forget industry. Industry is not an
automatic ally of transformation. There’s more profit in selling the current than there is in
stepping out and gambling on the future. So we need to think about this because if we don’t,
we’re going to let those generations down that are out there in the operating forces “doing it”.
And we’re going to let ourselves down and our country as well.
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The Littoral Combat Future Naval Capability (FNC)
Program
Col. Thomas O'Leary (USMC Ret)
Program Manager
Office of Naval Research
The mission of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) is to provide the science and technological
base that expands the technological superiority of the Navy and Marine Corps forces at a reduced
cost (Slide 1). And it does do that. But the key to the whole thing is getting that technology into
the hands of Sailors and Marines.
Now as shown in Slide 2, this is what we traditionally look at within the Navy and Marine
Corps… you can also apply this to the Army, the Air Force, the Coast Guard, and any service.
You have the current force, the legacy force as it is sometimes called. You have the acquisition
community that‘s working on the next force, and then you have science and technology that‘s
working on the force after next. And what you hear a lot about when you talk of
transformation… and this is what I‘ve come to understand to be the myth of transformation after
having been involved in transformation since 1995, is how do we get the legacy force to the
objective force to the transformed force? And the thing that you have to realize is that you will
never reach a transformed force, because the transformed force eventually becomes the legacy
force. So, it‘s a continuous process that‘s continually transforming the operational force, be it the
acquisition community or the science and technology community. You never reach this mythical
objective of the transformed force.
What is Future Naval Capabilities or FNC (Slide 3). FNCs are intended to be a process to align
and partner requirements, acquisitions, science and technology, and the S&T (Science and
Technology) investment to deliver the top priorities for those that need to be transitioned. In
other words, to take the very best ideas in technology and quickly get them into the hands of
Sailors and Marines and operators. Now, quickly is a nice word, but what does quickly mean?
The first time I heard about collaborative agents was in 1995. I can tell that I just put out a BAA
and received 65 proposals in which people were proposing collaborative agents as if they were a
new idea. So what is quickly? Certainly not months… but should they be?
Why did ONR go to Future Naval Capabilities programs? Well, as you can read in Slide 4,
science and technology and good ideas have traditionally been… and you can include Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), a field of dreams. The concept was, if you build
it, they will come. If you do something really good, it will be so compelling it will force a
change within the bureaucracy within the system. And this has happened at times. A couple of
notable examples are GPS (Global Positioning System) and JDAB. Those were so revolutionary
they caused services to change their TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures), but those are
the exceptions. Unfortunately, what usually happens are two things. One, there are a lot of good
ideas, but they‘re below the noise level. You have people working on something in one
university, on something else at another university, and something else again in industry, and
there‘s no way to bring this desperate initiatives together and form a critical mass. You get a
spike (FNC) that Dr. Pohl was talking about. How do you get them into a spike? So, the first
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problem is to be able to take all these good ideas and connect them… because we‘re really the
collaborative agents.
That‘s really good, but that‘s only a piece of it. Where do you get the data for the collaborative
agents? Somebody else is working on that. And then, how do you establish the part to link the
data sources for the collaborative agents and the decisions that come out of the collaborative
agents to the warfighter that needs them? So, there are many good ideas and they all have to be
pulled together in a FNC spike. So that was the first problem that FNCs were set up to solve.
The second thing is this valley of death… and this is one of the problems that you run into with a
lot of advanced technology demonstrations. You go out, and you take emerging, maturing
technologies and bring them together with an operational concept. Then you demonstrate the
concept and you get a positive reaction out of the leadership and they say, —we want that“. And
everybody knows that the required funding works on a two-year cycle. So you bring it in now,
and they‘re talking about FY05 and FY06. So they‘re saying this is great, let‘s get it into the
cycle. Well, by the time that money shows up they say, you know, that really is three-year-old
technology, we might as well start over again. So, you do another two years of science and
technology. What ends up happening is that the two years that you invested up front with
industry, with academia, and with the services‘ S&T efforts, is lost. Then you go out again and
wait another two years to get money, and so on. Finally, everybody turns around and says, how
come the acquisitions community can‘t get their act together and give us something.
The FNC program is designed to move us away from this valley of death by linking
requirements, technologists, acquisition, and resources together. The concept is that when we
take an idea and build it into a spike, it has a clear transition intention… to fast track it into a
program of record or to help develop a program of record.
Now, what are the characteristics of FNC spikes (Slide 5)? In other words, how do you know
what to work on? Well, you go with the main priorities. However, there are a lot of priorities,
and I‘m going to talk to you a little bit later about how we in the Littoral Combat FNC went
about identifying our priorities. that. From a general point of view: it has to have significant
technology options; a good budget which means enough money to do what needs to be done;
and, definitive milestones. There have to concrete deliverables that are well defined in the
demonstration. Experiments will and should take place, but when the day is done you have to
demonstrate that capability to be able to get it into a program of record. Because it is now
expected to go to the forces, such as the fleet and the fleet Marine Corps. It has to culminate in a
firm transition… that‘s what it is all about. The reason why we exist is to take this technology
and put it in the hands of the warfighter.
Now, how do you select the right technology (Slide 6)? Essentially, you are closing a gap by
signing up to deliver a product and demonstrate it within the timeframe of a five-year window. I
am currently working in a FY03 to FY07 window… that‘s what I‘m focused on. Within ONR
you also have the discovery and innovation program that is working beyond that window, and I
take things from that program into the FNC. I can also take things out of academia and industry
into the program, and I can also go out to a program manager, or to an acquisition program
manager if he or she is having a problem and help to fix that problem. But there are also a
couple of other key issues. First, you have to have a commitment to transition… we don‘t spend
money unless we know where it‘s going. Second, it has to be affordable… there are a lot of
great and elegant solutions out there, but the Navy and the Marine Corps may not be able to
afford the solution and would never be able to field it.
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There are 12 FNCs (Slide 7) that have been developed. And again, these aren‘t forever. These
are designed to go and to look at some specific problems, deliver the required capabilities to the
acquisition community, and get them into the fleet. Now, how serious is ONR about this
program? Pretty serious. They put over a third of their 1.6 billion dollar budget into the FNC
programs. That is a major shift in any organization to take a third of all of its resources,
including people, and put them into this effort.
The FNC that I am currently working on is the Littoral Combat FNC… and in some ways I‘m
kind of an experiment. Initially, the FNCs were set up to focus on naval operations or the naval
portion of the joint campaign. However, there‘s a lot more to littoral combat. So, they made the
decision to do some rearranging and add two new FNCs. One is the Electric Ship and Combat
Vehicle program and the other one is the Littoral Combat and Power Projection program. Now
as I said, they did a little bit of an experiment here, because rather than asking one of their highly
accomplished and qualified science and technology program managers to take over this FNC,
they decided to bring in someone who had an operations background. Of course they took care to
reduce the risk, by putting a whole team of accomplished S&T people on the program with me.
However, my background is operations and not science and technology, and the reason I was
assigned to manage this FNC was to make sure that the science and technology would be concept
based… that it would start out with a solid base of expeditionary maneuver warfare.
At the beginning we were considered to be just another vertical hatch among the other 11 FNCs
(Slide 9). However, as we started looking at our role and game plan in more detail, we began to
ask ourselves: Don‘t we want to have knowledge superiority insurance? Aren‘t we concerned
about the mine threats? Don‘t we need precision strike capabilities? Doesn‘t littoral combat
really cut across many areas? And then there was this other point of view that the Littoral
Combat FNC is intended to be that Marine Corps FNC. When we looked at this I said, you
know, it‘s not really a Marine FNC at all, it‘s the Naval FNC that cuts across all of these areas.
It‘s where the future fight is and it‘s a Naval concern. So we‘re a little bit different in that we cut
across all of the FNCs. This requires us to work hand in hand with the other FNCs, while we try
to focus on some specific gaps… particularly is they relate to the Ship To Objective Maneuver
(STOM) piece of naval expeditionary maneuver warfare (Slide 10).
Now, we had to find a starting point to be able to do this because this is emerging and we needed
to be able to provide a common vision to our partners in industry and also to academia… so that
they would understand what we were talking about. This meant working hand in hand with
doctrine, concepts, and requirements that Marine Corps Combat Development Command
(MCCDC) and the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) have a primary
responsibility for. You see in the slide (Slide 10) what we‘re trying to do in our near term
objective for STOM within the context of naval expeditionary maneuver warfare. Eventually we
want to go to completely free operations in a disbursed and non-linear battlefield… but we‘re not
yet ready. Collaborative agents are one of the tools that are going to allow us to do that in the
future, where you can do dynamic planning and adaptive execution continuously. They will get
us there in the long term. In the interim we‘re focusing on what is doable in the near term: the
force that will be delivered in 20 tanks; the ability to identify where the threats are; the
information that is required to decide what needs to be done and convey that to the appropriate
executor… sailor and marine, so that they can maneuver around the threat and get to the
objective. And that‘s a hard thing when you think about it.
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You might say, well is this future amphibious operations? Well, kind of but not really. It does
derive from past amphibious operations when you think about it. In World War II or in the 1930s
when it was developed, amphibious operations was about obtaining ensured access in order to be
able to then take possession of the site of operations. Once you had your ”iron mountain‘ and
your beach head, then you could support sustained operation. When you look at naval
expeditionary maneuver warfare, and particularly the idea of seabasing, it‘s the future of assured
access in the global strategic environment of the future. It is a legacy of amphibious operations,
but it‘s different because in amphibious operations you selected the amphibious objective, the
landing force objectives, and the amphibious objective area. You did all of this and it was very
linear, and then you put your head down and you went. There was very little dynamic planning.
It‘s continually going onward… as you plan you gain more situational awareness… as you
execute you gain more information and the plan can be updated. As the plan is updated,
commanders are able to convey better decisions to those who are executing. The executors then
also have to be able to adapt, and eventually get to what Admiral Cebrowski calls selfsynchronization… which would be something well beyond the 2010 force. But it‘s with the idea
that you will be able to do dynamic planning and adaptive execution that collaborative agents
really come into play.
Our goal is to support the development of naval expeditionary maneuver warfare and enhance
the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps team as part of a joint force, to ensure assured access
and sustained operations in the littoral. In this regard we have identified four enabling
capabilities in which to invest S&T resources. The first is ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance) for the amphibious force, next is fires to the MAGTAF, then maneuver and
littorals, and finally task force command and control.
Perhaps we were fortunate in that we had to start essentially with a blank sheet of paper. Most of
our fellow FNCs found that a tremendous amount of work had already been being done in their
area by ONR. Now you can sit there and say, boy, they was really lucky, or you could also say
they didn‘t have the advantage of starting with a blank sheet of paper. One of the problems with
having to start with a blank sheet of paper, is that you get judged to some degree on how fast
you‘re able to expend money… and not necessarily on what you‘re doing with the money. So,
part of the problem is that you have to get a program going. You have to start executing almost
immediately and it‘s kind of like the chicken and the egg… well, I have to know what I want to
do before I can execute… but they want me to execute before they‘ll give me the money to
know what I want to do, and so on. So we came up with a dual track program. We started
executing with the initial money that came out of the program budget decision by going to the
acquisitions community, going to the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and the core
programs within ONR, to find on-going programs that were getting ready to mature and that we
might be able to help push across the goal line. At the same time, we started our longer term
effort which began with front-end analysis, war gaming, and so on, to develop our goal and our
enabling capabilities, to identify our spike and help to shape our broad agency announcement
process that went out to industry, and to bring back what came from industry, academia and the
labs through the broad agency announcement process.
Now, just to go over a couple of things in regard to our four enabling capabilities:
The first one is ISR for the amphibious force (Slide 15) and our guidance was, look at the
element level in the MAGTF because the joint commander is getting a lot of
information… we need to get something down to the tier one, tier two… UAVs for
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example. We thought about this and said, OK that sounds pretty good… but really, why
are we doing this? Because it‘s important to get data and be able to feed that data to the
commanders and their staff so they can make decisions… commanders at all levels. So
ISR really is about getting the best and most timely and most accurate information that
you can. OK, well that has to do with command and control.
Well, the next one is expeditionary fires support (Slide 16). There were two areas that we
focused on: the gap between the lightweight 155 and the 81; and, network fires, which
came directly out of our war game.
The third one is MAGTF maneuvers in the littorals (Slide 17). We have a lot of new
things coming into the Marine Corps, such as the AAAV, the V22, and all of these things
coming in with a new family of amphibious ships. But again, what drives maneuver? Is it
the ability to know where the threat is, so as to be able to maneuver around it? How do
you get that information, how do you convey that as information to the decision makers,
how do you present it to the decision makers so the decision makers can make timely
decisions, and then how does the decision maker get that down to the executor… and
how do you coordinate the execution by the executors so that it is appropriately
deconflicted. This is something that aviation has done a good job with, and we use that as
a model. As we started to study this in more detail we came back with the conclusion that
its all about commanding and controlling maneuver, and that brought us back to
command and control again… even though it is maneuver-specific.
And then for the last enabling capability we finally got into command and control (Slide
18). The ability to provide command and control at the MAGTF level… to be able to do
the job that the MAGTF commander needs to do. However, it really all gets back to being
able to provide timely and accurate information to better enable decisions, to better
transmit those decisions, and to better coordinate the action by the executor that results
from those decisions. Needless to say I can‘t go into the reasons, but out of those 65 BAA
proposal that we received, how many of them do you think had a piece in them on
collaborative agent technologies? And it was at that time that I was glad that I sat
through those lectures on collaborative agents out at Cal Poly so I would have an idea of
what was going on… so thank you Dr. Pohl for tutoring me in that.
But the point is, if we are going to get to where we‘re going, collaborative agents and decision
making, is at the heart of it. If it‘s a fire problem… when you peel it back it gets to the decision
making… and collaborative agents are going to help enable that maneuver… the same thing and
certainly command and control.
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The Joint Task Force Wide Area Relay Network
(JTF WARNET)
Raymond Cole, Jr.
JTF Warnet Technical Manager
Office of Naval Research
Good afternoon. This started in 1997 and it focused on several areas and I‘ll cover those in a
little more detail as I talk about JTF Warnet. However, it really culminated in an exercise in June
2001, which was a Joint Service exercise. It consisted of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the
Army, and that‘s kind of important because it really wasn‘t what this ACTD started out to do. It
was really a Navy, Marine Corps ACTD (i.e., the Extending the Littoral Battlespace (ELB)
ACTD (Slide 2)). So the part we‘re in right now is the two-year residual effort of an ACTD.
This effort is really focused on transition, but what happened is there were some things that
Admiral Blair and other Four Stars said about the ELB ACTD, in particular they said: —We have
got to have this now.“… and I will show you what it is that they saw. They said that they really
couldn‘t wait for the acquisition committees. They really needed to have it sooner.
So, in the next chart (Slide 3), you‘ll get an idea of what Admiral Blair and others saw. For the
first time, he (Admiral Blair) went around to these different services and on their tactical display
he saw the other services, not as an aggregated symbol like you would if you were up at the
higher level commands, but at the tactical level, the maneuver level. On the next chart (Slide 3)
we can see it more clearly. You could see the individual elements and you could see their
positions. He saw that he could really do fires for maneuvers. So, if the forces could see each
other, if they could do planning together and share overlays, then they could really fight together
more effectively and they would not kill each other.
So, this was what they saw in the ELB ACTD that they wanted to have sooner, and Admiral
Blair said that he wanted to have it in PAYCOM and he wanted to have it in WESTPAC, and so
on. As we look at the capability, this is really what we‘re trying to do (Slide 5). This is a figure
that we‘ve drawn with each of the services, and inside these ellipses we‘ve indicated their
command and control applications at those various levels. What JTF Warnet is going to do to
enable Admiral Blair‘s vision, is to connect the LANs (Local Area Networks) at those tactical
levels of the services. Also, it‘s going to attach to their databases, subscribe to their data, and
publish data from the other services, to enable Joint war fighting… and you realize, we don‘t do
that now. Currently, the services tend to take turns. There are some exceptions to that, like how
the Army and the Air Force fight together, but also to provide (Slide 6) horizontal connectivity
between the services to tie them together at the tactical level.
Now normally when you do a JTF exercise, in fact always when you do it, it will be associated
with one of the other services. Now when you do this, nobody shows up with extra stuff. You
really do it out of your hide. So, to do the JTF the service that‘s allocated the function just uses
its normal resources… the organic assets that they go to war. So, what JTF Warnet is bringing
to this joint environment and which will be organic to each of the services, is the ability to
translate to and from their databases, because the war fighters have told us that they want to use
command and control displays. We don‘t want you to give us another one (display). We want
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to use what we normally use. JTF Warnet is providing that translation. It‘s also augmenting the
services‘ communication capabilities, both within a service and between the services at the
tactical level. JTF Warnet is doing this with what we call a surrogate for the JTRS Wide-band
Network Waveform Radio. We will show you in a little more details what we‘re using and how
we‘re doing it.
This is really the problem the warfighters want JTF Warnet to address, and if we go back to
Colonel Wood‘s question, how it demonstrates experimentation? As shown in Slide 7, in FY04
we deploy. Our experiment is really about joint war fighting, getting the services to fight
together, not about the technology we‘re using. That was already demonstrated in the ELB
ACTD evaluation data.
So, if we look at the components that I just described (Slide 6), there are two kinds of radios that
we‘re using. One is this surrogate JTRS radio and it happens to be a BAE VRC 99, which is a
non- programmable radio. However, it is a network radio, so it has some of the attributes that we
think are going to be in the JTRS radio. It is the closest radio we can find to that kind of
capability today. The other radio link is a tactical common data link. This is sort of the next
generation standard from CDL. It gives you an IP high-speed point-to-point link. I‘ll show you
a little bit more about the capabilities of that. But the importance here, in this tactical
environment, is that it gives you a very long reach line-of-sight communications capability.
The ELB ACTD concentrated on line-of-sight communications and avoided SATCOM. In JTF
Warnet, we really want to take advantage of the services‘ legacy communications, whether it‘s
EPLRS or SINCGARS, but especially SATCOM because the services rely heavily on SATCOM.
The real key here for JTF Warnet is the translation. Remember, the services told us they don‘t
want another application. They want to use the applications at the tactical level that they know
and use today.
They want us to provide this transparent translation service for them. I will show you how we‘re
doing that. Again, these are some of the systems that JTF Warnet will translate from and to
(Slide 16). However, we will also provide some collaborative tools that will augment what they
currently bring with them. These are really pieces out of a defense collaborative tool set that
we‘ll use to foster that Joint planning and execution capability between the services.
System management: Part of our requirements from the warfighters is to be able to
easily operate this system without a lot manpower. So, we are building a system
management tool that‘s based on a commercial product which in turn is tied to the Joint
network management system. We are making this tool as easy to use for the warfighter
as we can, because that‘s going to be key for them to be able to use this system
effectively, to see how it‘s working, to make changes, and to really understand what‘s
happening.
IT Gateway to Link-16: We want to get some of these ground tracks into the cockpit.
We want the pilot to be able to see a few of those blue PLI (Position and Location
Information) tracks around the target. He‘s the guy that can make that last minute
decision whether he is going to pull the trigger or not. Again, we‘re not going to change
anything in the cockpit, we‘re using capabilities that are already there.
And finally, as Colonel Wood said in his presentation, —You can‘t solve all the problems with
technology.“ You‘ve really got to rely on CONOPS (Concepts of Operations) and TTPs
(Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) to use the technology and the training material. How do
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you use this technology to execute an effective Joint war fighting capability? Clearly, that‘s a
big part of what JTF Warnet is all about… the documentation.
Here‘s a timeline (Slide 7), and previously Colonel Blair, and now Admiral Fargo, has concurred
that this capability is going to be deployed in early FY04 in WESTPAC, probably targeting
something like a COBRA-GOLD-04 exercise. Working backwards, we will undertake a predeployment exercise and a series of war games leading up to that, and we will then make the
decision whether or not JTF Warnet is ready to go to these services as an operational prototype.
Again, we‘re not an ACTD anymore because what happened back in April is that the JROC said,
this is no longer an ACTD, this is a joint service initiative. JTF Warnet is not a program and it‘s
not an ACTD. We‘re in a kind of no-man‘s land here. Following the JROC pronouncement we
received funding from all the services (i.e., Army, Navy, and Air Force) and a lot of money from
LSD, because it is a Joint initiative. If you‘ve ever tried to do anything Joint, nobody wants to
do it on their nickel. So, to do this and push it, LSD has put in about 60% of the funding.
Leading up to these pre-deployment exercises, we are building up the JTF Warnet capabilities
from the ELB ACTD. This is a big effort and Dave Durham has joined us to build the C2TD
(Command and Control Translator Database), which is probably our main development in terms
of the additional translation we need to add to make this really into a Joint application. We‘re
also adding some software-agents to really have the capabilities that the warfighters have told us
they need. We are also going to buy some additional radios. We had 25 VRC-99s. We bought
20 more, and will have 45 altogether. These are expensive items and that‘s all we can afford.
Here is the navy picture (Slides 13 and 14). I usually avoid showing these pictures to a Joint
audience, but I did want to show you how ELB and JTF Warnet flow into the Navy FORCEnet
vision. So, we are very much teamed with these other programs, and hopefully what we will be
deploying in FY04 will be an early implementation of FORCEnet, so that the Navy and the other
services will get a chance to work with that kind of capability.
Now let‘s look at some of the hardware components. Essentially, we are a program right now
that‘s fielding equipment. This is the VRC-99 radio (Slide 11). It‘s an avionics radio, running
with 28 volts. If you are running it off 110 volts, you need a power supply. In applications
where we have a long range, maybe to an airborne relay nerve, or if we have a lot of cable loss,
like on a ship, we use a 51-power amplifier to overcome that. The radio itself is a 10-watt
amplifier.
The next rack shows some of our servers, our router, our rooter, and some of the other
components (Slide 10). So, there are basically two small racks like this and the radio rack. It‘s a
relatively small footprint, to bring the JTF Warnet capability to each of the service nodes that
will have them.
For the ELB ACTD they used the A-band version of the VRC-99. We found that there are a lot
of problems in the D spectrum. This certainly makes a strong argument for programmable
radios. It is very difficult to buy a radio on a fixed band and expect to use it anywhere in the
world and get frequency allocations. The FAA is just beating us alive in that A-band… and the
B-band. Guess what, the Administration gave part of that away for third generation cellular?
So, we will need to be able to change them in the field or put in different boards, or we can
make them either A-band or B-band to give us more options in respect to frequencies. Again,
it‘s a network radio. It‘s got an Internet connector on it, so it‘s very easy to use in a network
sense.
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We will probably connect the ships together with SATCOM or if we need to, we can have an
airborne relay node in there, either with the TCDL or a VRC-99 node dividing that relay.
Again, the TCDL gives us that long-reach factor to the shore forces. Likewise, we‘ll give each
of the other services some of the VRC-99 radios. In this way they can use those to augment
deficiencies they have in their current communications within their service. And then there is the
Warnet part, the joint part that ties it all together. But again, remember, nobody shows up with
this part. When the services deploy they take all this with them. Then when they get into the
theater, and now they‘re in a Joint exercise, they push a button on the system management
console that says —Joint“. Some of those assets are allocated to the Joint connectivity, and some
are still used within the service as a service Internet. And again, you have airborne relay nodes
that tie together those various networks.
Next, you have UAVs (Unmanned Airborne Vehicles). This just happens to be something that
BGen Catto (Commanding General, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL)) is
watching very closely, because it was started by MCWL as an experimental warfighting
capability. We will use it in JTF Warnet, certainly in the exercises, to provide that airborne relay
capability (Slide 12). The VRC-99 fits vertically in the nose cone, in this way either carrying the
flare payload or the VRC-99 communications payload. It gives you a vertical take-off UAV that
uses the same fuel as a HMMWV (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle). This is totally
organic to the Marines, so that they can deploy on demand an over-the-horizon communications
capability.
OK, now to the C2TD (Slides 16, 17, 18, and 19), which is really a translator. What happens
when you turn on the C2TD? All of a sudden the services will be seeing not only their normal
command and control display, but now they will also be seeing the other services. In addition to
seeing the blue and red tracks, they will be able to calls for fire together. If their applications
support that, they can do overlays and battlefield geometry. C2TD also uses an object model
database, so it‘s able to do things like blue-on-blue alerts. In other words it gives you an alert if
you have a potential fratricide situation with your own fighters. Shown in Slide 16 are the
various service applications that C2TD going to translate as well as publish data to. The Link-16
gateway could be in any service… I am showing it in the Air Force here. The communications
just enable the flow of data, but the C2TD provides the transparent capability at the tactical level.
As you are all aware, we have very little interoperability right now.
Next, Slide 17 shows how that translator is built? It is built on the MCSIT (Multi C4I Systems
IMMACCS Translator) component of the IMMACCS (Integrated Marine Multi-Agent
Command and Control System) program, funded jointly by MCWL and ONR (Office of Naval
Research). It provides independent channels for input and output and is very flexible, and very
scalable. Slide 18 shows the status of the message translation that we plan to accomplish with
MCSIT. Oh good, the logistics one is listed as well. We are prioritizing these based on what the
warfighters told us, and by golly, they said they want some logistics messages in there, so we
will translate those between the services. How are they going to use logistics between the
services as part of the CONOPS and TTPs? That‘s enough of a problem within each individual
service, let alone how do you do it in a Joint environment? That‘s the experiment… that‘s the
kind of thing that you learn by doing this.
As a management tool (Slide 19), C2TD will allow us to hook up geographical areas as overlays.
You can manage the kind of data you get from these geographical areas in terms of both
subscribing and publishing. In this way they will be able to control both the data from their own
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service that goes out to the other services, as well as the data that comes in from the other
services. JTF Warnet will provide a Defense Collaboration Tool Set (DCTS), but the important
part here is how to use the DCTS a Joint environment (Slide 20).
In this next chart (Slide 21), you‘ll see one way that we do that. We found in the ELB ACTD
that it was best to have the servers distribute it in each of the services, so that over the wireless
tactical network it‘s really server-to-server as opposed to client-to-server communications. We
found that worked a lot better. Again, that‘s how we‘ll label that collaboration between the
services. They‘ll be sitting there at their normal collaborative application, but instead of just
doing it within their service, they‘ll point it to the Joint server and they‘ll be able to do
collaboration between services.
One of the things we learned in the ELB with these TDMA radios is that you want to have only
five to eight of them on a sub-net to get good throughput. So, some those will actually have
multiple VRC-99 and they will serve as gateways between those sub-nets… that way you keep
the performance up. So, that‘s how the VRC-99s will support deficiencies within each service as
well as tie those services together with reasonably high-rate communications capabilities… that
are not currently available.
Security is a big problem (Slides 23 and 24). So, here we are, we‘re going to the services and
they‘ve got routers, and then we are going to have a JTF Warnet router and plug into their router.
So, now we have broken all of their security rules. So, this is really something. We are working
with each of the services, and we are working with PAYCOM, to do this? How do you provide
this kind of secure connectivity here? To get us through this we have asked PAYCOM to be our
DAA. I won‘t go through the details here with you, but what we‘re doing is we‘re looking at all
the services per their requirements. We‘ll come up with a super set of these requirements and
we‘ll test all of those. We‘ll provide the documentation of the services, so that we will have a
system that‘s accredited to use and plug into the warfighting systems.
Documentation is again a major part of this job. We‘ve got a whole hierarchy of documentation.
I won‘t go into it, but some of this is on our web-pages, which you can access from the ONR
web-site (www.onr.navy.mil). Go to tactical, and under military you‘ll see JTF Warnet listed.
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3D Battlespace Visualization With Live Video Overlays
Dr. Peter Burt
Sarnoff Corporation
Princeton, New Jersey
The situation that I want to introduce to you is shown here, where we have some kind of a
conflict in an urban area, let‘s say. And we want to control this situation from a remote site, such
as, perhaps a command and control center on a ship. I would invite you to think about
Mogadishu as the type of operation we are talking about. However, in a future operation we will
probably have a lot more information available to the commander and the war fighter, in the way
of sensors that are in the environment itself (e.g., UAVs (Unmanned Airborne Vehicles), ground
sensors, etc.). We can imagine that in the future it will have a very sensor-rich environment.
So, what we would like to do is to be able to take all those sensors and provide the information to
the commander in a way that is most instructive to him. We want him to have total situation
awareness focusing on things of interest and also we want to take the same information and
provide it to the war fighter in a way that is most directly relevant to his moment by moment
activity. The way we are going to do this is to basically start with a three-dimensional graphicrendered model of the scene. In this case, the scene happens to be the Quantico MOUT (Military
Operations on Urbanized Terrain) site. I thought that might be more relevant, so I switched a
little bit from what you saw before. We will construct a graphically rendered model of that site,
which means that an observer can view that site from many directions. If he wants to, he can
zoom in and zoom out, take a bird‘s eye view, go down to the street, what have you. Then we
will overlay on that model all the sensory information that is coming from the activity and this
will provide the commander with the ability to move seamlessly in space, because it is
graphically rendered. It also allows you to move seamlessly in time, which is to say, we have
got the representation, we have got the information integrated together, we have got a recording,
we have a history of all of that sensory data so that we can move back in time.
If you observe some on-going activity in the area of interest, you can see that there is a group of
people, war fighters, the enemy, and what have you. I can cruise back in time and see where
they came from, who they interacted with, and that sort of thing. So, that‘s going to be the
integrating point. We will take all the sensor information, as well as other types of information
available about the site, such as view specific information, names of buildings, streets, and so on,
and just integrate it all together.
I am going to introduce this concept by way of a demonstration that was held just over a year ago
here at the Quantico MOUT site. It was kind of a joint demonstration of a DARPA program we
were involved in called Next Generation Internet, and a Marine exercise in which they were
performing a peace-keeping mission. So, within the MOUT site there were a couple of opposing
forces and then there were peace-keeping mission individuals charged with kind of monitoring
local activities and taking whatever controlling actions might be appropriate. The facility was
equipped with a number of sensors. In this case, they were fixed cameras. There were, I believe,
12 of them, and you are seeing views from six of those here. Now, in general, there would in
addition be other types of sensors. For example, there would be ground sensors. There would
61

also be aerial surveillance, and what have you. All of these sensors would be data feeds. But the
point I am trying to make can be well illustrated, I think, with just this set of cameras that looks a
little bit like a bank of monitors from a guard facility. OK, in each of these we have live video.
So, even though I didn‘t get them all turned on, you can imagine what is going on. This is kind
of live action. The commander is seeing some individuals coming down this street. He is seeing
some other individuals over here. He gets an appreciation that something is going on, but he has
a very poor sense of how those activities relate spatially to each other, or how they relate to his
own course of action. So, what we need is some way of taking that information, and again, in
the future, it is not going to be six cameras, it is going to be 100s, and integrating it into a
common view. That is the need. What we are going to show here is this kind of model-based
graphical-rendering approach, which basically lets us say take a number of actual cameras,
integrate this live information into a new view (i.e., into a model) and then render that view as a
virtual camera. So, a user can view what‘s going on in the scene from many perspectives if he
wants to. Each user can have his own perspective on the ground, or in the air.
Well, let me show you what that looks like. So, here we have again a representation of the
Quantico MOUT site. It is based on a graphically rendered model. We have indicated where
there are some cameras and we have projected onto the model the video that is coming from
those cameras. So, we can see this swath is a footprint of this camera looking down the street.
There is a similarly footprint up there. So each of these kind of lighter areas is actually live
video overlaid on the rest of it, which is a previously constructed model.
So, here‘s what that same set of six cameras looks like. Here is one group of vehicles coming
down this street. We can kind of zoom over and take a look at that. We see on-going activity
surrounding that vehicle. Each of these patches obviously represents the view of different
camera. Actually, let me go to the next one. If you remember, there was a group of people
coming down one of these streets, that‘s that group. Now we are just pulling back, taking a
larger view, and we see over here the other group coming down this street. You can see
immediately where these various activities are taking place and how they relate spatially to one
another.
This is what we mean by live integration of real-time sensor information into a model and then
providing the ability to kind of render or present that information from a user‘s specific
perspective. In this case, we are just showing video, but clearly you can include in that same
representation, other types of information, alarms from trip wires, ground sensors, aerial vehicle
information, and so on.
All right, so what I have talked about so far is just a framework for taking a lot sensory
information, structure it and present it in a way that is immediately intelligible. Now we can go a
step further. We can process that sensor information for the purpose of automatically detecting
things of interest. So, in this case, we are demonstrating a kind of processing that detects these
people as they move through the streets, or these vehicles, and as we detect them and trap them,
we can overlay the information on the model as well. In this case, we are doing this
symbolically. So, what you are going to see is another fly-through of this same scene. This is
that group of persons on the street, and what you‘re seeing is where they are now symbolically
represented and where they have been represented as tracks. You can cut this time sequence and
get the history. Now, to underscore, this is a process of both integrating information together
and accumulating that information, so if at any time, we want to kind of play back in time we
could in principle see where those folks came from and who they interacted with.
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As I have mentioned, the framework provides a kind of common representation in which you can
integrate other types of information and other sensors. For example, unmanned air vehicle
sensors, organic air vehicle sensors that might be flying around town, ground vehicles, and even
sensors that the soldiers might carry themselves or place on the site. To illustrate that, I am
going to show you how we can integrate a video from an unmanned air vehicle, so that it is the
same site. In this case, there is a small UAV that flies around, and I‘ll show the example video
from that UAV. We‘re just flying and watching this individual running thorough the street. This
is just direct video fed from the UAV. An observer can certainly get a sense of what‘s going on,
but can also quickly lose track of exactly what he is looking at, where the person is going, where
he has been, and obviously how he might interact with others.
So, what we are going to do is to take that same video and overlay it on the model that I showed
you before. It is going to be a little difficult perhaps, for you to see. Here is the video being
projected onto the model. There is the guy. So we can clearly see, he ran down this street, and
then he comes down this street. So, we get a clear view of where he is, what he has been doing
as he moves along.
Now in principle, that is one camera. We can have multiple UAVs. DARPA likes to talk about
future combat where you‘ve got swarms of sensors and UAVs flying around. Well, how are you
ever going to make sense of all of that? Well, here, we‘ve got two, and you can see that they are
just laying their video down on the same model. So an observer sees the information, and
doesn‘t have to be aware of where it is coming from. It‘s a rendered-representation, so we could
kind of fly around and see that activity or replay it and see it from different directions.
So, that is the sort of information that might be made available to the commander. The
commander, or an operator in the command and control center, could chose what information is
important, chose the perspective, and the kind of domain that you see. Now you would also like
to be able to provide this information to the warfighter on the ground. And obviously, the
warfighter on the ground doesn‘t want to have to leaf through computer displays, and so on.
You need very direct information, exactly what he needs at the time. Imagine that the warfighter
has a head‘s up display. He can see the scene and then overlay on the scene the information
that‘s pertinent to his mission. For example, he is looking up the street and sees, overlaid on the
display, an indication of where he‘s supposed to be going. Prior information has indicated that
there is a sniper that he should be aware of. The model shows where that would be, as buildings
or labels, streets or labels, and that sort of thing. All of that information can come from the same
model, just tailored for his view.
So in principle, graphics would allow you to go right in the door, there. It‘s just a matter of how
much of that model has actually been populated with useful information. So, it is very easy to
steer this thing and go right underground. All of the examples that I‘ve used so far involve this
kind of urban area with distributed cameras. The same sort of notion applies if you‘re operating
in rural areas and undertaking a much wider surveillance of the scene. And for example, here is
the video from an UAV, where we have projected the video right onto the model scene. This is
graphically rendered three-dimensional terrain, and what you can see here is the footprint of the
video. You can look directly at the video and see things going on, or you can lay it on top of this
model and you can kind of see where it is, where you‘re panning. At the same time you can
accumulate all of this information. This is live imagery, this is historic imagery, where you can
accumulate the live imagery into a mosaic, kind of paint out the scene and lay it on top of the
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historic inventory. You get not only the current video, but everything that we‘ve seen over the
mission.
Let‘s go back to the notion that I brought up at the beginning. In a Mogadishu type of mission
the commander could see activity going on in the scene, he could see through aerial cameras, see
where vehicles are moving, but it was very difficult to translate aerial video vehicles to
geographic locations and coordinate activities. So, what I‘m going to show you here is
obviously an example. I will start in a second. This is raw video from an UAV. There are some
vehicles in it. We would like to know where those vehicles are on a map or we‘d like to see that
video in the context of a larger model of the scene, so that‘s what‘s shown here. Ok, so here‘s
the video. This red ”x‘ represents this particular missile launcher. The other vehicles have
different symbols, and as they come into view, we detect them and lay them right on top of this
common spatial representation or if it‘s more intuitive, we can put the same video right on top of
a map. Again, I am showing one video, but the framework allows multiple surveillance aircraft
or sensors on the ground or in the air, to be integrated together.
Ok, so all of that is taking current sensor information and putting it in an existing model. So
there are issues that come up. What if we don‘t have an existing model? What if there are things
in the image that are not in our model. Well, one of the things in the image that‘s not in the
model are the vehicles and the people. So, going a step further, the technology I talked about so
far is doable today. It‘s not deployed today, but it‘s doable today. What I am going to show you
now is what we will be able to do in the future. We can generate models of actors, you know,
moving objects that are in the scene as the event is unfolding. Here is an actual video sequence
that we‘re generating from a three-dimensional representation of the scene. What we‘ll do is to
construct from this three-dimensional representation a model of that guy as he‘s moving along…
and it looks something like this. So here is the underlying graphical representation of that
individual, it‘s triangulated surface representation, and when we project video images onto that
representation we get a model of the person. You can pan around, and zoom in and out. This sort
of thing may not be critical in a combat mission. However, in a minute I am going to talk about a
training type of operation, where we are going to review an activity, a mission, or an exercise,
and you‘d like to really see how each individual carried out their part of the mission.
First, let me tell you a little bit about constructing the model itself. In the case of Quantico, we
first flew over the site… there you have it. At any rate, imagine we‘re flying over in a little
UAV, and what‘s notable about the video is that it‘s bouncing all over the place. Let‘s not worry
about that. I think that‘s the only one that doesn‘t show up. So, at any rate, it‘s that town and we
just fly over it and we grab together some video. From that video, we can now recover the
shapes of the buildings. It‘s basically a motion stereotype of computation. So, here again, we
kind of extracted the three-dimensionality of the scene (i.e., isolated buildings) just by processing
this kind of raw representation and then ultimately end up with the integrated model. Now in
this case, which was done a year ago, it took a couple of days. We flew over one day, then we
played around in the lab and produced a model. But looking into the future, this is process can
be made very fast, using both these motion stereo and modeling tools. So, you can go over and
very quickly get a three-dimensional representation of the scene.
As a final example, I am going to talk about a current exercise that we are doing at Sarnoff. It‘s
an ONR (Office of Naval Research) contract in support of training and we‘re setting this type of
integrated, what we call video flashlight representation, at Sarnoff. So, here‘s an aerial view of
Sarnoff Corporation. It‘s in Princeton, New Jersey. We flew over and we got some video
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sequence. We computed a site map from motion stereo. We kind of automatically outlined
some buildings and then extruded models of each of those buildings. It‘s largely an automated
process, and then that becomes our model.
Now in this case, we want to go a step further. We‘d like the representation to include not just
outside space, but inside rooms. So, we are imagining that the Marines will come and they‘ll
actually storm our building, and they‘ll go inside and apprehend our CEO or whatever. So, part
of the exercise is constructing an internal model. I will show you in a second, models that were
constructed by a laser scanner. So, here is just an illustration of visualization that includes both
the outside and the inside. Here‘s Sarnoff. The exercise is going to take place in this building,
kind of a lounge. You can imagine flying up and down, peeling away the building, and then this
is the interior space. So, this mission is a training exercise. So, imagine that during the exercise
there are going to be a lot of cameras. There‘s going to be a kind of accumulation reporting of
the events, and then you can replay and see how each of the individuals and the operation
proceeded in detail.
In summary, what we wanted to address is a kind of sensor-rich battlefield environment. In the
future there will be lots and lots of cameras, lots and lots of video, lots and lots of other types of
sensors. We‘d like to bring that together into a common view that‘s immediately interpretable by
command and control, and also be able to render it in a way that is appropriate for warfighters
involved in an engagement. The idea here is to bring it all together in the context of a threedimensional model, and where appropriate, lay video and other sensory information on top of the
model. Thank you.
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Force Protection Information System Program
Gordon Schacher
Naval Postgraduate School
Clifford Link
Naval Criminal Investigative Service
BACKGROUND
Post Cole incident, Pacific Fleet sponsored development of a web-based Anti-Terrorism/Force
Protection (AT/FP) information system and associated planning processes. The Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS), Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and Third Fleet plan
and execute Limited Objective Experiments (LOEs) to meet the program's objectives. The
Office of Naval Research provided funding for the first experiment, which was executed at Port
Hueneme in August 2001. This paper focuses on information system development, omitting
Force Protection execution aspects of the program.
The initial phase of the program was based on the assumption that improved information is
needed for AT/FP planning, with the following broad information system attributes:
SIPRNET web-based
available to units with low bandwidth and intermittent connectivity
support collaborative planning
dynamic information updates as FP execution approaches
NCIS is standing up the Multi-Threat Alert Center (MTAC) to provide improved threat
information and distribution to the Navy. This program is developing the system requirements
for MTAC AT/FP information distribution and processes for tactical use of that information
INFORMATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND STRUCTURE
The Navy has installed Collaboration-at-Sea (CaS) on most of its ships. It is a Lotus Notes based
system, operates on SIPRNET, and provides information replication. When a ship comes on
line, information updates are automatically replicated to its server. This capability alleviates
bandwidth restrictions. There can still be information currency problems, depending on a ship's
connectivity schedule.
The Tactical Anti-Terrorism Information and Planning System (TATIPS), has been developed to
support this program. Its current version is being tested on a non-classified CaS server. Its main
purpose is to test capabilities and develop requirements rather than produce a system to be
fielded. Descriptions of TATIPS structure and the various web pages follow. Each solid box in
the figure represents a web page, with arrows showing links.
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The information system will be used for two purposes with slightly different paths: 1) to obtain
area information (dashed arrows), 2) to obtain specific operation information (solid arrows). For
both uses the initial step is a geographic Pull Down Menu (PDM). (We do not discuss here using
the system to obtain historical information through the archives.) When interested in an area,
one obtains information directly through the AT/FP Home Page, with the exception of operation
specific information. When interested in a specific operation, e.g. a ship entering a port, one will
go to that Operation page from an Operation PDM under the geographic area.
Entry to the system for an operation will normally be through the Operational Unit home page,
such as that of Third Fleet. When interest is for the area rather than an operation, entry will be
directly to the AT/FP home page from any originating point.
Operational
Unit
Agency
Home
Page

__TA PA__
Date
Information

PACE/PIVA
CD

Tactical
Unit

_ Operation___

AT/FP
Home Page
Agency
PDM
-------Geographic
PDM

Participants
----------Assessments

Operation
PDM
Assessments
IIR

__IIRs__
Messages

RFI
-------Archives

__RFIs___
Requests
Responses

Bulletin Board
All Messages
_Chat Room__
All Messages

-----------IIRs
Last Date/Time
-----------RFIs
List From / To
Opened (R/G)
Response (R/G)
Alert
-----------Plans
Log Requests
-----------Bulletin Board
Last Entry D/T
Alert
-----------Chat Room
Last Entry D/T
Alert

Information system structure
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__Participants_
Name
e-mail address
phone number
TA PA HNS
Date
Information

AT/FP Plans
and Log Reqs
Form
Past
Current

Web Pages
Operational Unit: Home page of the organization that has cognizance over the operation, e.g.
Fleet, Region.
Agency: Home pages of the various agencies that may have pertinent information.
AT/FP Home: This is the central hub for stepping to any desired AT/FP information.
Agency PDM: Allows the user to go to a specific agencies home page for either information
or communication.
Geographic PDM: A geographic area is chosen as the initial navigation action.
Operation PDM: The Menu is used to access the specific operation of interest. Each
operation will have a name that easily identifies it to the user.
Assessments: Current Threat and Political Assessments for the area.
IIR: Provides access to all Intelligence Information Reports for the area.
RFI: Provides access to all Requests For Information for the area.
Archives: Files of information from past operations.
Operation: There is a separate home page for each operation. Only information for the specific
operation can be accessed from this page.
Participants: Name, organization, and e-mail links of operation participants.
Assessments: Direct links to Threat and Political Assessments and Host Nation Support.
IIR: Direct link to IIRs for the area, including date/time of the last report.
RFIs: Direct link to operation RFIs, who from, to whom, whether it has been opened, and
whether a response has been generated. An alert is shown for outstanding requests.
Plans: Direct link to pertinent AT/FP plans and LOGREQs, past and present.
Bulletin Board: Direct link to the bulletin board for that operation with date/time of the last
entry provided. An alert is shown for entries for which a response is requested.
Chat Room: Same as the Bulletin Board.
Threat Assessments (TA) and Political Assessments (PA): TAs and PAs apply to an area and it
is assumed that all will be pertinent to an operation within that area. Thus, the same information
will be accessed whether navigating for the area or an operation. Each Assessment is
accompanied by the date issued/updated.
Host Nation Support (HNS): HNS refers to support provided for a specific purpose at a specific
location, so it is included only for an operation.
AT/FP Plans and Logistics Requests: This page contains forms for plans that are to be submitted
for the particular operation. It will contain forms that have been completed and submitted for
similar operations or, preferably, for that same location. The current, active plan for this
operation is present. If there has been more than one plan submitted, the original plan and the
current update are present. Note: depending on the C2 process for the operation, it may be
necessary to have ISIC approval before a plan can be posted on this page.
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PACE/PIVA CD: PACE and PIVA are being combined into a single product for AT/FP use.
PACE is too large for many platforms to be able to access through the internet, and the same will
be true for the combined product. Thus, CDs will be burned with the information and provided
to units. This programs information system will provide updates to that information.
After-Action Reports (AARs): AARs will be placed in the information system archives.
Multi-Path Information
Some information must go directly to tactical and operational units. This system is not meant to
replace existing communication paths, such as Navy messages. Thus, some information will be
transmitted by these means as well as being posted on TATIPS. A desired capability is singlepoint-entry, such as automatic messaging upon entry of information to the web.
Tactical information will be generated at the operation site. An example is changes in Host
Nation Support. This information will be acquired by a local agent and transmitted directly to
the tactical unit Command. Depending on available time, this information may not be on the
information system until after conclusion of the operation.
Alerting
Various pieces of information are time critical and an alerting system will insure they are seen
and/or timely action taken. Information for which alerts are needed and the type of alert are:
AT/FP plan - due date.
Logistics Request - due date.
Bulletin Board - alert recipient of an items presence, when desired by the person posting.
Chat - alert recipient of an items presence, when desired by the person posting.
IIR- alert affected operational and tactical units and local agents.
RFI - alert request recipient, alert requestor when a response is sent.
Assessments - alert operation participants of any change in an assessment.
LOE #1 RESULTS
A fully developed information system was not available for LOE #1. The system used was a
combination of capabilities from Third Fleet and Department of State, which provided an
adequate test of the program's concepts. The following results emerged from shipboard
personnel using this system for planning prior to the execution phase of the experiment. A full
report on LOE #1 is available.
1. Manning the system to fully make use of collaboration during AT/FP planning requires
more personnel time than is available.
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2. The current connectivity schedule of 6 on/6 off leaves dark periods that are too long for
collaborative planning.
3. Both chat and bulletin board capabilities were desired, for asynchronous and real-time
collaboration.
4. Being able to contact intelligence agencies directly through the web improved planning.
5. Watch standing at the Immediate Superior (ISIC) level must match that of the tactical
unit for plans iteration and approval.
6. The tactical commander needs to have insurance that the ISIC is using the same
information when plans are being rapidly changed in a dynamic situation.
The most far-reaching of these results for this program are 1) workload and 2) connectivity.
Excessive workload implies that a combination of directed and dynamic planning is needed.
Connectivity implies that a replication system such as Collaboration-at-Sea (CaS) is needed. It
also indicates that a change in connectivity scheduling is needed.
CURRENT PROGRAM DIRECTIONS
As has been noted above, this program has developed TATIPS not as a system to be fielded but
one to determine requirements. This means that, at some point, a transition is needed to
development of an operational system or to implement TATIPS capabilities within existing
systems. We have chosen the latter course.
Three AT/FP information systems are under current development that are candidates for
implementing the capabilities identified by this program. They are:
Joint Risk Assessment Management Program (JRAMP)
Area Security Operations Command and Control (ASOCC)
Integrated Warfare Command and Control System (IWCCS)
JRAMP has been developed for USEUCOM and will be mandated for use by units going into
that theatre. It has been vetted by Sixth Fleet for submission of their directed AT/FP plans.
ASOCC has been developed for Pacific Command and servers are currently in place. A civilian
version has been developed for Coalition operations. It will be tested for use within MTAC in
the near future. IWCCS is currently in use in Carrier Battle Groups for situation awareness. It is
being modified by NSWC/Keyport for shore-side AT/FP use. A test of it similar to that planned
for ASOCC may be undertaken.
All of these information systems satisfy some of the requirements that have been developed by
the TATIPS program, but not all. This program is currently examining how to adapt to use of
one, or all of the above systems. It is planned to test JRAMP during LOE #2 and ASOCC during
LOE #3.
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Transformation… CETO Style
Ki Harvey
Deputy Director
Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO)
The Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) was established in November 2000
at the direction of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities out of a growing concern for the wide range of security challenges the US will face
in the 21st Century. CETO is a unique organization within the Marine Corps establishment and
is best viewed as a think tank dedicated to developing new ideas. Currently CETO is addressing
the following tasks:
B

Develop possible futures (beyond EFDC focus).

B

Alert senior leadership to new threats and opportunities.

B

Stimulate the Advocacy Process.

B

Focus on the long-view while recognizing the force development continuum (time).

B

Serve as a nucleus of think tank for ACMC.

B

Support MARFOR/MEF Commanders.

Technology is changing everything, and the pace of technological change is accelerating.
Proliferation is a key issue, but it‘s not just that technology is available everywhere. The real
key is that technology is proliferating in a way that is more and more user-friendly, and can be
used as an enabler to support the adversary. Part of CETO‘s role is to think down the road about
how the Marine Corps must organize and fight to successfully meet the challenges in future
conflicts.
The current Mission Needs Statement (MNS) states that the Expeditionary Fire Support System
(EFSS) must provide close supporting, accurate, immediately responsive, and lethal fires in
support of the MAGTF. That drives the key issue of internal transportability and limits weight
and size. The USMC must have Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in FY06. Force Structure
implications also need to be examined. Finally, as we push technology forward, we need to be
sure that we are smart about it.
Many adversaries in the world have access to or are actually employing enhanced effects or
thermobaric weapons. The Soviets were the primary developers of these weapons and they have
been proliferated to numerous other countries. The RPO-A and the RPG-7V are the primary
examples. CETO discovered that very little work has been done on developing defensive tactics,
techniques, and procedures for dealing with these weapons. Further, we found that not a lot has
been done on medical precautions and treatment issues. In conjunction with MCCDC (Marine
Corps Combat Development Command) and SYSCOM (Systems Command), we have
developed a draft paper (currently being staffed) that addresses both these issues. We are also
starting to work on offensive Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). In addition, we are
helping to define requirements for a confined space clearing capability.
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We try to listen and respond rapidly to the evolving needs of the Marine Corps warfighting
commanders. CETO strives to provide useful and focused products such as tactics, techniques,
procedures, assessments, draft concepts, proposals, reports, and recommendations. CETO‘s
organizational structure provides the capability to anticipate emerging threats… the flexibility to
respond to both immediate and longer term needs. In addition to its core staff of research
fellows, CETO enlists the help of consultants who have strong academic credentials in various
areas of expertise, and many of whom have had recent first hand on-the-ground experience.
CETO‘s mission is to prevent operational and tactical surprise to senior warfighting
commanders. We serve as a catalyst to stimulate thought and provoke debate on issues of
significance to the senior leadership of the Marine Corps. We also provide support to the senior
warfighting commanders by responding to their requests for support in areas of concern. In
addition, we identify emerging threats and opportunities, and develop strategies for defeating the
threats and exploiting the opportunities.
Here are our tasks (Slide 3). Alerting senior leadership to new threats and opportunities and
serving as the think tank for the ACMC (Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps) are two of
the most important ones. They cover the time horizon from now to the long term future.
The diagram in Slide 4 shows how CETO fits into the new Expeditionary Force Development
System (EFDS) here at Quantico. We begin with a very broad focus and look to the future to
identify potential threats and opportunity. In that way, we‘re acting like a deep reconnaissance
unit to keep the main force from being surprised.
Let‘s look at what might cause future conflicts. The next three slides (Slides 5, 6 and 7) contain
a lot of data compiled by the US Army Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Looking
at the world today, there seems to be less friction between ideologies like communism versus
democracy. Nation states seem to be less contentious with more countries moving toward
democracy. However, there is increasing tension between state and non-state players such as the
Israeli Palestinian question or radical Islam versus the fundamentalist Islamic states. The
lessening of tensions between governing ideologies has allowed other frictions to bubble to the
surface. These are cultural and ethnic frictions. For example, the effect of the globalization of
Western culture versus the more restrictive fundamentalist societies. Technology is pervasive,
even in the remotest environments. There is competition for resources such as water, food, and
fuel, and then there are refugees and immigration flows.
Looking at the situation as it exists today and what others say about the future, it appears that the
future is driven by three overarching trends: demographics; economics; and, technology. Here
are some statistics on demographics that will likely be a cause or have some impact on future
conflicts. The world population will double in 40 years with 95% of the growth in the developing
world. There is a youth bulge of 15 to 24-year-olds and where such bulges occur there is a
likelihood of violent upheaval. Historically, countries that experience greater than 3% annual
population growth face instability.
Another interesting fact is that in the US, one of every 9.7 people was not born in this country.
That hasn‘t happened in 150 years. The US is truly a nation of immigrants. One area of concern
is urbanization. By 2020, 60% of the population will be in urban areas. Just 30 years ago, onethird of the world‘s population was needed to produce and distribute food. Now, it takes only
8%, so people have to go somewhere to find work. Another problem is that the disenfranchised
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are becoming a bigger problems for states. What do you do with people in a constrained urban
environment? The issue becomes resources like water and food. For instance, in the next 40
years, 212% more water will be required just for industrial purposes to meet the exploding
population needs, and much of this will be in areas that already have water problems. The
likelihood is that future conflicts may well take place in an urban environment. Technology is
changing everything… and the pace of technological change is accelerating. Proliferation is key,
but it‘s not just that technology is available everywhere… the real key is that technology is
proliferating in a way that is more and more user friendly. It can be used as an enabler for your
adversary. You don‘t need college educated people to use the technology that is out there.
Further, proliferation means more than just missiles, bombs and other tools for weapons of mass
destruction. It includes the brains… the nuclear, biological and chemical scientists who can
provide the support to other nation states or transnational organizations. An example is the
Russian scientists who were reportedly working for China, North Korea and Iran after the fall of
the Soviet Union. Surprise is a big issue. The US must stay ahead, but there can still be
surprises out there that we can‘t account for.
Here are the types of likely threats we see in the world of 2015. Regional military threats. A
few countries maintain large military forces with a mix of Cold War and post Cold War
technology and equipment. For example, China, Vietnam, India, and Egypt… weapons of mass
destruction. This includes the potential for unconventional delivery of these weapons by both
state and non-state actors. The asymmetric approach of adversaries. Regardless of the foe, state
or non-state, future adversaries will employ an asymmetric approach that seeks to avoid direct
engagements with the US. The foe will devise strategies, tactics, and weapons to minimize US
strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses (Slide 8).
In order to anticipate and face these threats and to identify where there may be opportunities,
CETO maintains a strong regional approach. This way we can also act better on the
requirements of the Marine Corps components of the Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Within the
four regions, Pacific, Europe and Africa, Southwest Asia, and the Americas, we look at key areas
such as demographic trends, weather, and the economy. We try to identify potential flash points
that may ignite crises in the future. The goal is to better understand potential regional threats and
develop ways to deal with them before they become battlefield crises. CETO has performed indepth studies on regions such as India and Indonesia, and is currently examining potential flash
points in Nigeria.
In addition to the regional focus, CETO is looking at fundamental areas such as weapons
technology, mobility, support sustainment and aviation technology. In particular, we are
focusing on the impacts of information technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and
power/energy on these areas. Some developments may present terrific opportunities, but also
cause us great harm if they‘re used against us.
Here (Slide 11) is a list of current projects that we have. Part of CETO‘s role is to think down
the road about how the Marine Corps must organize and fight to successfully meet future
challenges and conflicts. We are considering developing concept papers in the Fall on several
topics. One paper would explore the fitness of the basic USMC organization for combat in the
2020-2025 time frame. Questions like is the current MAGTF the right construct for the future
and if not, what is, will be addressed. Another paper might discuss enhancement of the MEU
capabilities. This paper would address additions to the current MEU capabilities in the five to 10
years range. Technology, equipment training, and the new expeditionary strike group concept
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would be addressed. A training paper would examine the potential for improving and
standardizing training in the operating forces with an emphasis on the process itself. And lastly,
we would like to focus on how Marine Corps concepts such as expeditionary warfare and
seabasing, complement the Joint force. As you can see, we have a plate full with just these
papers.
In June, CETO hosted a seminar concerning the child soldier phenomenon and implications for
US forces. Today there are some 300,000 children bearing arms around the world and they‘re
involved in over 30 conflicts. In January of 2002, Special Forces Sergeant Nathan Chapman
was the first US serviceman killed by hostile fire in Afghanistan. Reportedly he was killed by a
14 years old Afghan boy. A bullet really doesn‘t care who pulls the trigger. CETO‘s goal in this
was to inform operational forces about the nature of this emerging threat and why it is nearly
inevitable that Marines and soldiers will face child soldiers in a peacekeeping operation or in a
combat situation in the future. We saw the opportunity to provide training to deploying forces
on the threats and started a dialogue among senior officers on the rules of engagement issues
before the fact, not after the fact.
You‘ve heard a lot about this (Slide 14)… how does the Marine Corps organize, equip, and train
in order to combat terrorism? What capabilities and technologies does the Fourth Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) need to have? We‘ve been looking into these issues.
Also, how do you protect a base such as Quantico? It‘s got 100 square miles, some shoreline, a
civilian town physically located within the confines of the base, a major interstate highway and
rail lines bisecting the base, and still allow the 7000 military, 5300 civilians and 3600 military
family members to do what they need to do? What complicates all this is that most people,
vehicles and equipment entering the base are not threats to the installation. Here, the adversary
clearly has the operational advantage. Adversaries will generally observe patterns to pick a time
and place of their choosing, or attack another facility entirely.
Some of our thoughts about how to solve this daunting task, especially regarding technologies
use a holistic approach. This problem will probably not be solved by one system, process, or
technology. It needs to be layered and graduated. We need to be able to deal with a variety of
terrain and environments. There must be no single point of failure, but redundancy with graceful
degradation. Penetration of the system should not disable the system nor allow total system
access. The solution approach needs to be scalable, interoperable, and must work and integrate
with other military and civilian security systems (including databases, networks, and
communications). And, it must include the human element… enable human behavior and
complement human strengths and capabilities.
The current mission needs statement states that the Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS)
must provide close, supporting, accurate, immediately responsive, and lethal fires in support of
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The requirements for this, for reasons of internal
transportability, limit weight and size. The Marine Corps must have an initial operating
capability by FY06. Force structure implications need to be examined. And finally, as we push
technology like an Expeditionary Fire Support System forward, we need to be smart about it.
As you can see, we are deep into a number of concepts and issues that are transformational in
nature. At first glance, some of the projects we‘re working on seem straight forward, like
providing security here at Quantico. However, we‘ve learned that it‘s like peeling the layers of
an onion. There‘s always something else underneath to think about.
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Transformation … to
Intelligent, Logistics Information Management
Chris K. Neff
Logistics Program Analyst
US Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hi 96860
—I don‘t know what this logistics thing is that Marshall keeps talking about, but I want some
of it!“ Admiral Ernie King œ 1942

Abstract
—The security environment of today and tomorrow will be characterized by uncertainty,
chaos, surprise, and conflict … naval forces must exploit the power of information to seize
the advantage over potential adversaries, and must be postured, through technological
advances, changes in organizational structures of forces, and experimentation with
innovative concepts of operations, to sustain and advance broad competitive advantage.“
(England et al. June 2002)
As the nation continues to transform its responsibilities, global relationships, and military
priorities; the events of this past year have highlighted the critical need for the timely
integration of information and effective knowledge management in a post-911 climate. The US
Department of Defense's (DOD) strategic vision is documented in the QDR and Joint Vision
(JV) 2010/2020, which recognizes our changing global environment and emphasizes the need
for information superiority, while ensuring operational interoperability among the military
services and our allies. The department‘s future focus on the operational concepts of: œ
dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics œ
should allow combined military forces to achieve full-spectrum/global dominance. US Naval
Forces continue to conduct inter-operations with our Pacific Rim neighbors from Japan, Korea,
Canada, and Australia; as a vital element of regional stability. In recent years China, Korea,
India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Persian Gulf States have challenged this regional stability.
Stability cannot be achieved without fully operational unit availability anywhere, anytime;
capable of responding to varied situations and scenarios. Focused Logistics is a critical
component of total operational readiness.
In order to ensure maximum fleet logistics readiness there is a need for the effective integration
of disparate information, technological innovation, and focused logistics doctrine and practices.
This is essential for the tracking and distribution of assets through the entire supply chain, from
manufacturer to customer. Common or shared information at all DOD levels will enable the
support communities to provide the logistics necessary to meet, and sustain, both strategic and
tactical operations. Initiatives such as Total Asset Visibility (TAV) and the effective integration
of maintenance and supply processes are critical to this success. Effective operational logistics
will require the intelligent integration of accurate and timely information.
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This paper discusses the need for the effective implementation of logistics information and
knowledge management as we transform to focused logistics and intelligent information
management.

Keywords
Decision support, logistics network, transportation, inventory management, just-in-time,
financial management, information management, knowledge management

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this paper may not represent the official position of the US Navy, or the Commander, US
Pacific Fleet.

Introduction
—Transformation is about more than technology … it is about innovative concepts of operating
and configuring our forces, adjustments in how we train and base our people and material, and
how we conduct day-to-day business … the goal of transformation is to maintain a substantial
advantage over any potential adversary in key areas such as information warfare, power
projection, space and intelligence.“ (Wolfowitz, 2001)
Modern military actions require the effective management of assigned assets, and the ability to
obtain adequate resources to operate and maintain them. Within the Department of the Navy,
there are numerous stovepipe organizations focusing on various elements of the resource process
each with a limited understanding of the end-to-end logistics process or, more importantly
limited access to meaningful information. In order to ensure that appropriate funding is
available, necessary contracts are in place, repair and maintenance facilities are properly staffed
and outfitted, transportation networks are robust, and personnel are adequately trained; an
effective information management system must be available to decision makers.
The US Naval presence in the Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea at the time of the terrorist
attacks on New York City and Washington DC; emphasizes the value of, and highlights the
necessity for; a fully capable military force anytime, anywhere. On September 12th, 2001,
Admiral Thomas Fargo, Pacific Fleet Commander, stated that: —we can not continue to transfer
personnel, ordnance, equipment, and supplies from one ship to another in order to meet
deployment requirements“. This observation was the result of US military practices that had
been employed in recent years to maintain fully capable forces in those anticipated trouble spots,
throughout the world, at the expense of non-deployed units. These actions resulted in, once
again, allowing US defense forces to deteriorate to unacceptable levels. Attempts to forge the
DOD into a more —business-like“ organization failed to recognize the true nature of the Defense
business. In light of the current Global War on Terrorism, the list of potential —hot spots“ has
increased while the number of available US Military assets has declined. As the force structure
continues to change and available units decline there will be increased pressure for greater
operational availability linked to the military needs of the appropriate theater commander. It is
essential that our Naval forces have the right equipment and supplies, in the right place, at the
right time. In order to meet this challenge, repair and maintenance cycles will need to be
modified, logistics customer response times will need to be reduced, system and platform
availability will need to be increased, and mission requirements will need to be satisfied.
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The realignment and consolidation of stakeholders and intelligent information and knowledge
management will be essential in the planning and development of future logistics requirements
to meet DOD and coalition force operations.

I.

Transformation … The Global Environment

—Emerging operational concepts, technologies, processes, and organizations will transform the
capability of America‘s naval services of the 21st century to conduct multi-dimensional joint,
allied, and coalition warfare. The transforming US Navy-Marine Corps team will be fully
integrated into the Joint Team across the full expanse of a unified battlespace. Naval forces
will provide unique and complementary warfighting capabilities from the sea to joint force
commanders to support their ability to enhance deterrence; secure swift, decisive military
victory; and strengthen the peace that follows in support of the critical operational goals
outlined in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Secretary of Defense‘s Defense
Planning Guidance.“ (England et al. 2002)
It‘s been said that militaries are always prepared to fight … the last war. During the American
Civil War, Union and Confederate commanders were still ordering Napoleonic charges long
after it should have been obvious that the winning tactics at Waterloo wouldn‘t work at
Gettysburg. Victors seldom learn the lessons of the pervious war. New threats require new
defenses, new methods, new equipment, and just plain new thinking.
During Granada, US Army ground forces were not able to share information with a sister service
and a quick thinking soldier relied on simple logic and conventional means of communication to
avert the potential of significant personnel casualties. The US Congress recognized the need for
change and in 1986 passed the DOD Reorganization Act, commonly referred to as Goldwater œ
Nichols. Since that time the DOD has made some progress in service interoperability, however
the current administration has placed renewed emphasis on Transforming the military in a
changing global environment.
Today we must be prepared to engage in a full spectrum of Military Operations Other than War
(MOOTW). Prior to 911 global events highlight the Navy‘s role in humanitarian disaster relief,
non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), peace support missions, enforcement of embargoes
and no-fly zones, drug interdiction, illegal immigration, international criminal activity, and rapid
response to terrorism. At the time of the attacks on New York and Washington D.C. our forward
deployed naval presence proved the value of a mobile combat-ready force. Global dynamics will
require, the identification and availability of resources needed to fight and win or deter and
protect; will necessitate a greater independence, while working more closely with those nations
that are true allies.
US Naval vessels are sovereign assets that because of their mobility and self-sufficiency can
relocate to any region on short notice. As the current administration has moved forward with the
GWOT the need for coalition support and interoperability has increased. Command ships
provide valuable independent and mobile assets that do not require partnership, agreements, or
treaties with regional governments in order to maintain a presence. Our future will require
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maximum flexibility to counter threats and aggression and we must be prepared to modify our
plans in the backdrop of a dynamic operational environment.
In order to provide the warfighter with the maximum number of options the DOD must have a
well defined, trained and ready force, whose capabilities are understood and can respond when
required. As resources become scarce the force structure must become more flexible in order to
respond to increased missions. In the US Navy this has resulted in fewer platforms being built
and available, while adding weapons or mission response capabilities to those platforms. Add
to this the challenges of being prepared to meet any mission on a moments notice, ensuring
increased system reliability, maintenance and support for current equipment, systems and
personnel; there is an increasing need to ensure that we optimize the resources and remain
focused on the mission. While platforms and weapons systems are needed to meet current and
future challenges, we must ensure that these systems are fully operational when required
stressing the need for an effective balance of current and future force requirements. Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz recognized this fact in his April 2002 testimony to the
Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Military Transformation
In order to ensure material availability we must identify and equipment required to meet the
current and future threats to global security, the Department of Defense must evaluate all
potential threats and analyze the resources required to neutralize, minimize, or eliminate those
threats. We must also recognize that previous defense strategies may not work in the future. As
an example we can no longer count on our strategic forces to deter a foreign power from a first
strike attack. Likewise, increased use of chemical and biological weapons by military, paramilitary, and others is an indication of vulnerability which places new demands on governments
to provide protection for the general population. Finally, the increasing complexities of an urban
battleground add to the need for a greater balance of requirements to resources and the essential
availability of real time knowledge to maximize the warfighter‘s options.
Figure 1. depicts the roles, responsibilities, organizations, and focus of the logistics readiness
equation.

Figure 1. Logistics Readiness to support Sea Power œ 21
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The unified commanders have the principle responsibility of developing plans and concept of
operations in order to counter anticipated threats. Additionally, the development of these plans
require the identification of the required resources and the timing for their availability. Finally,
the commanders must determine the capability required, the acceptable risk, the impact of their
plans, and their vulnerability or weakness.
Once the unified commander has developed the plans and identified the resources required they
must convey the requirement to the Chief of Naval Operations, who is the administrative agent
responsible for assessing the requirement, and submitting the support documentation to obtain
and distribute the resources.
Logistics readiness requires the development of maintenance plans to ensure equipment and
facility availability. These maintenance plans are the responsibility of the engineering
community and the Navy‘s Hardware Systems Commands (HSC). Once these plans have been
developed the logistics community must assess the acceptable customer wait time in order to
determine the proper material/parts allowances the stock positioning of the material, the
transportation network‘s ability to provide the material when required, the lead time to
manufacture the material, and the ability to repair existing components in order to maintain
adequate ready-for-issue inventory levels. This effort requires the effective communication of
numerous logistics readiness stakeholders; including the Fleet and Type Commanders; and the
OPNAV, HSC, and inventory support staff.
History has proven that global relationships are dynamic. A review of our allies and enemies
over the past 226 years provides evidence of this constantly changing environment. We must be
prepared to respond wherever and whenever required. Military preparedness will demand that
adequate logistics support is available in order to execute our plans. Therefore it is essential that
we bring together personnel, supplies, and equipment in a coordinated and responsive manner to
meet the demands placed on the logistics network.

II. Transformation … Focused Logistics
—Focused logistics integrates information superiority and technological innovations to develop
state-of-the-art logistics practices and doctrine.“ (Cohen 1997)

In order to meet the challenge of change we must be able to sustain a long-term, forward
deployed presence. Within the Pacific Fleet this can mean supporting deployed forces through
the discipline of sea-based logistics with a full spectrum of battle force replenishment,
operational logistics, weapons handling, force support, maintenance, and infrastructure from
logistics bases over 14,000 NM away. These disciplines include the challenges of: conducting
re-supply in sea state 3 conditions, Total Asset Visibility (TAV), providing logistics information
to operators, safe knowledgeable weapons handling, stock positioning, transportation, re-supply
and predictive maintenance actions.
The area of logistics brings together the disciplines of staffing, training, warehousing, inventory
management, transportation, procurement, repair, and maintenance. While most requirements
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can be satisfied by financial resources, there may be some instances where the availability of
financial resources alone will not allow actions to be taken within the desired timeframe.
Therefore, it is essential that an effective information/knowledge management system be
available to meet the demands of a complex logistics network.
Although funding is required to meet the DOD‘s goods and services requirements … dollars
don‘t fix broken systems … material and people do. It is important that we turn our attention to
material requirements and the resources necessary to have the right material, in the right place, at
the right time.
Figure 2 identifies the complex logistics structure and challenges of maintaining an adequate
balance.

Figure 2. Logistics Structure Complexities

Figure 3. Logistics Readiness Triangle

Figure 2 contains four columns representing the manufacturing or repair communities, the shore
infrastructure inventory warehouse or storage facilities, the fiscal management communities
(both inventory and cash accounts) of the various stakeholders, and the shipboard and aviation
platforms or customer base. As indicated there are numerous, special interests, and stakeholder
relationships which require effective communication in order to maximize options and enhance
the effectiveness of the decision making processes. Roles and responsibilities vary from one
stakeholder to the next and many of the business rules and processes that exist today are the
result of isolated stovepipe organizational decisions.
Figure 3 depicts the three principle elements of the logistics readiness triangle required to
maximize the Navy‘s opportunity to have the right part, in the right place, at the right time. The
key points to be made are that it takes a team effort and the amount of Acceptable Customer
Wait Time (ACWT) is a metric that must come from the person or organization that is
responsible for fully operational equipment and systems. Critical to team performance is
knowing what needs to be available, when it is required, by whom, storage location, and our
ability to deliver the good or service.
Inventory managers may desire to locate material in strategic locations, however the uncertainty
of mission requirements and equipment necessary to support those missions requires the timely
availability of material or equipment assemblies and sub assemblies. Post-911 there were
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periods of time when the existing transportation system could not deliver material to the
customer. Uncertainty regarding material failure rates, and organic repair capabilities further
complicate the logistics readiness equation. From a 24-7 preparedness perspective our units
would be best suited to carry all anticipated material with them. This solution may not survive
the budget ax or be supported by shipboard storage capacity therefore, the stock positioning
decisions require the collective integrated solution of all the appropriate stakeholders.
A study by navy inventory managers found that it takes an average of 39.4 days for a repairable
item to be received at the designated repair site. The proposed solution, developed by a logistics
stovepipe organization, without the participation of the fleet customer, utilizes express air freight
services from the commercial contract transportation network. This solution fails to
acknowledge that the customer is extremely mobile, and may have already contracted for
government transportation to move passengers, equipment, or other supplies to the same
location. We must recognize that capabilities which exist today in the private sector may not be
available in the future. Modern Just in Time inventory management practices in private sector
work best in fairly stable production processes, but tend to break down when used in a more
dynamic environment. (Noreen and Garrison 1997).
In order to ensure that material is available to the customer, whether in maintenance (a repair
part) or as a consumable (food, fuel, paper towels), warehouse and inventory management
personnel must be knowledgeable of future demand. If a ship consumed $546,000 in fuel during
underway operations last month but is going to be inport for the next six months there is little
need to warehouse a large quantity of fuel. Inventory managers and procurement agents need to
know ships operating schedules in order to ensure proper material is available either from onboard inventory or government/commercial sources. Likewise if the Ships Engineer is planning
to clean the fuel storage tanks, the inventory manager needs to ensure that he can remove or not
replenish fuel out of or into that storage location.
Essential to effective inventory management is the ability to evaluate and predict future
requirements. Prior demand history may provide a good starting point for the 75% solution
however, greater predictability is required in order to ensure proper decisions are made. It is
equally important that we have accurate and unbiased information. As previously stated there
are two major categories of material, repair and consumable. There is little flexibility in
obtaining new consumable items, one must go to the manufacturer; but there are several options
available to our modern military forces with respect to repairable items. Historically, the navy
has recognized three levels of repair and maintenance; Organizational (O), Intermediate (I), and
Depot (D). When we consider which level of repair/maintenance is appropriate, we evaluate the
performing activities capability to complete the task. Typical limiting factors are the lack of;
skill, material, facility availability, equipment, or knowledge. In order to repair system
components or maintain systems we must understand the meantime between failure, the
significance of the casualty, the length of service of the affected component or system, and the
anticipated replacement/service life.
In a 2001 review of different Naval Aviation supply parts it was determined that of the 164,000
parts managed by Navy, 124,000 of those items had zero demand from all Naval sources (Navy,
Marine Corps, and Naval Reserve). The ability to effectively predict which items will have a
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demand from one year to the next will have a significant impact on the Navy‘s ability to increase
material availability.
The numerous and varied stakeholders have over time created stove pipes that tend to isolate one
another. We can not afford, from both a fiscal and readiness perspective, to allow the current
stakeholders to operate in a stand alone environment. We must bring these diverse efforts
together to ensure the Navy‘s overall capabilities meet the needs of the Commander-in-Chief and
the country. A crucial element of this imperative is effective and responsive logistics
information management.

III. Transformation … to effective Logistics Information Management
— Initiatives such as Joint Total Asset Visibility and the Global Combat Support System will
provide deployable, automated supply and maintenance information systems for leaner, more
responsive logistics.“ (Cohen 1997)
As identified in the previous section there are numerous isolated organizations contributing to
the availability of material to our warfighters. When this problem is expanded to include the
entire DOD the challenges are increased. If we are to maximize our options and take full
advantage of the transformation movement within the department we must work together. Our
decision makers desire to make the best possible decisions therefore, the services must
effectively share logistics information and data. Without meaningful and timely
data/information our decisions may fall short of our expectations.
Figure 4 provides a conceptual design to bring together information from the various
communities including: financial, maintenance, operations, inventory management,
transportation, vendors, and support infrastructure. A common or shared vision, throughout the
department, is essential if our information/data capture methodology is to be useful and
meaningful to the varied and diverse users of the systems.

Figure 4. Logistics Information Basic Conceptual Design
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Much of the required infrastructure already exists. The challenge is to create a vision that is
endorsed by the stakeholders and the commitment to support and deliver the product. Members
of congress and the DOD recognize that we can not achieve transformation if we are not willing
to change the way we do business and if it takes an inordinate time to complete the effort (SASC
2002). Currently there are over 7,500 software applications used within the navy. Many of these
systems have been developed by Central Design Agents (CDA‘s) whose mission includes the
delivery and maintenance of legacy applications. Within the past year a fleet request to one such
agent, for data base elements and schema was passed down 5 layers of the organization and after
over 6 months elapsed time the information has still not been received. In order to move forward
and minimize the negative effects of time delays, information must be made available to all
appropriate users when desired/required. An effective balance of push/pull capability and
information filtering is essential in this period of transformation.
Figure 5 depicts a network on logistics information which when captured could be available to
all users. The basic network is in place therefore the information could be made available to the
appropriate user without significant effort. The user community should include all elements of
the logistics readiness team previously depicted in figures 1 and 3. In addition to the
customer/user base depicted in figure 4, figure 5 adds elements of the mobile logistics support
force and other units in an afloat Battle Group (BG), Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG), or
Expeditionary Support Group (ESG).

Figure 5. Goods and services information network
In an environment of increasing threats and limited resources stakeholders and legacy systems
must be consolidated in a network designed with a strategic focus and a common solution. The
Defense Reform Initiative Directive #47 (DRID 47) identified the need for the DOD to operate
in a shared electronic data environment. The final report identified the need to effectively
integrate knowledge based solutions in a seamless exchange of information (Hambre 2000).
Michael Isikoff in his Newsweek article of May 2002 observed —So much intelligence comes in,
rumor, hearsay, disinformation, so little of it more than trash: once in a blue moon an agentprospector may get lucky. But even then an agent‘s warning is likely to be dismissed as what
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Condoleeza Rice last week called —chatter“ …there‘s always too much information“ (Isikoff
May 2002). Likewise Fareed Zakaria made the following observation: —No one person at the
FBI had responsibility for strategic analysis, connecting the dots“ (Zakaria May 2002)
The US Department of Justice has been transmitting homeland security information to over
18,000 law enforcement agencies at all levels of government since September 11, 2001. In the
months that followed the attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. information from a
plethora of sources became available. Had we possessed the capability to —connect the dots“ we
might have been able to make some different decisions or take specific actions to offset the
attacks. In our data/information rich environment we need the ability to not only access the
information but to filter it and quickly analyze it to support better decisions. The intelligent use
of information through integration, can ensure that we focus on the meaningful and valuable
information and manage our resources in a more effective manner.

IV. Transformation … to Intelligent Logistics Information Integration
—For the past 20 years the US military services have suffered under the limitations of stovepiped computer software applications that function as discrete entities within a fragmented
data-processing environment. Lack of interoperability has been identified by numerous think
tanks, advisory boards, and studies, as the primary information systems problem.“ (Pohl 2001)
In his paper —Information-Centric Decision-Support Systems: A Blueprint for ”Interoperability‘“,
Dr Jens Pohl highlights the importance of creating a decision support collaborative environment
where computers can focus on the functions that they perform best, and humans can cooperate in
the decision process with the requisite knowledge to optimize the solutions. Better decisions can
be made once the human computer partnership has been established and organizations have
progressed to an environment of Business Intelligence which brings together effective,
computer-assisted (agent), information management and knowledge building (Pohl 2001). In an
Information-Centric environment it is possible to create an architecture that will enable datacentric applications, like many of the US Navy legacy systems, to information centric systems
through translators. (Fig 6). This has the obvious advantage of transforming data-centric
systems, developed though the numerous stovepipe software applications, without the need to
standardize data elements across the user community. As Pohl points out existing legacy
applications have been developed and deployed at enormous investment. Their value is linked to
the critical functions they perform, and the savings in lost time and productivity which will occur
as these functions migrate to the new decision support environment. Finally new information
centric systems provided under the umbrella of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) will require
process and software changes to integrate with residual information management systems.
The cornerstone of the ERP process is the migration of numerous legacy information systems to
standard applications using common data elements across all business applications. Current
estimates are that the ERP process will take 8 to 10 years to complete and will cost the Navy in
excess of $1.8 billion. Although ERP offers the opportunity to bring data together in a common
environment it lacks the ability to identify information that could be valuable to a humancomputer partnership. More important is the amount of time that it would take and the number
of legacy system owners that will be required to willingly participate in the transition/migration
process.
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Intelligent decision support agents can help resolve both of these concerns. Agents can be
created to access legacy applications and link common data elements together. The development
of these agents can reduce the amount of time required to enhance the knowledge level of the
users and extend the value of legacy systems.

Figure 6. Logistics Information Integration Vision
Figure 6 depicts a series of translator and agents extracting data from various logistics legacy
applications. The larger umbrella on the left conceptualizes the ability of integration networks to
be developed in a manner which would allow them to function with other networks. From a fleet
perspective the development of a system of networks would allow all layers of the organization
to extract the same source data and convert it to decision support tools that would meet diverse
mission requirements and responsibilities.
Figure 7 shows a more detailed perspective of logistics system integration at a unit or command
level.
Figure 8 provides a conceptual perspective which brings together the repair, supply, and
inventory functional areas from 3 separate organizational levels. The network to the right
depicts a centralized information source that would be feed through a series of agents serving to
communicate with various user communities.
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Fig.7: Logistics Systems Integrations through translators and agents

Figure 8. Logistics Information Integration
Figure 9. displays an information network that ties together the key logistics elements of fleet
operations with the capability to focus on the critical information in the decision making process.
An effective, integrated, and intelligent network of logistics information systems will bring

106

together common information in a shared environment which will permit stakeholders to meet
their responsibilities while ensuring the commonality of the data/information source.

Fig.9: Achieving a Balance
Once this network is in place, collaboration can occur and communities of practice can come
together to support decisions based on related functional information. This highlights a
streamlined organization and information network that allows for true collaboration to occur with
the numerous and varied stakeholders each empowered to make the best possible decisions based
on information availability and knowledge.

V. Summary
—The significant problems we face cannot be solved with the same level of thinking that
created them.“ Albert Einstein

People - As Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz noted in his testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, the single greatest element of Defense Transformation is the all
volunteer force. We are experiencing unparalleled enlistment, retention, and reenlistment rates.
Our military personnel are more capable and adapt at utilizing current technology than ever
before. They have grown up in the information age, with keyboards and mouse‘s as extensions
of their fingers. If we don‘t provide them with tools that are useful, functional, and
technologically current we will lose these powerful force multipliers to private sector.

Threat - We must take advantage of the information that is available within the DOD and
utilize the technology available in private and academic communities if we are to exploit
Information Technology and move forward. As we develop our plans for the future we need to
look at what functions should be done in house and what functions should be outsourced. In that
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light, it is essential that the department correctly assess the threat, create a strategy to counter that
threat, and develop the plans necessary to execute the strategy. This function is inherently
governmental and should be done by government military or civilian employees. If we fail to
plan develop and implement with the appropriate mix of stakeholders we will not be able to
respond as required. History has shown that we don‘t have to wait 16 years to deliver
acceptable products if we work within the organization and seek out pockets of innovation.

Information - Today‘s demand for meaningful and valuable information will not allow us to
wait for the data/information owner to provide us with the information … we need tools that are
user-centric which will allow us to gain access to information when required. From a
technological perspective there is no longer a need to rely on stovepipe organizations to pass
data/information to the user community. The real challenge will be overcoming the information
protectionist policies of legacy information owners. The advent of Agents provides us with the
opportunity to intelligently integrate data and information. In order to expedite the
information/knowledge management process we must exploit our pockets of innovation and
develop a strategic blueprint for intelligent information management.
Logistics - Focused logistics will require the cooperation, communication, and interoperations
of our allies and sister services. It is essential that the 4 elements of logistics and supply support
are brought together to focus on material availability. This will require material manufacture,
repair, storage, stock replenishment, and transportation; based on the best information available
to all the organizations involved in the process. With increased availability of information and
the intelligent use (filtering) of that information to all organizations and individuals involved; we
will be in a better position to ensure material, equipment, and personnel availability. Within the
DOD each of the services are taking a different approach to the logistics support/material
availability strategy. In some cases material support will be 100% contractor supported, while in
other cases there are plans to allow the manufacture of material —on-the-fly“ providing mobile
manufacturing capability and an inventory of raw material. If we are going to transform the
DOD we need a department level strategy that recognizes the interdependence of our military
services.

Transformation
We can not wait 10 to 20 years to deliver major weapons systems, we must figure out how to
bring systems on line faster. (Wolfwitz 2002). As Vadm Cebrowski pointed out in April 2002
during testimony on military transformation; change does not have to take this long, proof
shows up again and again in our history. For example, the go-a-head for the Polaris missile
program was given in November 1956. Just 48 months later, the USS George Washington œ our
first Polaris missile submarine made it‘s first patrol. Our Navy‘s strategic program has been
uninterrupted since. The program has been flawless because of the vision, commitment,
cooperation, and teamwork of dedicated personnel and organizations.

108

As Naval Commanders seek to create balanced programs it is imperative that the future realities
of uncertainty, chaos, surprise, and conflict be kept in perspective, we must focus on our
collective missions and never lose sight of the importance we play in support of our National
Security Strategy. Failure is not an option!
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Section B: Homeland Security

The textual portions of some of the papers in this section are
based on audio recordings that have been transcribed and
edited by members of the Conference Organizing Committee.
These papers typically consist of two sections: the textual
transcription of the audio recording; and, a set of PowerPoint
slides.
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Homeland Security: A View Through the Eyes of Janus
Steven I. Cooper
Special Assistant to the President
Senior Director for Information Integration and CIO
Office of Homeland Security
Lee Holcomb
Director of Infostructure
Office of Homeland Security
It is a pleasure to be here this morning and to share some information with you. What I would
like to do is the following. I‘d like to give you a very quick overview of where we (Office of
Homeland Security) have been, and then share with you where we are headed. Within that
context, I want to take about the first 15 minutes, so somebody keep me honest and on time
please… then I want to hand it off to Lee Holcomb.
Lee came on board as our director of infostructure, —I-N-F-O-structure“. I will smilingly tell you
that I spent over two weeks battling with the White House Office of Administration and
Presidential Personnel over the fact that I was misspelling —infrastructure“. So, if we put this in
the context of transformation, which is the theme of this conference, it starts on a pretty mundane
scale, but it is honestly representative of part of the major task of transformation that we are
really about.
When I came on board in March, I was given basically three objectives by Governor Ridge and
President Bush. The first was to help map out the national strategy for homeland security. We
released that to the President in July, the President then signed that and released it to the public
in mid July and I don‘t know if all of you have had the chance to read it. If not, you can
download it from the White House web-site. Take a look at it. There‘s a lot in it. And so we
were able to put a little checkmark by that task. I am using —we“… it was myself and Jim Flycik.
Jim is special advisor to Governor Ridge and my deputy. Jim, many of you may know, was an
associate secretary in the Treasury Department and the Chief Information Officer (CIO) of
Treasury when we pulled him over. Jim and I basically drafted the chapter around information
sharing and systems.
The second objective that we were given is deceptively simple when you hear it in words. It
focuses on the essential information needed for homeland security. We can effectively translate
that into combating terrorism, but with regard to the essential information for homeland security,
and integrate the federal government. I playfully asked Governor Ridge: Well, that will keep me
busy for a few months, what do you want me to do after that?
Prepared, as he always is, he then handed me the third objective. This objective deals with the
essential information necessary for combating terrorism and homeland security, and integrating
the federal government with state, local and tribal governments in the private sector. That
objective is taking a little longer. Quite honestly, those really are my objectives, and we needed
to reach these objectives yesterday.
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The paradigm that we then began to shift into was to first shape some type of vision of where we
needed to be. And this again was meant to be a national strategy, and therefore it had to be, I
felt, a national vision. So, here‘s basically the very central national vision around information,
integration, information sharing, information delivery, and information technology, because all
of those are components of this vision. OK, expressed very simply and I am sure that you‘ve
already heard this in some form or another, but I‘ll show you where there are two fundamental
differences: we basically have to ensure that the right information gets to the right people all
the time. I am sure you‘ve heard these phrases many times: right information; right people; and,
right time. So, the first paradigm change is: all the time. In the war that we are fighting, and it is
a real war, it is all the time. That in itself is a huge difference in how we think about information
delivery.
The second difference is more subtle, and that‘s about the right people. What I found when I
came on board is that there appears to be no federal agency whose mission includes collaboration
with another federal agency. I don‘t mean this in any negative sense, so please don‘t hear my
remarks as critical. There are good reasons why things were the way they were, and are the way
they are. I don‘t think it‘s because anybody gets up in the morning and decides: Let me see, what
can I do to mess things up today? Nobody starts their day that way, and nobody‘s mission is
about messing up. It‘s about helping and accomplishing the unit‘s mission. But it is interesting
that I could not find a federal agency whose mission includes collaboration with another federal
agency. It‘s just an observation. It‘s not right or wrong, it‘s just an observation.
OK, so let‘s come back to the right people for a moment. The paradigm that I found and that I
am still finding to a large extent is based on —need to know“. One can argue that there are a lot
of good reasons for this. The intelligence community has beaten me about the head and
shoulders as to why everything we have to do is based on need to know. OK, fine, I accept this.
There are certain things that I admit I am not necessarily going to take on as major
transformation. I am not going to take on the intelligence community on the issue of —need to
know“. The Department of Defense (DoD) tends to lean in the same direction, to a somewhat
lesser extent. Interestingly enough it‘s not so much pure need to know in the intelligence sense,
but rather… forgive me for saying this, again I don‘t really mean it critically… but it‘s
entrenched around the respective services. Certainly, the Marine Corps, Navy, Army, and Air
Force, have done really good things within each of their services. However, interestingly
enough, when you get to the DoD level you find the same type of mindset: We accept that this
guy is in the Navy, and we are in the Air Force, but wait a minute, why does this person need to
know… blah, blah, blah, and so on.
So, the notion of the right people, as we have defined it at this point in time, gets in the way of
what we have been tasked to do. Lee, myself, Jim Flycik, Bob Shepherd, and Mike Resnick who
is on detail to us from the FBI, are the core people. A pretty small team. I think it‘s a very, very
high quality team and I‘ve been very, very impressed by the quality of people that I‘ve talked to
and met in the federal environment. But, we need to kind of turn the right people paradigm…
and I won‘t say around… but we need to shift it slightly. It is my contention that we really need
to move toward… and I know that this is part of the theme that all of you have been talking
about for some time… we need to think in terms of an information-centric type of environment.
So in fact, if I have a role to play in whatever my job mission and organizational unit is, I need
information to do whatever I do. Now, let‘s play on that for just a second. Whatever I‘m doing
fits into some type of process. I am going to call it a business process, because quite frankly we
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are talking about the business of homeland security. There are major business processes for
homeland security. Let me tell you what they are. Prevention, detection, protection, alerts, and
warnings, and… God forbid there should be an incident… incident management. Some of you
might call that disaster management or consequence management. We are calling it incident
management, response, and recovery. Those are the major business processes of homeland
security. Now there are some cross-cutting processes. Legal, policy type of activity, information
technology… it‘s cross cutting and not really a business process. However, information delivery
is a business process, research and development, and communication in the people to people
sense, not telecommunications in the technical sense. Then there a couple of other supporting
types of things, but those are the business processes. If I need information to do my business
process, and if I have a role to play, shouldn‘t I be able to access whatever information is needed
in the end to end process that I have a role to play in? That‘s a question, and I‘m posing this
question today. I could put a couple of you on the spot and ask you what do you think… and
maybe we‘ll do that.
My argument is that this is the beginning of a thought transformation that I think can lead to a
more effective way to accomplish the objectives that we have been given. Let me give you a
very real life example. The business process that begins with a foreign national applying for a
visa outside the United States and ends when that individual travels to the United States and
leaves the United States. Take a guess how many federal agencies are involved in that process
today. There are 11 federal agencies involved. Now guess what? Each one of those agencies
has a piece of that process. And guess what else, they don‘t see anybody else‘s piece of the
process. Think now… that‘s not because anybody consciously set out to design that process in
that manner. It‘s because the powers that be in the federal government, over time, chose to assign
various pieces of that process to various agencies. And each of those agencies set about to do the
best they could do in their domain of the process. But over time, you end up with 11 agencies
and 11 stealth plans that aren‘t integrated.
The transformation and the approach that we‘re taking to kind of begin to change this paradigm
is to develop, construct, and populate a national enterprise architecture for homeland security.
Very simply, if you‘re not familiar with the concept of an enterprise architecture, let me define it
for you. If you were to draw a triangle on your notepad in front of you and at the very top of the
triangle draw a horizontal line, and within a tiny triangle inside there just write —national
strategy“. Then that‘s the business strategy for homeland security. We have released version 1.0
of the national strategy for homeland security. Those of you who have anything to do with
information technology know that you don‘t want to necessarily buy version 1.0 of any software.
I don‘t think we‘re quite that bad. I don‘t think we have quite as many bugs, but I won‘t kid you.
The strategy that we have released is a first strategy. We need feedback. We need dialogue from
all sectors, public and private. We need feedback from individual citizens. We need feedback
from our allies outside the United States. So part of the purpose in the first release was to engage
that dialogue. And we‘ve begun that process.
Strategy, as you know, is dynamic. I served in the Navy on active duty for a couple of years
during the Vietnam era, and subsequently spent 14 years flying naval air in the reserves. When I
was setting up my own company during that period of time and talking about my strategy and
this and that, my commanding officer looked at me and said: —Steve, strategy is what you use
when you run out of bullets.“ Well, I didn‘t argue with him at the time and I‘m not sure that I
agree with him, but be that as it may, the top layer is the national strategy. The next layer down
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is really where you‘ll find the capabilities, the strategic capabilities, the functions, and the major
business processes of homeland securities, and those are the ones that I described to you. The
next layer below that represents the information. We need to successfully carry out those major
functions, deliver the capabilities, and successfully execute the processes in that business process
layer. OK, so those top three layers are about the business and they really don‘t have anything to
do with technology.
Now, there are also three bottom layers… so you can kind of draw another couple of lines. In
order, the next layer down can be thought of as the equivalent of applications and/or decision
support capabilities that automate and enable the three layers above. The next layer down deals
basically with what I‘m going to call desktop services, pervasive services in an automated way.
So for example, if you‘re a knowledge worker or if you‘re a warfighter, those computer-based,
electronic devices will deliver a lot of pervasive services. That‘s for example where you find email, or file and print services. The bottom layer is basically the stuff that you never see, it‘s
behind the screen, it‘s where you find most of your local area networks, your wide area
networks, virtual private networks, and that type of thing. So it‘s all the technical structure that
supports everything else. Quite simply, we need to develop and populate a national enterprise
architecture for homeland security. This is one of the major deliverables that we are working
toward.
We have engaged state governments through a working group of state CIOs (Chief Information
Officers). This is one of the areas where Lee (Holcomb) is leading the charge, so to speak. There
is a poster board that we set up outside. You might have seen it when you walked in. It‘s very
much a work in progress, and has not yet been vetted by the agencies and others. We have set up
some CIO working groups in the federal environment. These are comprised of CIOs of the
agencies that will become part of the new Department of Homeland Security. We are tackling the
major processes and information around four groups that are represented in the President‘s
proposal for the new department. The poster board shows you a glimpse of the —as is“ state of
what we found. It also shows a conceptual diagram of the concepts —of push back the border“
and —smart borders“ that are beginning to evolve. In fact, Rob Quartel, I think is speaking to you
later this afternoon and will probably expand upon the —smart border“ concept.
The second area that we are addressing deals with emergency preparedness and response. You
can think of these as directorates or divisions inside the new department. The third is new
capability, such as information analysis and infrastructure protection. This is a new capability
that the President and Governor Ridge want on day one, and I will try to give you a little bit of
insight into that area later. And then, the fourth area is science and technology. The role that
broad technology (not just information technology) plays is critical to bringing a lot of the
technology that exists in America on-line, quickly and effectively.
So that‘s the national enterprise architecture and that, as I said, is one of the major things that we
are doing. Let me tell you some of the other things that we found. One of the major tasks that
we have embarked upon is to basically create a virtual consolidation, or a virtual single watchout list. This is a word that I invented after I went to talk to the intelligence community and they
told me about their —watch list“ of bad guys that we don‘t want in the United States. Also some
civilian agencies, the State Department, and a couple of others call them —watch lists.“ When I
went over to DoD, and those of you who are now or were formerly in the service know this, I
found out that a watch list is not about bad guys that we want to keep out of the United States.
It‘s a list I don‘t want to be on because I don‘t want to stand on watch, or do that duty, or
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something like that. So DoD refers to them as —look-out lists.“ The airline industry has another
acronym that they use. So, playfully in one meeting with a couple of representatives I suggested
that we just call them watch-out lists, and this name appears to have been accepted for the time
being.
But here is what we found. There are 14 major watch-out lists. This is not because anybody is
doing the wrong thing. Rather, it‘s again similar to what I described to you previously. Each
agency has a mission, and they created for their purpose and their mission a list of people that
they want to keep out of the United States. But we need to make certain that the names that are
on any of these lists are on every list. So we have embarked upon, literally for the first time in
history, a process of pulling all these groups together and figuring out how to create the
equivalent of one list. Technically, we can achieve this. There are different approaches that we
can investigate, that we are investigating, and that we are looking at. But the challenge is around
people and process, not technology. Like it or not, this is —turf“. People protect turf when it‘s
time for change. We will work through it. It‘s too critically important not to work through it.
So, the motivation to work together is real. If we don‘t catch somebody that we need to catch,
people may die. It‘s that simple, and that‘s a very powerful motivator for change.
In fact, we found that we had only started to peel back the onion a bit. Underlying these 14 major
lists, there are 58 minor lists. Some of the 58 are fed by databases and other lists. Some of these
feed the major lists, and some don‘t. So this is real. Numbers are real. This is what we‘re
finding. This is what we‘ve got to tackle, and we have to do it yesterday. We need help. I mean
those of you who represent the private sector, we believe that an awful lot of the solution sets
that we‘re looking for around information technology are in the private sector. Those of you
who are federal agencies, we need your help. My challenge to you is as follows. You need to
think more broadly. I know I‘m lecturing… you‘re right, I am. I‘m asking for help. I‘m
suggesting that you need to think more broadly if you‘re mission is related to homeland security.
Certainly those of you who are in uniform might think… I don‘t know whether I should believe
this guy or not. I am simply planting a seed. You can nurture it and help it grow, or you can
decide… I listened to the guy I don‘t agree with him, and that‘s perfectly acceptable. That‘s
what we‘re about.
That was one very real example, and there are others. We are also addressing the need for
—vertical integration“ around state and local governments, and in the private sector. We are
putting together some forums in major cities to actually talk with and listen to state, local, and
private sector representatives. Our first forum to engage the first responder community is coming
up in Atlanta on October 16 and 17. Georgia Tech and its Institute of Homeland Security is
jointly sponsoring this forum, and you‘ll hear from Tom Bevan this afternoon. Tom, his institute
and Georgia Tech have provided an enormous amount of help in putting this together. The other
cities that we are initially targeting include Indianapolis, San Diego, and Seattle. We are trying
to cover geography, but we‘re small staffed and therefore we can‘t move as quickly as we would
like to. Part of what we‘re doing here is to look for best practice. I believe very strongly that an
awful lot of the solutions that we need already exist. We just have to locate them, identify them,
and raise their visibility. One such example that we found is the emergency response network
that has been built by the local community in Dallas. They‘ve actually pulled together with the
local FBI, law enforcement, public safety, public health, the hotel and hospitality industry, the
private sector, and they‘ve done a marvelous job of creating a web-enabled emergency response
communication network that they use every day. This resulted in the arrests of various people.
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It‘s an example of best practice that we believe in, and we would like to kind of replicate it and
make it known across the United States. And so those are some quick examples.
Let me stop and turn this over to Lee Holcomb, to talk a little bit about some of the observations
that he has, and then let us give you a chance to ask some questions and we‘ll try to respond as
effectively as we can.
Thank you. First of all we haven‘t coordinated this talk at all, so it will be interesting to see if it
fits together or not. Many of the things that I‘m going to touch on will cut very coarsely into
things that Steve had mentioned. First of all I have to say that it has been a great honor and
challenge to come in and take on the activity of trying to put together a sound architecture… an
enterprise architecture for homeland security. The pyramid framework that Steve described is in
fact the framework that was developed by the federal CIO counsel and promulgated over the last
two or three years as part of the guidance to the various federal agencies for putting together an
enterprise architecture for their respective agencies. We‘re trying to follow that guidance as we
move forward and develop an enterprise architecture for homeland security. It starts at the top
with the strategy that was mentioned, and then gets down into the business process level. The
chart that is outside is in fact an early product of one of our four working groups involved in the
review process right now. We would welcome any comments you would like to provide.
It addresses one of the four areas that Steve mentioned… the area of border and transportation
security. One of the things that I believe is important is to look at the information sharing
processes that support these business processes. They do differ depending on who you are and
where you are in the cycle. They may include a technology of pushing information to
individuals, and they may include a process of pulling information or a process of subscribing to
get that information. It may be a process where you simply want to generate a query. If you‘re a
border guard you may just want to know if is this a bad guy and what do I do about it. Or, it may
be a process that requires access in order to engage in peer-to-peer collaboration. All of those
processes are ones that we need to understand… which ones fit the individuals and their interests
and how do we actually architect the system in a way that we can make it happen? The notion of
—need to know“ is going to end up, as Steve mentioned, as an inhibitor to the ability of these
processes to work. I think it‘s highly doable but we certainly would like your thoughts and ideas
on which of these particular ways of sharing information are appropriate for the different
processes… and ideas on how to make it happen.
Another key part of the strategy document that the President has put out is the whole area of
creating metadata… ontologies if you will, for various communities. I think, if you look back
historically over the past eight to ten years, there are communities that have addressed this online issue. I will mention two of these organizations, because I believe that they have done a
pretty good job. One of them is the National Library of Medicine. They have the advantage that
they teach medicine and the terminology that they use is kind of somewhat under their control.
The other is the Eisenhower Library for Education and their digital on-line library that the NSF
(National Science Foundation) and the Department of Education have funded. Both of those
organizations have done a pretty good job of developing ontologies and metadata. But when you
get beyond those communities, and certainly when you get into a lot of the tactical military areas,
it has been more difficult to see that development. We need to find ways to motivate individuals
to help develop those standards… those metadata standards. Also, we need to reward people for
success in this area, and make it easier to contribute.
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Many of you have come up with ideas, such as… we just need to copy what various commercial
entities are doing… we should build a huge data warehouse and we‘ll mine everything. I think
that one of the conclusions we‘ve reached is that it is highly unlikely that there will ever be one
large warehouse of data. Due to privacy concerns and many other factors we need to find a way
to work with systems… sets of systems and not one large mega system.
There is another observation that I would like to share with you on looking back over the last 10
to 15 years. Right after Desert Storm, you may or may not recall, there was a pretty large outcry
that the intelligence community failed in supporting the tactical warfighter. They did a great job
in getting information to the beltway here. A lot of excellent networks around the Washington
area got that information here for strategic national decision making, but the poor guy there on
the warfront wasn‘t getting that information. There were hearings and discussions about it at that
time… and over the last 10 years DoD and the intelligence community have worked very hard to
try to break down those barriers… to try to get that information out to the warfighter. I think
today we see significant improvement in that linkage, and there is a lot of expertise to draw from
the military in that regard.
Anybody watch the news last night? Notice that they had hearings yesterday on the failure in the
intelligence community to get information out to those who needed to act last year on September
11. It‘s the same problem, but we are dealing here with a much broader community. It is easier
to push information out to a warfighter who may have more of a trusted relationship. In respect
to September 11 we are talking about pushing information out to a much broader community.
One of the biggest challenges we have is to deal with how we can disseminate this information to
individuals that may not have the same trusted relationship that the warfighter has. I believe that
there are many lessons that we can take from the military and how they tackled that problem in
the 1990s. Last week in a workshop with General Kellogg, we addressed some of those issues
and I think that there‘s a partnership that we can form with that community. Everyone has said
this before. I‘ve watched it in my own organization.
This week there‘s a new Harvard University business case study coming out that I happen to be a
participant in. It deals with knowledge management within NASA… what went right and what
went wrong and like all Harvard business cases, it doesn‘t all look rosy. I can tell you right now
that NASA is a highly technical agency that has ready access to the technology that‘s out there.
Knowledge management wasn‘t working well in the agency, not because of technology issues
but due to it's culture and it‘s incentives. Much of what we had spent time on in this case
addresses the question of how do you provide an environment of incentives for people? How do
you create the culture and the rewards to promote knowledge sharing?
Information sources are very important. As you know, traditionally we‘ve been talking about
information that flows among the law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities, at the
core. There are additional extremely important information resources out there that we need to
tap. The private sector. I worked a lot with the aviation industry in NASA, working on the
safety of aviation. The airlines have huge amounts of information on their flights can be mined
for safety and security purposes. Yet there are disincentives to those companies to share that
information. They don‘t want their competitors to get it, so we need to find incentives and ways
to collaborate with industry to protect the things that are competitive, but be able to extract from
that the information what we need for security purposes.
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The other community that‘s really important is our citizens. We need to find ways to get
information from citizens that can help us. We need to do it in a way that doesn‘t infringe on
privacy concerns, and we need to deal with a wide variety of legal issues associated with citizens
providing information. We need to be able to vet this information in some way, and we need to
be able to categorize it in terms of quality. But we need to find a way to bring the information
from this wide set of sources together. We need new models for doing that. We welcome your
thoughts on how to do that.
The last comment that I will make is related to something that Steve and I were talking about
yesterday. When you look at these mission control centers or incident centers, what you see is a
room full of screens, with a little sign on top of each one… for example, coming from NASA. If
you look at the mission control center in Houston you see the same thing. You see a subsystem
for propulsion, and so on, and so forth. Behind all of these are a lot of databases and, of course,
different agencies and so forth. However, in the end it comes down to a bunch of people sitting
there, in other words it‘s people to people connections. We need to find ways to deal with this
paradigm and be able to not only assimilate information within a community, but to cross over
and to deal with both the explicit information you can capture about a system and the implicit
information that individuals have. How do we bring that together, and how do we find
paradigms that will blend the automated systems that we have with the stovepipe systems that we
have and cross over and endure effective communication between individuals.
Those are some of the challenges that I think we need to tackle. We would welcome your
thoughts and ideas, all in the context of homeland security. So with that I think I‘m going to stop
and open it up. Steve, if you would like to take and field some questions.
Questions from the audience:
Question: So you're asking for our ideas, but you say there is no funding. Where do you want us
to send all these ideas? How are you going to process them? You challenge the group, where do
you want us to turn.
Cooper: OK, here‘s what we‘re doing and admittedly you‘re hitting a couple of the challenges
we‘ve got. Technology, particularly broader technology, scanning devices, sensors, and things
like that we‘re actually channeling through the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy. There‘s a group that supports them… the TSWG working group. I think that‘s a process
that apparently has been in place for a while. It certainly existed before I got here. It‘s a process
that is kind of geared up to work on a much larger volume faster than our small office obviously
can, meaning the White House Office of Homeland Security. However, that group is not well
equipped to deal with information technology. It‘s really not their focus. Therefore, what we‘ve
done internal to the White House Office of Homeland Security is to link up with the Department
of Commerce. This may not be the best solution of the moment, but they are equipped and can
help us and are helping us with a first pass at handling the volume of proposals and information
that we‘re getting.
Question: Have they gone out with a BAA yet?
Cooper: No, we‘ve not gone out with any BAAs yet.
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Question: You're just ad-hoc-ing?
Cooper: Well, yes, if you want to think of it that way. We have a process. I‘m not sure it‘s quite
ad hoc. I think it‘s a little more structured than that. But we have not formally gone out for
requests for proposals or some type of procurement action specifically related to homeland
security. Why? The White House Office of Homeland Security is not a procuring agency.
We‘re an advisory agency, and we are not replacing the existing procurement channels within
any of the agencies that are proposed to become part of the new Department of Homeland
Security. So one mechanism is to continue to talk with those agencies.
Question: Who will those agencies be in the administrative system? Do you anticipate that it will
be the Department of Commerce?
Cooper: In the long run it will be the Department of Homeland Security. Once the legislation is
enacted, it will become the Department of Homeland Security. And the Department of
Homeland Security will then: (1) take on procurement authority; and, (2) become the lead
agency for anything related to homeland security. We‘re not there yet. Unfortunately we‘re in
this kind of transition mode.
Holcomb: I would just like to add a comment, Steve. We have created these four cross-cutting
teams that are looking at the different business processes. They are not initially intended to fund
activities. However, as a group, for example in the border and transportation security area, we
would look to that working group to vet a proposal in their area. So we will begin taking these
pilot activities before those groups to establish goodness of fit to the business processes that
we‘re in the process of developing.
Question: How do we get good ideas to you?
Cooper: The easiest way, although you have to bear with us on timing a little bit because we‘re
currently running about a four-week backlog is to send stuff directly to my staff… to me or to
Lee. We will leave our cards on the table somewhere and you guys can pick them up… send it to
us by e-mail. We are actually working through these e-mails. In the time that I‘ve been on
board, we‘ve probably worked through over a thousand inputs and/or proposals, many
unsolicited proposals. Not perfect, but it‘s better than nothing.
Question: In what you‘ve explained here, and you started off by indicating that moving into an
information centric environment is important and an opportunity that we can‘t miss right now. It
seems that there are five sort of concurrent processes that you‘re involved in… a kind of
summary of what I heard you say. Firstly, you obviously need to know what is the status, what is
available out there, and also what are we doing wrong at the moment. You and your group are
bringing a great deal of expertise from industry… that‘s something that you had from day one.
Then secondly, however, there is a transition that is taking place because we‘re not an
information-centric environment right now. We‘re in a data-processing environment. So there
is a need for leadership and vision to get things started… to move in the right direction. And
there is a great deal of need for coordination. But there is also a need to show industry,
government, users, and agencies what this information-centric environment can provide for them
and how we can get there. And that‘s probably a real problematic issue for you. Because on the
one hand, there is urgency and you want to start some major project, you want to create an
architecture. On the other hand, the world is not really ready for that major architecture right
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now because we haven‘t gone through the transition. So then there is the possibility of some
very fast pilot project to show everybody what this architecture could be. Could you address this
a little bit? How are you going to proceed with this very difficult problem?
Cooper: Yes, absolutely. In fact, what we‘re doing is really operating along two parallel paths.
What we have to do is exactly what you just described in the process of developing an enterprise
architecture… about creating a vision… about creating leadership that moves us from wherever
we are to an information-centric type of environment. We‘ve begun that work. You‘ve heard us
talk about the CIO working groups. You‘ve heard about what we‘re doing in this area. In
parallel, we are also identifying pilot projects to demonstrate what might be successful… what
does the desired end state look like. Here we were are temporarily delayed. I‘ll phrase it this
way, we‘re temporarily delayed because the funding for pilot projects to speed up the enterprise
architecture is in the President‘s 2003 budget which is in Congress… and that‘s about as much as
I‘m allowed to say about Congress. We do indeed have several pilot projects identified. I can
share a few of them with you. There‘s the 10-state coalition led by the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement that is going to link and share some knowledge management tools, analytical
tools and capabilities, for law enforcement sensitive information. I mentioned the Dallas
Emergency Response Network which we would like to replicate in other environments across the
United States. Also, there‘s the virtual watch list consolidation that we‘ve begun work on even
though we don‘t have the money. So, there are several pilot projects we‘ve identified.
Holcomb: We are also working the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are seriously looking at some
collaborative projects in appropriate areas. One of those is protecting critical military
infrastructure. The President‘s strategy has laid out the various infrastructures that are in the US,
and DoD has been assigned as the lead for all of the infrastructure that supports our bases and
military operations. They are looking at a pilot project in that area as something they might get
going. So, even where we don‘t have HLS direct funding, agencies that are coming into it will
collaborate with us. We‘re planning to encourage a selective set of pilot projects.
Cooper: We‘ve had some very constructive discussions with the Department of Defense,
including Northern Command. In fact just yesterday I talked with General Kellogg (J6, Joint
Chiefs of Staff) about this national enterprise architecture. We‘re also working very closely with
General Meyerrose who is tasked with effectively guiding DoD‘s enterprise architecture for
Northern Command… so we‘re linked, and quite simply DoD has money. There are absolutely
ways to get things done. For example, in talking with General Kellogg and saying, look you take
the lead, you‘ve got the funding, let‘s link up, let‘s move forward. Maybe I have an advantage in
that I don‘t know what I don‘t know… and until somebody comes along and says you can‘t do
that, my approach is just do it. I admit to carrying over from the private sector, but so far it‘s
worked pretty effectively and I haven‘t gotten fired, and I haven‘t gotten into trouble yet.
Question: There are not a lot of people out there that know what all the other agencies are
doing, how they are doing it and why they are doing it?.
Cooper: Ok I‘m going to give you a totally honest and candid answer. Yesterday morning, Lee
and I were standing in my office and I said, Lee, we need to get a great big sheet of white paper,
stick it on the wall and start putting yellow post-it notes for every project we‘ve identified across
all these agencies. Now, is that very sophisticated from a technology standpoint? No, but in
reality what we recognized is that we are in a unique position. OK, we probably are at the
beginning of knowing more about what‘s going on related to homeland security. We obviously
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are far from knowing everything that‘s going on related to homeland security in every agency in
the federal environment, state and local, and private sector. However, we simply need to take
this collective knowledge that we have and publish it. First we need to get it out of our heads and
off all these notes we‘ve got scribbled all over the place… and honest to God that really is what
we started doing. We actually can do that quickly, publish that information, so that people can
cross-pollinate.
Question: I agree, but to what degree is human interaction involved? Getting people in the
same room just to dialog or speak on issues... firefighters vs. emergency response personnel vs.
VIPs... very different kinds of people.
Holcomb: It‘s a difficult issue. I spent 20 years involved in what was under the Regan
administration called —Fix It“, and then after that it got transformed into the National Science and
Technology Counsel, and after that it‘s gone into Community on Information, and so on. I can‘t
remember what it is called now… it‘s gone through three or four different names. A lot of what
that committee did, at least on the R&D side of the federal government, was to try and get the
agencies that are involved to talk. Exactly what you‘re saying is what we found. If you stay at
the management level, you don‘t get the kind of interaction that you want. Quite frankly you get
folks that are trying to advocate budgets and they‘re somewhat competitive. When you get down
to the technical level, the people that are actually working the projects, you find that people are
doing very similar things. When they start to talk to each other they‘re going to say, why should I
duplicate. Why don‘t I work with you and collaborate. That‘s what we found in this program
and, by the way that program led to what we know today as the Internet. OK, the ”Fix-It‘
initiative supported the original collaboration between DARPA, NSF, NASA and DoD that led
to the development of the Internet. This happened mostly at the grass roots level because people
wanted to work together. It turned out that this model worked really well because you got more
out of it when they collaborated because you didn‘t have to connect so many different places by
sharing. That group has experienced exactly what you‘re talking about. Do we have that for
homeland security today? Not exactly, we don‘t have that infrastructure in place yet.
Question: One more question Steve. As you struggle with this incredible task of the overall
national coordination, you also have to deal with some very real vulnerabilities that exist right
now. One of these vulnerabilities that has been discussed here… we had Larry Mallon and John
Hwang talk about it yesterday and Rob Quartel is going to talk more about it this afternoon, is
the goods shipment area. In this area we are very vulnerable at the present time… I think we all
understand that. So as you struggle with the national infrastructure issues, how are you able to
address the critical vulnerabilities… and there probably are more, but this is one is well known.
Cooper: Yes, the group that‘s kind of leading the charge actively on that is a group that again is
being supported by our office out of the White House. There is a container working group that is
actively working on a policy at the coordinating level This group has made a number of
recommendations to the appropriate agencies, including the Coast Guard, INS, Customs… those
are the major ones. So again, there‘s parallel work going on. We recognize that we have to do
stuff today at the same time that we‘re shaping tomorrow. And you know, is there some margin
for error here? Yes, absolutely. But I think you have to bring a little bit of what I call pragmatic
reality to the situation. At the same, I don‘t think that developing a desired state vision is
mutually exclusive from doing things today. Some of the things you do today may not get you to
your desired vision, but that doesn‘t mean that one should not do it. It‘s the right thing to do
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under the circumstances right now. What we‘re trying to do as quickly as we can, is to shape the
vision so that we can take any action that needs to be done and figure out whether it is basically
in the right direction. I argue, so what if it‘s headed northeast, northwest, who cares? Make a
midcourse adjustment, right? If it‘s headed south, then I think before you act upon it, you
quickly evaluate, might there be an alternative, because south is going to be a throwaway. And
then you have to make a business decision. Whatever the cost of that decision is… near term
and longer term? You have to make a business decision… I‘m sorry, I know I sound like a
broken record, but this is about business and it‘s the business of homeland security.
Maybe last question, are we running out of time… last question…
Question: Have you compared notes with the general public?.
Cooper: We‘ve begun that dialogue. It is not just the federal government and/or state and local
governments feeding information to the average citizen. It‘s also what information the citizens
have that they would like to kind of get into the government environment. We‘re doing a couple
of things. First, we‘re looking for best practices that might already exist, where something is
already being done to exchange information with the average citizen. That Emergency Response
Network that I mentioned in Dallas is one example. If you go out to their web-site and I forgot
the URL… if you send us an e-mail we‘ll send you the URL. They actually have a little web
report that you can click on and fill out incident information on something that you as a citizen
may have observed. It feeds directly to the local FBI office. When I first learned about this, I
figured, well I‘m going to give it a try. I filled out one of these report templates. It must have
been about 8:30 at night or something and I sent it. I didn‘t make anything up, but simply
entered, Steve Cooper, White House, Washington (DC). Honestly, within three minutes I
received a call from Special Agent Art Fiero in the Dallas FBI office and the conversation was
kind of funny. He introduced himself and I reintroduced myself, and he asked did you send a
Shield Report… they call it a Shield Report… and I said yes, and I said I‘d like to learn more
about this. He said, well it‘s kind of late, can I get back to you tomorrow… I said of course. He
called me back the next morning about 8:30 am. I answered the phone and he said this is Special
Agent Art Fiero of the FBI. I said yes, I remember from last night, and he said: You really are
with the White House. I said yes, and I said… it never occurred to me that I might cause a
problem, I was just interested to find out how this web-site works. He came back and he said,
well we‘ve done a little research and how can we help you? This is funny… but it is an example
of how we can begin this two-way dialogue.
The other thing that we‘re doing is related to the information-sharing forums that I mentioned
previously. These provide opportunities to reach out and to listen to people who are outside the
normal environments, and for the outside intelligence community to listen and understand, tell us
what they would like to see.
Let me tell you about a vision that I have. Wouldn‘t it be kind of neat if any citizen in the United
States could go to the Department of Homeland Security portal on the web and enter his or her
zip code or street address… and what you get is anything relevant to your house or where you
live that might be of interest to you related to homeland security. Wouldn‘t that be kind of neat?
Now that‘s part of my vision. We‘ve got the technology… if we can get past this people and
process stuff, I would argue that we just added value for every citizen in the United States.
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Matrix Management Concept . . .
A new administration is being formed for our Homeland Security. Unfortunately it is being
created on a traditional "inline" management template from the top down to a working level. It
is suggested to keep our present administrative government as many departments have built
strong time-honored response capabilities. Our major problem is that the security issues within
our government structures need to be identified, coordinated, managed and provided with
resources to operate effectively. Here Homeland Security can become the "crossline"
"program managers". They would act across the "inline" administrations at levels where
security issues are handled according to that program. These two "lines" of management
constitute a Matrix Management. Where they intersect we have "nodes" of direct control with
delegated authority for responsible action and reporting up the "inlines". Now within each
administration we can "sub-matrix" management or at least "parallel" manage to shorten the lines
to the top.This way decision-making gets done quickly at a working level
. . . keep our inline government administration intact . .
they now have working resources in place . . . and can expand . . .

. . . Homeland Security develops viable security programs crossline . . .
. . . with collaborating nodes . . . for immediate decision-making . . .
. . . action . . . and reporting
...
that is Matrix Management

A decentralised homeland security is well understood as the essential way to recognise and
handle local breaches in security. Those many people in the field are more familiar with the
situation, know the people, the resources to gather and what they can collectively rely on to get
things done. With initiative they improvise by selecting information that is more meaningful in
the context they know. Here we "let the trees of the forest grow" by allowing the various
government agencies to continue to conventionally "inline" manage their affairs with top down
administrative authority. We are now asking those inline managers to identify the security issues
within their organisation, delegate responsibility from the top to a reliable technically competent
manager to become the collaborative matrix "node" in the "crossline" homeland security
programs.
A centralised homeland security is seen as the essential place to go for all national and
international security issues, a resource for all information and a readiness to combat breaches
beyond the local borders of jurisdiction. These become "programs" where select people see a
broader scene within a context of cascading situations and global resources. Here we "let the
forest with the trees grow" by inviting those centers of expertise and resources within
government agencies to collaborate at all levels in the national programs. It is important to
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"crossline" manage the programs in "nodes" at the levels where they can be effective in decisionmaking. Those nodal supervisors would be granted authority to respond laterally to the national
program without having to go up the line for every decision. However those nodes would still be
responsible for reporting actions and in accounting for the time and money in a shared program
budget with the central homeland security resources who "program manage" those contracts.
This way the Homeland Security becomes an administration of program or project managers
with many resources decentralised in an effective collaborative administrative matrix and
communications network.
Management : Management is people organising people and things to provide an environment
for an effective performance in task, work and process. Managers get things done. It is the basic
hands on, human factor in getting the appropriate people and things together for doing the job.
Thus the leadership of this team must first define what has to be done and with what resources in
order to build the organisation to do it.
Administration : Administration is the structure of the organisation for it to work,
incorporation, the legal entity through legislation, a charter or articles of association. It
empowers through a delegation of authority and codes of conduct for the organisation to be
managed. Thus this leadership must first define the context of the organisation so that it can be
authorised to be managed within the community in which it operates.
Security : Security is a building of confidence in those things that reliably guard us and our
world against danger, attack, threat, loss of income, false arrest, stolen identity, seisure of
property, fear, terror and war. Issues involve the signs of threat against our security, then the
action of the breach in security, our reaction to mitigate the threats and breaches, the recovery
from that breach, then the countermeasures for the threat, breach, reaction and recovery. It is
important to categorise security according to the types of threats and breaches, rather than the
trauma, terror, panic of the consequences. Talking about "counter terrorism" gets us nowhere ;
address the causes rather than the effects ; thus solutions are to "counter threat" and to "counter
the breach", in specific ways, that is Contingency and Emergency Planning. The initial signs may
give no indication as to the degree the cascading events may lead to, so it is very dangerous to
label it by extreme consequences. It is well known if you keep responding to false alarms nobody
will believe you for the real one, so paranoia sets in. Cry wolf too often, the real wolf will get
you.
Contingency Planning : A contingency is the dependence on the chance of a sporadic event
happening. Planning ahead both defines then anticipates or predicts the occurrence of those
events before-the-fact. Assuming we can define the parameters for that chance, then there are
contingent trends leading to it happening. With a chance of happening… it will happen ; that is
Murphy's Law. You do not know when, where or to what extent but the chance is there. Thus we
use trend analysis in contingency planning. For security issues we focus on the "what if"
outcomes of chance threats. Countermeasures are to eliminate the chance of the what ifs. We
use heuristic methods with sporadic models to discover those events, then trend analysis to find
the combinations of contingent subevents. We often use contingency planning in facility
management by staging outages for repairs, periodically testing alarms, calibrating control
systems, and using AIMS Automated Integrated Monitoring - Management Systems.
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Emergency Planning : An emergency is the dependence on the probability of an adverse event
happening. That is the chance now becomes a probability in the odds it will happen. It is afterthe-fact of the occurrence. Here we know the cause and effect so we assign a probability for the
risk in the consequences of those events happening. Like insurance it patches up after the breach
in security. Thus we use after-the-fact investigative, reconstructive, probability models in
analysing emergency planning. For security issues we focus on minimising the breaches and
mitigating losses. So those contingencies become emergencies when the chance of cascading
threats become probable breaches that we recognise and can respond to.
Inline Management : Top-Down, Hierarchical Administration : Bossland : Inline
management with its top-down administration is a sequential tree-like delegation of
responsibility within an organisation. Each succeeding level of authority depends on the effective
decision-making of both the one above and below it. This is fine for a sequential order of
dependent decisions, like in legal court procedures or filing applications, where each cumulates
then culminates in a final decision by a judge or assessor. Inline organisations depend on the top
person thus when they change or die it severely disrupts the whole line. This hierarchical
organisation is from the concept of a "sacred ruling" or feudal with respect to property control. It
is very time consuming, pedantic, with managers signing off at each level, but worse is that
decisions can not be changed along the way. Changes reflect failure and it is difficult for those
inline managers to save face so they pass the buck without modifying the situation. Inline
management is hopeless for contingency planning and emergency responses to breaches in
security where decisions are changing by the moment and action has to take place immediately
without top-down authority. The point is that emergencies reflect poorly on the organisation and
the lethargic internal reporting with public disclosure frequently fails to satisfy those outside
parties or organisations who are affected.
Parallel Management : Round-Table Administration : Camelot : Parallel management with
its round-table administration has representative managers, each having parity or "equality" in
the decision-making process, all presided over by a nominated Chair. I liken it to the Arthur's
Knights of the Round Table with the King presiding. Each representative manager has their own
portfolio of responsibility to account for. Significantly, important issues can move more rapidly
to the top management without being delayed or blocked by inline managers.In parallel
management the individual representation and nominated Chair can be easily changed with little
disruption to the organisation. The major question is in how you weigh the inequitable
decisions around the table. A recognised parliamentary procedure for meetings usually decides
by a vote with the Chair casting a deciding vote or a veto. Frequently the aggressive "dominant
monkey" wins as the saying goes in behavioral circles. Unfortunately in boardroom tactics
portfolios are often distributed according to the political camp of those above, who makes the
money, who budgets to get things done, then the allegiances in sway votes. To alleviate these
problems there should be many informal meetings for consensus building, particularly in
contingency and emergency decision-making and in authorising the nodal managers to interface
outside the organisation within a collaborative matrix program.
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Crossline Management : Program Administration : Crossline management with its program
administration is an inhouse across-the-organisation selection of experienced personnel and
specialised resources for specific interdisciplinary programs in research, development and
implementation. One administrative division may have the skilled professionals to do a job but
another division may have the testing, reporting or logistics facilities for the job. As Chief of the
Psychophysics Section, National Bureau of Standards in noise programs we were using the
reverberation chambers in Applied Acoustics and for visual programs the internationally
recognised experts in the Colorimetry Section. As a Senior Physical Scientist in the Federal
Energy Administration I liaisoned with the across-the-board programs in Conservation, Oil and
Gas, Geothermal, Solar, octane grading, and the economic PIES Program in Strategic Planning.
Usually a designated qualified professional is delegated a job to do by their management. That
person knows what resources to bring together and advises management what needs to be done.
If that designated person is part of the upper management then the authorisation for the
administration of that program is straightforward. However, lower echelon personnel must be
authorised administratively to manage those interdisciplinary programs. This is best done by a
"contract" or a "letter of agreement" between the parties involved to allocate the division of
resources, technical support, budget and reporting requirements for the program.
Matrix Management and Administration for Collaborative Programs : Matrix management
is a grid of programs that goes across the management of collaborating organisations. It
combines a crossline management in common programs with each organisation through their
inline and parallel administration. It is an interagency or corporate crossline selection of experts
and specialised resources from collaborating organisations for specific interdisciplinary
programs. A crisis occurs… a Lead Organisation evolves with a mandate to resolve that
crisis… they liaison with Collaborating Organisations… those that can collaborate to identify the
common links for resolving the crisis… personnel and resources are identified and grouped in
Collaborating Nodes… the Lead Organisation prepares a Program Plan or Business Plan upon
which all the parties can agree to... they go about their common mission. Programs can wax and
wane, be replaced, redirected, reorganised,… without disrupting the collaborating organisations.
The FEA, Federal Energy Administration was created for two years to solve the consequences of
the 1972-3 Arab Oil Embargo. This responsibility moved to ERDA then DOE, Department of
Energy. A program budget can complement a nodal budget for that organisation, there can be an
exchange of resources, but more significant is the inplace communication network for a rapid
preemptive deployment of security to address the threats, breaches, reactions, recovery and
countermeasures. Collaborating organisations can be government at any level, corporations,
private enterprise, consultants,.. any group with the compatible expertise and resources. At the
NBS, National Bureau of Standards we had across-agency "Tri-Service" programs with the
military testing an actual townhouse in the huge thermal chamber, insulation on mobile cold
storage units, noise in hospital corridors. There was one with DOT, Department of
Transportation studying the auditory assessment of tire noise from vehicle passbys to endurance
wheels. As an outside Consultant I managed, ran, measured, reported a steampipe test in the
NBS Laboratory for a HUD Housing and Urban Development program. NASA, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration got a man on the moon with crossline matrix management
between corporate and government organisations. Again, inter-organisation "agreements" must
be established for this mutual collaboration, particularly to reduce the bureaucratic protocol and
to authorise the nodal managers to respond appropriately within the propriety of the contingency
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or emergency and the organisation's security. Principles and use of Matrix Program Management
and Administration are well established, responding well with flexibly to crisis situations..
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Planning for Programs and Business Enterprise :
Outline of Topics
Title :
Authority :
Contents :
Summary :
Description :
Theme :
Marketing :
Production :
Management :
Financials :
Evaluation :

Suggests what the program and business enterprise is about …
Plan authors with authorisation, on who‘s behalf, what for, disclaimers. …
List in way people want to read the plan …
Key features for each section noted on one page…
Enthusiastic outline of program and business enterprise with illustrations,
opportunities and constraints, …
Mission statement, objectives, unique distinctive features of program and
enterprise, …
Program collaborating organisations, comparables, benefits, promotion,…
Mission, benefits and revenues; supply meets mission and demand in time,..
Planning, programs, projects, collaborations, commissioning, operations,
maintenance, upgrading, matrix management , …
Budget and Revenue, production, overhead forecasts then financial
statement with profit and loss projection, cash projection, balance sheet, …
Backup reports, statements, significance of information …
JFHalldane 1991, 2001
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Leading Organisation : The Leading Organisation for generating the programs to resolve the
crisis must be seen as capable of doing the job but also independently separate from those
parties with special conflicting interests in the crisis. You can expect an organisation to protect
its turf and not to be self-critical. It is not going to tell the world where it goes wrong as that
reflects failure, so you allow them an outward avenue in the matrix crossline programs to express
what should be done well. In Asia I found you only talk about the positive "things to do", never
the negative "things not to do". For example, you have seen elevator signs "do not use in case of
fire"!… well what do you do? Be assertive, direct, "fire, go stair, now, elevator stopped". A
further point we have found with professional groups is that they are unable to police themselves.
Perhaps realising these issues the Office of Homeland Security has been formed as an
independent organisation to lead us out of the security crisis. With crossline programs there is no
need to transfer any agencies into the leading one ; instead decentralise in a matrix of programs
using the best from what you need.
Collaborating Organisations : Collaborating groups must present their case, credentials and
conflicts of interest for their expertise, capabilities and facilities in order to contribute to specific
programs or projects. It is a two-way effort with the program organisers and other collaborators.
The CIA, Central Intelligence Agency coordinates intelligence, then disseminates, evaluates and
distributes reasoned information. These are covert operations by questionable means on
questionable characters well outside the ways of civil patterns. This is essential input for
exposing threats, contingency planning, preemptive action and countermeasures. Homeland
would allow the CIA to do its job but at the same time disseminate and report in useful form for
the public to expose likely contingent threats and breaches.The FBI, Federal Bureau of
Investigation is just that, it investigates after-the-fact.. It is hard for them to be proactive as their
world needs legal warrants issued upon evidence of the things they are investigating. However,
their profiling of cases and response methods can help in security planning, particularly in
forming preemptive countermeasures. The INS, Immigration and Naturalisation Service is a
service that should encourage people to come to our country to become citizens; certainly their
mandate is not to keep them out. Homeland Security could well deal with the job of keeping out
the undesirable by developing contingent criteria for screening entry-departure. The OEP, Office
of Emergency Preparedness is within Health and Human Resources. The FEMA, Federal
Emergency Management Agency addresses emergencies in natural and technical disasters, major
transportation accidents and now "terrorism". Note these agencies address the breach in security,
the actions taken, mitigation of losses, recovery and countermeasures. They are interested in the
probability of occurrence because they need to know the extent of the resources they have to rely
on. They can not be involved with a chance of threat and contingency planning. Similarly,
corporations with high security risks are required to have emergency plans. They are now
confronted with new threats that need contingency planning to indicate which threats will
cascade into an emergency that we can be prepared for. Our matrix programs can be our
effective interface here.
Program Planning : Business Planning : There are two sides of planning in our present day
economy. One is to resolve the program opportunities and constraints to achieve the mission at
hand, the other to create resources through business enterprise to drive that program. We see
this in government planning for programs to create public services, then "privatise" by selling off
those services as a going business. Postal and power went this way with dubious consequences in
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some cases. My preference is to "corporatise" where government keeps their business for future
revenues but contract out the management. We will need to think about corporatising programs
later in Homeland Security in order to economically sustain their activities. There are
fundamental topics in planning to address. these are outlined in the table to cover the title,
authority, contents, summary, description, theme, marketing, production, management, financials
and evaluation. It can be easily modified for the particular program.
Nodal Management of the Collaborative Matrix Program Plan : The Nodes are the
intersections of the collaborating inter-organisation program crosslines with the organisation
inlines. The input-output at these nodes is controlled by a resourceful, responsive, highly
skilled, propriety sensitive Nodal Manager. The whole program depends on this vibrant pattern
of nodes for actions which in itself needs its own security. Those protocols must readily open to
the trusted network but restrictive to intruders or the merely curious. We should solve problems
without leaks in information and misinformation. My suggestion here is to confirm the
consistency of the enquiry-response between nodes for legitimacy; a form of nodal accounting
and personal acknowledgement of their good work. After awhile we will find a buddy system
will evolve in the personal trust and co-operation between the nodal managers.
Systems : Systems are ways we think things relate and work. The logic is based on cause and
effect; change one thing and another responds in a systematic predictable way. Science depends
on this consistency so we create "models" that explain the co-relationships in fixed rules. Our
automated controls depend on this fact, providing they are working according to the wanted
relationships. All our "analysis" of events searches for consistent relationships but the question is
which model of behavior best simulates the task at hand. Even in physics we need to overlay
separate independent simultaneous equations to the extent of the number of variables to get
solutions. Typically we equate energy, forces, temperature differences, volumes… In financials
we overlay projections for profit-loss, cash flow, assets-liabilities, then balance them. For
building security, safety and control we install closed protocol proprietary BAS, Building
Automated Systems, then to supervise those we overlay open protocol AIMS Automated
Integrated Monitoring Systems. By adding "expert" systems of predetermined coincidences we
get "conditioned" responses so that the monitoring becomes management. Now where an event
may not happen all the time or when a number of events have to occur before a threshold is
reached for it to happen, then we have probability models for the overall effect. My contention is
that we should focus on those underlying switches that cascade the events, that is the root causes.
Probability is based on random events, stochastic, normal bell-shaped Gaussian distributions.
Where probability is limited say by replacement, repairs, bypass, obsolescence,… then we get
Poisson distributions. These are all predictable probable patterns for emergency planning.
Now when we have sporadic events happening occasionally, those irregular isolated incidences,
unpredictable, strewn around,… then we have sporadic models. Earthquakes, eruptions, tidal
waves, plague, insurgence,… all unpredictable but likely. However, there are cues as precursors
to those sporadic events. These cues come together in a trend analysis for our contingency
planning.
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Manager Systems : Grouping and Sequence for Programs
_Providing Resources:
Authority to manage program, contracts: delegate responsibility for use,
operations, maintenance, upgrading: project co-ordination in cross-management, consultants, verifying
commissioning, training management and technicians: supervise, situation initiative: inventory updates: track
permits, warrantys, accounts, budgets: projective business planning, management planning: instal AIMS,
LAN …System diagrams…
Flow charts for responsibility. spread sheets for events. inventories. reports.
_Monitoring Performance: Ensure work-fail-safe operations, appropriate use schedule
maintenance, accommodate upgrading: supervise AIMS, BAS effectively: routine data recording, utilities,
bills, logs, service calls, inventory, condition reports, automated response for system failure, security breach:
inspect, audit, survey, test: warranty provisions …
Displays. data storage. reports. Schedules. automated emergency response alarm and control. —middlethird“ regression statistics
_Diagnosing Operations, Use, Maintenance, Upgrades: Criteria for good-poor
performance, limits: trace causes for alarms, outages, complaints, high utility bills, waste: system failure:
management effectiveness: procurement quality: logistics, lift travel, user directory: technician know-how::
…Analytical models : sporadic for contingency, probability for emergency,…
Automated diagnostics. —expert“ systems. calibration. independent condition verification. analysis for
automated emergency response program. …
_Responding to Plan: Anticipate events: contingency planning, life emergency priority: equipment
failure, security, safety, health, damage mitigation, specific contingency:reporting sequences, data
verification: analysis of events: appropriate action: …
Automated response to programmed events. decision trees and confirmation nodes.
_Designing Better Alternatives: Practical scenarios from manager system feedforward:
consultant review, contractor ideas: question reliability of products, see demonstration, past experience,
backup services, user-friendly: design integration for better performance: Computer design aids. Files.
overlays of better alternatives. animation of event sequences.
_Evaluating Situation, Improvements: Evaluate improvements to design, response,
diagnostics, monitoring, resources provided: trend analysis for good-poor performance, questionnaires,
technology assesment, environmental impact, performance testing: progressive specifications, design and
performance specifications: compliance with regulations, codes, standards, ordinances: conservation power,
energy, water, sewage, refuse, resources, life cycle costs: feasibility analysis, priority setting, budget,
decision making, matrix management, critical path, programming: justifications: …
Evaluation and computer applications common in planning, engineering, architecture, economics,
management, offices…

_Implementing Changes: Undertake changes decided from evaluation, design, responses,
diagnosis, monitoring, resources: program or project management for construction: commissioning:
supervision: worker initiative,operator manuals: warranty provisions: contract requirements: …
Schedules. critical path. installation testing. condition reporting. contract logs. …

_Adjusting Performance for Program-In-Action: Fine-tune the program-in-action:
difference testing for peak performance, balance loads: improve manager system cycle: Realtime
monitoring. resetting control criteria. performance verification and modification for working conditions to best
performance for program-in-operation, facility-in-use.
JFHalldane 1991, 2001

Management Systems : What helps a manager organise their responsibilities ? It is well known
that a person can not do everything at once, in fact the brain time-shares information even
between the sensory modes, depending on what dominates the perception of their space and form
in time. In organising management we follow the sequence of the things being organised. If a
process, it is often in departments in the line of the process, such as in form filing, banking,
manufacturing, etc. Our computer now has many formats for spreadsheets, accounting,
inventory, reporting, applications,… So this has traditionally favored the inline, hierarchical
organisation. This has all changed with mission oriented programs. It started from the World
War 2 era where we had to organise a whole lot of huge things simultaneously, then suddenly
bring them all together and guarantee they would work in the field ; lives depended on it.
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Standardisation, component and system testing, trials, human factors, co-operation, planning,
forecasting, training,… all followed. It was matrix management to accomplish a common
mission. The saga continues today. We can handle the predictable emergencies relatively well,
however the major difference is that we are now confronted with contingencies in unknown,
unpredictable threats. For Homeland Security today the new direction is in sensing the cues for
threats in contingency planning which may in turn cascade into breaches and emergencies of
a different character from what we are used to. Contingency planning is the main focus for our
manager systems. We must have systems for a heuristic discovery of the sporadic cues to be
correlated in trend analysis for our contingency planning. This would arm the Nodal Manager
with automated contingency systems that can scan the field for threat cues, integrate likely
cascades from trends, feedforward, confirm for nodal consistency, issue alerts for pending
breaches, modify with feedback, transfer to an emergency mode where appropriate. An outline of
manager systems is noted in the table which covers providing resources, monitoring, diagnosing,
responding, designing, evaluating, implementing, adjusting the programs for each node.
. . . sensing the cues for threats . . .
. . . systems for heuristic discovery of those sporadic cues . . .
. . . to correlate in trends . . . . . for contingency planning
. . . automated for continuous scanning . . .

Conclusion . . .
Matrix management in crossagency collaboration can select the best for relevant security
programs without the disruption of our present administration.
The mission success rests in the appropriate competent actions of the decentralised nodal
managers.
Homeland Security programs require a different approach to management, especially in
contingency planning. These new ways involve feedforward, heuristic discovery of threats in
cues from sporadic events, and trends that lead to actual breaches in security. This should not be
confused with the parallel programs in the probability of breaches in security for emergency
planning, then the reactions, recovery and countermeasures.
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Collaborative Role of Data Analysis and Inspection
Technology in Improving Supply Chain Security
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Abstract:.
The combined Los Angeles and Long Beach port complex is the largest in the United States and
the third largest container port complex in the world. In 2000, the port complex handled 9.5million Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEU) of cargo which constituted 35% of all waterborne
container cargo in the US. Established in 1977, the Center for International Trade and
Transportation (CITT), California State University, Long Beach, is designated a multidisciplinary center for intermodal transportation studies and integrated logistics research,
education, training, policy analysis, and technology transfer by the U.S. Congress. The authors
and others at the California State University œ Long Beach have for some time conducted
research on surface ocean transportation, port of entry and exit inspection process, and integrated
approach to managing shipping containers, with particular emphasis on high-speed sealift,
terminal operation, and application of new technologies.
The trans-Pacific supply chain is not only significant to the regional populace and businesses, but
also a critical national infrastructure resource with linkage to the global economy, particularly
commercial suppliers and businesses. Furthermore, the port complex is vital to support our
military deployment and operation. The supply chain agility is indeed a central theme to the
successful operation of the vast goods movement enterprise. In view of the heightened
Homeland defense and security, we are challenged to identify opportunities to enhance the
supply chain and operational processes, and, at the same time, reduce vulnerabilities to the
supply chain.
This presentation has the objective to highlight the importance of an integrated approach to the
Southern California regional supply chain for goods movement by presenting on-going projects
in goods movement and inspection technology and associated pilot technology and logistical
demonstration efforts. To sustain growth in the region, we enlist the support of stakeholders
(e.g., suppliers, shippers, port and terminal operators, inspection agents, and manufacturers, etc.)
to collaborate in supply chain management. The key to collaboration is based on shared values;
proper application of new technologies such as real-time monitoring; sound public policies; and
efficiencies in goods movement including management of —weakest links“. We will present
supply chain vulnerabilities and weakest links through our systematic analysis and to apply
threat reduction techniques or risk management concepts, thus ensuring contingency plans are in
place to enhance supply chain security and to maintain a robust goods movement in the region.
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—Pushing the Border Out:“
Creation of the —Virtual“ Electronic Border
Rob Quartel
CEO and Chairman, FreightDesk Technologies
Former Member, US Federal Maritime Commission
Abstract:
International trade is a tremendously complex business, but it generates within itself the means to
protect it through sophisticated electronic data and information processes.
A typical international transaction will have as many as 20-25 involved parties œ buyers, sellers,
inland transporters on both sides of the ocean, ocean and other water carriers, middlemen,
financiers, governments and others œ and will generate 30-40 documents. Some 6 million
containers, many carrying cargoes for multiple owners and valued on average at $60,000 each,
entered the US in the year 2000, on ships carrying from 3-6000 containers each. Literally
millions of people and hundreds of thousands of companies worldwide are engaged in the
business of moving cargoes internationally. In the US alone, there are an estimated 400,000
importing and exporting companies, 5,000 licensed forwarders and customs brokers, perhaps as
many as 40,000 consolidators large and small, and millions engaged in the transportation
industry. Worldwide, there are at least in theory some 500 ocean carriers œ although probably
10-15 carry 90 percent of cargoes shipped between continents œ an estimated 50-70,000
forwarders and tens of thousands more intermediaries, not to mention several million companies
moving goods.
This is a process that literally spews data œ data on the contents, on who touched the cargo, who
paid for it, where it‘s been, where it‘s going. And it‘s a process into which commercial shippers
œ the people who own, buy, or sell a cargo œ tap into daily, in one form or another, to collaborate
on transportation and financial transactions, to exchange documents, to meet regulatory
requirements of the various jurisdictions in which they operate, in addition, of course, to
documenting the basic buy-sell transaction that begins the shipment. For the most part, every bit
of the data and information generated by this process is available œ somewhere and in some form
-- but not necessarily captured in one place by the private sector, and certainly not by the US
government.
The author, in October 2001, proposed the creation of a —virtual“ border œ a concept known as
—Pushing the Border Out“œ in which information generated throughout the trade process would
be captured in a data warehouse, combined with US government intelligence and law
enforcement data in a new government-run —fusion center,“ and analyzed using sophisticated
forms of artificial intelligence and profiling to provide government and commercial operators
with a means of ascertaining levels of risk associated with individual shipments PRIOR to their
loading onto a ship bound for a US port. Under this concept, all international cargos bound for
the United States œ as well as outbound cargos œ would be —opened“ electronically first, prior to
the layering of other security technologies and practices, and evaluated for risk. Much of this
proposal has been written into various pieces of legislation now pending before the Congress,
and into proposed regulations governing US trade.
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APPENDIX
(By kind permission of the author the following testimony to the Subcommittee on Technology,
Terrorism and Government Information of the US Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb.26, 2002) is
included as an Appendix to the paper that he presented at the Workshop.)
I would like to thank the members of this Committee for their invitation today. I‘ll begin with an
assertion that I think should be made policy:
B

Every container destined to enter or pass through the United States should
be treated as a potential weapon of mass destruction; every ship that carries
it as a delivery device; and every port and point inland as a potential target.

While the discussion here today focuses on protecting the port -- natural given the legislation
before the committee -- the port, frankly, is the least of the problem.
Yes, it‘s important to protect the security of the physical infrastructure, yes we have to worry
about the safety of specialized vessels and guard against attacks like those which took place on
the USS Cole, yes, the technology for sealing and tracking containers is important. But in terms
of the system of intermodal international trade œ shipping, moving goods around the world in
international trade œ the port of entry is just one œ not even the most important œ piece of the
puzzle.
If you think about trade as a process of integrated pieces, then the port should be considered
the point of last œ not first œ resort in our war on trade terrorism.
To be blunt about it, nothing we have heard discussed today œ whether it‘s electronic seals
or port inspections or beefed up patrols or biometric-aided identification cards or GPS or
other physical tracking devices on containers or earlier reporting of a ship manifest or
neutron scanning 2 percent or 20 percent of all containers going to the United States œ
whatever -- has more than a small probability of stopping a determined terrorist from
slipping a lethal shipment into the mainstream of international commerce and driving it
under the Golden Gate Bridge to an end that none of us would like to see.
That‘s because the action starts well before the port.
So, focusing on stopping a weaponized cargo at the US port is too little, too late: The port is a
potential target, not just a gateway. Ports have little interaction with cargoes other than to lift
them off or on the ship, to store them, or to serve as a border funnel for customs activities. Their
job is in some respects no different than that of a rail yard or similar intermodal exchange node.
They are either efficient pass-throughs, propelling cargoes on their way to their final destination
œ or, they may become bottlenecks, driving some 20 percent of the national economy into the
ground.
If we can‘t allow a weaponized container in a port, neither can we allow it on the ship, the
principal means of delivering goods in intercontinental trade to the United States. Ships
suspected to carry these weapons œ some ships of which today carry the equivalent of 6500 or
more containers -- can only be turned back to the point of embarkation œ not stopped, searched,
and accessed for removal of an 8x8x48 foot 20-ton container while on the high seas.
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B

Interdiction of terrorist activities really needs to begin at the beginning œ
with the shipper and his customer, at both the physical and transactional
start of an order.

While I fully support the measures designed to protect our seaports contained in this legislation, I
suggest to this committee that the first line of defense in the future isn‘t the traditional
physical border the port represents, but a new technology border œ a virtual, electronic
border œ that we need to push back overseas.
So, when we talk about technology in this hearing, I think we have to talk about information
technology, first œ because THAT is the first line of defense for our ports.
The fact of the matter is that we can‘t inspect every one of the 17,000 containers that end up in
the United States on any given day, either here or in the overseas countries and ports in which
they originate, without destroying the fabric of our economy. But we CAN create a hierarchical
approach combining physical inspection, human trust procedures and a new process of early
electronic inspection employing the latest in information technologies.
Why is this electronic border a necessary approach? If I can, let me turn your attention to a
couple of slides.
This first slide illustrates a key point: International trade is a tremendously complex business. A
typical trade will have as many as 20-25 involved parties œ buyers, sellers, inland transporters on
both sides of the ocean, ocean and other water carriers, middlemen, financiers, governments and
others œ and will generate 30-40 documents. Some 6 million containers, many carrying cargoes
for multiple owners and valued on average at $60,000 each, entered the US in the year 2000, on
ships carrying from 1000-6000 containers each. If we were to add a physical inspection to one
of the very large ships carrying these cargoes to the US through the world‘s hub ports œ the
Regina Maersk, for example œ a single hour‘s delay per 20-foot container would add from 150 250 man-days (roughly 1 _ to 3 man-years of work shifts) to the time it took to offload the 6000
containers riding that one ship.
Literally millions of people and hundreds of thousands of companies worldwide are engaged in
the business of moving cargoes internationally. In the US alone, there are an estimated 400,000
importing and exporting companies, 5,000 licensed forwarders and customs brokers, perhaps as
many as 40,000 consolidators large and small, and millions engaged in the transportation
industry. Worldwide, there are at least in theory some 500 ocean carriers œ although probably
10-15 carry 90 percent of cargoes shipped between continents œ an estimated 50-70,000
forwarders and tens of thousands more intermediaries, not to mention several million companies
moving goods.
This is a process that literally spews data œ data on the contents, on who touched the cargo,
who paid for it, where it‘s been, where it‘s going.
And it‘s a process into which commercial shippers œ the people who own, buy, or sell a cargo œ
tap into daily, in one form or another, to collaborate on transportation and financial transactions,
to exchange documents, to meet regulatory requirements of the various jurisdictions in which
they operate, in addition, of course, to documenting the basic buy-sell transaction that begins the
shipment.
So, when I look at what technology you need to protect a US port, I look back to the beginning
of the process, before the port, before the ship, before the port of embarkation, before even
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sealing the container. I look to the buy-sell transaction and the purchase order that is generated
from it. Then I look to the manufacturer or supplier overseas, his manufacturing and supplier
processes, how and where he or a consolidator somewhere loads the container, when and how it
was sealed, how it was moved, who touched it, who paid for it œ and even where it might be
going once the cargo reaches the United States. For the most part, every bit of that data is
available œ somewhere and in some form, but not necessarily captured in one place by the private
sector, and certainly not by the US government œ but there nonetheless, before the cargo ever
gets loaded onto a ship bound for a US port.
Throughout this process, the shippers of the goods are for the most part physically out of control
of the trade. They‘ve hired freight forwarders or consolidators or third party logistics companies
to handle the business because their expertise is in the manufacturing, marketing, and sale of the
product. All they really care about at the gross level is that they get exactly what they ordered œ
no more and no less œ and that it gets there at the time and price promised. Some have created
intelligent order systems, spent millions of dollars on enterprise resource planning and automated
customer service systems, and others have acquired or constructed internally services like those
offered by my own company which allow them to track, measure, and steer the progress of their
goods through the transportation chain, either physically or in terms of process and paperwork,
the latter actually being more important in the manufacturing process than where something
actually is. As long as they know it‘s on course, are apprised of delays, have the ability to replan a move or a manufacturing process in the event of a supply chain problem œ than they are
satisfied. That‘s really all they need.
The focus of logisticians and companies œ particularly American companies œ over the last
several decades has been on making that flow faster, cheaper, more transparent, and faster yet.
Our success at that provides an enormous competitive advantage to many of our companies and
makes a huge contribution to the reduction in the cost of numerous articles and products crucial
to everyday life in the United States.
Some in the government have suggested that, as in aviation, security rather than speed might
provide the competitive edge for ports in the US in the future.
With all due respect, speed and cost were the two most important criteria for the selection
of ports and transportation before September 11 œ and they will, for all but a handful of
shippers œ continue to be the most important criteria in the future.
There is a reason for that: Speed equals money. It also happens to equal security, as it leads to
fewer opportunities to tamper with a cargo.
Because the manufacturing system knows that, logistics costs have steadily declined from 25
percent to lower than 15 percent of GDP over the last 20 years. Carrying costs associated just
with inventory at rest œ goods in storage, the response of a manufacturer to uncertainties in the
supply chain œ in 2000 amounted to nearly $400 billion. A number of experts have estimated
that just a five percent addition to the logistics process œ thus causing an increase in inventories,
the response industry will have to take in order to make up for slow processing times œ would
cost the economy an additional $75 billion annually. That‘s the equivalent, by the way, of some
75,000 jobs lost, not counting the multiplier effect of these wholly non-productive costs
Introducing uncertainty, slowing down cargoes through physical inspection of every container
and every box inside it, otherwise derailing the transportation system, is exactly the opposite of
what we should do if our goal is to maintain a healthy American economy.
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So, the most critical piece of the technology solution to guarding our ports, in my mind, is
this: Profile cargoes, just as we profile people in the passenger airline industry, before they
ever get on the ship œ or plane, truck, or train œ bound for the United States and its ports.
B

The data that the private sector uses to make its processes more efficient is the
same data that the United States government needs to understand the commercial
processes underlying a cargo profiling process.

The next several slides talk to that process, but in short form, it‘s pretty straightforward.
In the profiling scheme that I suggested some months back, commercial data would: (1) Be
captured prior to loading of a container on a ship, train, plane, or truck in international
commerce, from the shipper, consignee, intermediary, banks, and all others that had an interest in
or touched or processed the shipment; (2) Combined with certain relevant law enforcement and
national security information; and, (3) Be processed through a form of artificial intelligence
(including evolutionary computing) to provide a —profile“ for every container and shipment
within it. The profiling process would generate a —go-no go“ decision driving further actions œ
loading on a carrier, physical inspection, further profiling, etc.
The profile should be based not only on what the cargo was said to be, but where it came from,
its likelihood of being what it is stated to be, who handled it from packing through transport to a
port, who would be handling it afterwards, where it had been and where it was going, who had a
financial interest in it, etc.
B

It‘s not just about WHAT‘s in the container, but the CIRCUMSTANCES in
which the container finds itself in the trade and transportation process.

The algorithm used to analyze it should consider not only fact-based data (eg, what the product
was and who touched it), but situational data œ eg, a container originating in an unstable country
and passing by Yankee Stadium on the day and hour the President was scheduled to throw out
the first ball.
Based on some probability calculus, the air, ocean, train, or truck carrier could be told that the
government either felt the cargo was safe to carry œ or œ that further investigation, including
perhaps a physical inspection, was necessary. (any have raised the issue of the necessity for
foreign government cooperation in this process. While it‘s an important thing to have, perhaps,
for political purposes including comity, it‘s not necessary. As long as the reporting mandates fall
on the American importer or his designated agent/intermediary, then the US government has a
stick that carries all the way down to the carriers, foreign manufacturers, and foreign
transportation players.)
Thus, if a carrier under this scenario loaded the cargo deemed safe and was later told enroute that
the cargo might require further investigation, then the carrier œ having cooperated with the USG
on the pre-release process œ should be held harmless from further government sanctions,
although it might well have to divert the vessel prior to or on arrival in a US port.
(Indemnification here is a form of positive coercion that avoids the extraterritoriality issue.)
If a carrier received notification that a shipment was suspect prior to loading, it should then be
required to arrange to have the cargo physically screened, or disclose why not. Screening could
be carried out by U.S. Customs officials stationed in overseas points, foreign officials subject to
bilaterals and some level of performance auditing, or by the companies themselves, again subject
to performance auditing and rigorous procedural standards. The actual inspection could take
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several forms, ranging from passively examining the container (neutron/gamma scanning,
motion detection, etc), to employing radiological and chemical —sniffers,“ all the way to breaking
the seal and opening it up.
Each of these methods has costs, risks, and probabilities associated with it and should be
employed differentially against the perceived calculated risk. Screening might, in many cases,
consist merely of re-checking documentation for inconsistencies and communicating with those
who provided the documents to clarify the issue. Breaking a seal would, however, require some
form of indemnifying the carrier, including possibly an entry order to do so from US Customs.
Again, none of these actions have to involve a foreign government. The United States has the
authority to deny entry of vessels that it deems of risk to itself, and to deny entry of goods
deemed illegal. Providing process incentives to carry out the inspection prior to leading the port
or embarkation is a legitimate, effective form of positive coercion. In the end, however, there is
no doubt that the support of foreign trading partners and international organizations should be
solicited, if only because our leading trading partners are themselves potential targets and will no
doubt feel the need for reciprocal protections.
This raises other issues, of course, one being the question of whether or not we would need to
place US Customs inspectors inside foreign ports of embarkation. My answer is: Maybe yes,
maybe no. US government agencies frequently place inspectors, expeditors, and agents inside
the premises of companies in the continental United States, sometimes with and sometimes
without the invitation of the private companies involved. Companies often place employees
whose job it is to ascertain quality, manage logistics, and to perform other expediting services in
the home facilities of suppliers or customers, again at the invitation of the parties. US Customs
inspectors could certainly be stationed inside the facilities of major carriers and manufacturers
overseas (as they are already), at their invitation, without generating an official response from a
foreign government, in order to provide processing capabilities. Carriers and manufacturers that
did this œ whether by invitation or by USG mandate œ could legitimately be considered —trusted
parties“ and receive —fast lane“ treatment on arrival in Customs in the United States, assuming
that proper cargo security procedures were employed across the length of the supply chain.
The bottom line, however, is that this is NOT about inspecting the majority of containers or
shipments. The goal, in fact, is to use information technology to substantially REDUCE the
need to physically inspect containers, to do so at a point in the logistics process that is the
least damaging to it economically, and at which diversion of a contaminated cargo can be
safely accomplished without delaying other cargoes.
By the way, this is NOT about enforcing US customs compliance rules overseas œ something that
frequently seems to be mistaken for the prevention of terrorism in many of the proposals placed
on the table. This is about determining which shipments and cargoes might be a threat to the
United States and its citizens, not about whether or not US tariff rules are complied with. The
latter has only a little to do with helping to ascertain the former, which is largely a function
designed for revenue capture. Not only are these not the same things, but treating this process as
a means of enforcing customs rules could actually undermine the anti-terrorism effort. A legal
cargo can become a lethal cargo under the proper circumstances. Thus, treating this as a customs
compliance problem not only doesn‘t solve the problem, it actually has the potential to lull the
public and the USG into a dangerously false sense of security.
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This may well be one of the most important reasons that the authority for both the
collection and processing of the commercial data piece of this process should lie elsewhere,
outside of Customs œ probably in the TSA or Commerce or some other government agency.
There are three important attributes to this solution and the approach I suggest.
First and foremost, it taps into the existing commercial trade management process and
leverages existing relationships into a new holistic structure. Second, it is potentially fully
independent of the need for international cooperation, as it requires only the compliance of
the US-side of the equation, particularly if process compliance was specifically designated
to be the responsibility of the buyer, a suggestion I have made elsewhere. And, finally, it is
an approach that makes the greatest use of the technologies being developed by the private
sector for use by commercial customers in a normal but obviously complex operating
environment.
All of this is easy to suggest, of course, and somewhat more difficult to implement.
But, to give you an idea of where we actually stand, four existing commercial documents already
reported in one form or another to Customs and the Coast Guard can provide much œ but not all
œ of the data that would allow us to profile a cargo based on contents, involved parties, and
transport mode and path prior to its ever getting on a ship: (1) The Shippers Letter of
Instruction; (2) Commercial Invoice; (3) Certificate of Origin; and (4) The carrier‘s Bill of
Lading. To that I would add (5) financial data, perhaps captured through Letters of Credit or
bank reporting; (6) Inland transportation leg information not now captured by ocean carriers or
the government, on both sides of the supply chain; and perhaps additional information.
On the commercial side, database structures already exist that are designed to integrate data from
disparate sources (for example, EDI transmissions, faxes, the web, and email) and that, in
computer parlance, allow you to instantiate a fully attributed shipment. Why a shipment?
Because trade moves in shipments, first, and only then in containers. From the standpoint of
profiling, shipment records need to be fully attributed œ meaning that they need to contain
detailed information about the shipment including all of the parties that are involved in the
transaction, the route/itinerary of the shipment, the items that are contained in the shipment, the
events/status of the shipment and its financial terms and any other information that was thought
necessary. And, the system needs to be able to collect, process and integrate this data and to
provide the required normalized data elements to support container and risk profiling in support
of Homeland Security.
Collecting and managing the entire set of commercial data isn‘t rocket science, although not a lot
of us do it. But it is what the private sector is beginning to look for today.
Analyzing the data IS rocket science, however. But, again, a variety of the required processes
are already in use inside the government and the commercial sectors alike œ in everything from
looking for illicit drug traffic to screening genetic samples for new drugs for medical purposes.
Without going into a lot of detail, the analytical process should be designed at the simplest level
to check against lists œ Denied Party Screening, for example; and at the most complex level to
think, to learn, and to detect deviations from what we know in our own experience is normal in
the operations of international transportation and manufacturing -- anomalies captured in rules
and facts which may pertain to both specific and general information, relationships between data,
expectations and other expertise. Items that violate expectations or otherwise contradict human
expertise are considered to be more suspicious.
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But, of course, cargo profiling is only part of the solution. As should be evident from the above
description, this is an onion, with numerous layers. At varying stages across the process we have
to layer on passive and physical inspection, physical protection of the ports, protection of the
cargo integrity from the basic risks of international transport œ spoilage, tampering, theft œ the
ability to interdict specific cargoes, tracking and visibility solutions, many of which we have
heard about today -- that allow us to maintain not only the integrity of the cargo but of the
transport system itself once a cargo is in motion.
Cargo profiling is an approach and a system that I believe that the Transportation Security
Administration at the US Department of Transportation already has the authority to implement œ
a question separate from whether or not they have the dollars to do so. (I would note that
profiling would certainly cost far less and take less time to implement than a full system of
inspections, electronic seals, etc.) TSA needs the support, almost in a sub-contracting role, of the
US Customs Service, the US Coast Guard, the various modal agencies, and, perhaps the US
Department of Commerce alike. The data base process could perhaps ultimately be embedded
into and as an extension of the Automated Customs Enforcement (ACE) system that Customs is
currently building œ but which will take another three-five years to deliver. This is NOT a
solution that I would recommend, however. Given the cooperation necessary from the private
sector even under a new mandatory reporting regime, Customs œ the —bad guy“ to even —good
guys“ in the international trading arena -- isn‘t the best place to locate this kind of effort for the
maximum impact, despite their current role and skill in the import transaction. The US Coast
Guard and other national security and defense agencies also have extensive law enforcement and
national security data base efforts going on, and numerous government data bases could be
tapped through the new process for relevant data without violating the need to maintain the
competitive position of individual companies and due process for the parties involved.
I don‘t believe, however, that we should or need to wait that long to implement a robust,
commercially relevant, profiling solution. We should be looking œ today -- at other USG data
bases, including the so-called ITDS system being developed several years ago at Treasury,
outside of Customs, as a possible stopgap; and, we should be looking to the private sector as well
for information technology accelerators. There may well be other data efforts underway
elsewhere in the law enforcement and national security community that present relevant
opportunities, as well. Several groups of commercial and governmental players have also
suggested demonstration projects that would cover ports and inland movements on both sides of
the traffic on both the East and West Coasts, as well as on our northern and southern borders,
using commercially available information technologies and real-world data and cargo
movements.
As a general comment here, I believe strongly that a critical issue here will be to obtain voluntary
œ not just mandatory œ commercial compliance with all of the parties in the commercial
transaction. Many of the processes covered here are outside the domain of US law enforcement.
We can‘t today make foreign suppliers abide by all of these rules, but we can certainly tell their
US customers œ today -- that they may face delays unless they know their sources and can
validate cargo and process integrity. We can‘t today tell a foreign port that it has to purchase
millions of dollars worth of screening devices for the cargoes destined for the US which our
screening picks out as suspect, but we can œ today -- certainly negotiate procedural agreements
through the IMO and individual American ports and distribution arms can provide speed
incentives for those that work with us. The ocean carriers barely make 1-2 percent ROI, so they
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will only be driven into bankruptcy if we require that they purchase screening machines and add
hundreds of new security personnel, but we may be able to help them through the imposition of a
user charge on all cargoes going through US ports, a portion of which is used to offset their
additional costs. We can‘t today mandate that the carriers for which the US is only one of
several stops profile all of their cargoes before sailing; but we can no doubt œ today -- find a way
to say that if we determine that a cargo is found to be suspect the entire ship will be turned back
because we won‘t risk the US port.
In closing, I‘d like to reiterate the point with which I began: US ports aren‘t the first line of
defense but almost the last.
This Committee and this government have a real obligation to see that no weaponized container
ever makes it to the port, period. They have an obligation to protect the integrity of cargoes once
entered, and they have an obligation to their customers œ the failure of which to provide will
destroy their commercial viability and that of the general economy œ to provide a speedy, lowcost transportation move. I believe we have the technical means to tap into the commercial
process, to profile shipments and containers, and thus, in concert with other actions, to see that
no container intended to be used as a terrorist device ever gets on a ship, a plane, a truck or a
train bound for the United States. We have the technology to do it, but the process starts well
before a container ever reaches a port.
Members of this Committee: When the aviation system went down on September 11, we already
had a security system, as imperfect as it was, in place, which could be re-booted three days later
at a higher state of readiness.
However -- If a container blew at a port or somewhere else in the international transportation
chain ending in the United States, this nation and its leaders would have no choice but to shut
down the entire system of trade with our country. We have no security system in place in our
international trade system comparable to that which pre-existed in passenger airline travel that
we can re-boot. We have nothing at all in place to properly secure over $2 trillion in trade and
the millions of American jobs associated with it. Electronic seals, tracking, additional port
security œ none of that will solve that problem adequately. We DO have the technology
available to begin to profile shipments aimed at the United States, today. It‘s not the complete
solution, but it‘s an appropriate start.
Again, I appreciate the Committee‘s time, and would be glad to discuss it further.

179

180

Joint Military/Civilian Incident Command Systems
for Homeland Defense
Dr. Thomas Bevan
Director, Homeland Defense Initiative
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia
I would like to start out with a movie to get your attention. It‘s always good to have an appeal to
authority to start you off, and so we have a bit of a movie from last March when we were
fortunate to have the President look at part of our technology demonstration.
Movie clip of President Bush: I have just seen a demonstration that helps prepare the
emergency firefighters and police for how to take care of a disaster or an attack… how best to
protect the citizens. And, I want to thank all those involved with the Center for Emergency
Response Technology Instruction and Policy for their hospitality and for the chance to see… first
hand how Atlanta and the State of Georgia are preparing for any possible attack. I particularly
want to thank the guy who they cut off his clothes and ran him through the water. That goes
beyond the call of duty to impress the President. There he is… better you than me.
OK, thank you. Well, that was an exercise we did with some of our technology. It was actually
the second major exercise we have done dealing with chemical, biological, nuclear, and
radiological attacks. We started about three or four years ago, when I came to Georgia Tech and
they asked me to start working on weapons of mass destruction. I decided that wasn‘t a good
idea to put in the title of my center, so it‘s the Center for Emergency Response and so on.
Now, why Atlanta? Well first of all, after the Olympic Games the first responders, including the
military first responders, in the community saw all of the shortfalls because of the planning they
had to do for the 1996 Olympics. Second, we were fortunate to have some leadership in the form
of our two Senators from Georgia, one Republican and one Democrat, who ran a series of
seminars starting back in 1996 warning of the dangers of terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction. So, the people were somewhat sensitized by that. Another reason is that Atlanta has
been attacked. Atlanta is a lucrative terrorist target, I guess you‘d say. Going back to the 1950s
with bombing of the synagogue which happens to be three blocks from my house. So the bad
news is that we‘re a target. The good news, however, is that there are a lot of good technology,
medical, and other folks in that region that can help deal with the problem. So we wanted to
harness that expertise.
From a personal point of view, I spent 24 years here in Washington being a contractor. I went to
the Ukraine for two years living in fear of my life most of the time because the Ukrainian Mafia
has a tendency to run over people that they don‘t like with large trucks. When I came back home
to Atlanta and I thought that everything‘s fine… I can walk the streets, no problem. Then
someone delivered an anthrax letter bomb to the hotel two blocks up the street from me…and I
said you know it‘s a classic tale, when you come home there are still problems that you have to
take care of. So, that started my personal commitment. The first thing I did was to go out and
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start talking to the regional people in the area, from the local level on up through to the federal
level, to try to get them together to understand what the problems were here and to get their buy
in to what we we‘re doing.
Along the way we went to a war game hosted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
(MCWL) which is across the circle over here. What we concluded from that was that we weren‘t
sure what the federal response of a terrorist attack would be and we certainly weren‘t sure what
the state response would be, but we knew that first responders were going to be on the line. So,
that‘s where we decided to start… from the bottom up. Another part of the other reason for that
was the CETO (Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities) unit of the Marine Corps, which
is essentially a first responder unit.
So, what do we do? Well we develop technologies, we try to assert them, we try to find
affordable technologies that can be useful because we‘re still down at the local level and they
don‘t have a whole lot of bucks… so whatever we do has to be affordable. The military likes
affordable technologies because they can throw them away and feel happy about it… so
affordability is one of our criteria.
For about 15 years, Georgia Tech as part of its state mission has trained HAZMAT incident
response people with its ”chem-bio‘ courses. We have about 8,000 graduates of that program…
so we have pretty good roots since we‘ve trained all those folks out in the first responder
community. In addition to commercial and state government folks, we now also provide a lot of
fire training, and some military training as well. Also, we formed a group of not-for-profits and
universities to work with us. For example, Midwest Research provides chemical agents such as
anthrax and sarin, and what not… we don‘t have any on campus of course, so they do our testing
and some of our work for us. The University of South Carolina works with us. They have
developed software that supports state emergency operations centers. And, Battelle (Stafford)
who are mainly in charge with supporting the CBIRF unit of the Marine Corps..
Our funding really started out with BGen Donovan of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
(MCWL), who had the foresight to see importance of our efforts and gave us $2 million dollars
to get started. About two years ago we were reeling under deadlines from that effort and I‘ll
show you some results from their demonstration in November two years ago. That effort has now
been transferred to the Marine Corps Systems Command as our technologies mature. This is one
of the last war charts (Slide 2), I promise that I will try to keep you awake with some pictures…
go to the next one please.
We received some funding from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) in May
2000 and we put on a demonstration in November 2000, using some of these technologies. It was
a chemical spill. We don‘t have any nerve agents on campus but that was the scenario. It was
called in to the Atlanta Fire Department, so the Atlanta Fire Department responded… the state
responded… the city responded… and oh, by the way CBIRF happened to be in town and had 50
people who also worked as part of the exercise. We had subjects that were trained by a doctor to
show signs of nerve agent poisoning, mainly for our marketing department… they seem to like
that sort of thing… but you can see we had both non-ambulatory and ambulatory patients. It was
an Urban Search and Rescue situation where the responders (Firefighters and CBIRF personnel)
had to go in and rescue people from this building, which happens to be my building.
Now, the first thing that the first responders said they needed were better communications. The
model I had for coordinating the response operations was Incident Command. I guess some
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people don‘t know what incident command is? Incident command occurs when you have an
incident such as a chemical or biological release or radiological release, and the first guy on the
scene is usually the fire chief in charge of that locality. He becomes the incident commander.
Incident command is the official doctrine of the United States in terms of these types of events,
but the doctrine really originated with the fire and HAZMAT folks. So, my motto for what
happens in these cases is that the incident commander is the fire chief who is in charge, and he
has resources from a lot of different places including the military.
We have vivid footage of a real incident at an Air Force Reserve Base north of Atlanta. The
incident commander was literally strapped with cell phones and radios to be interoperable with
all these different units that he‘s in control of. We said, we should be able to do a little bit better
than that… we can get better and more reliable communications. So we did two things. First, we
provided military style organic digital communications at the site so that we can get from the
incident command post into the hot zone… and we‘ve made some considerable efforts to make
the things we‘re using operable in the hot zone. Now, any first responder who‘s on site and who
has a Palm Pilot with a suitable card in it, or a laptop, or wearable computer, can share
information around the site.
The second thing we did was to provide the incident commander with a connection into the
Internet… representative of a wide area network. Now we have connectivity from the hot zone to
literally anywhere in the world. We tried to exercise this capability in some of our
demonstrations. In one particular case we did a medical emergency. We called it a medical
reach-back experiment… to try to stretch the bandwidth of that system. We did the reach-back
experiment to not only our local emergency hospital which is about six miles away (Grady
Hospital), but also to the Army Edgewood Medical Treatment facility where there is one of the
few doctors in the world who has actually treated chemical agent casualties.
So in our medical reach-back experiment (Slide 6) you can see a Marine who is collecting data
for each patient. The philosophy is, each patient gets his own web-page. When he shows up he
gets a bracelet with a bar code on it. We can scan that with a Palm Pilot. That trundles off to
start the web page, and now we load the web page with medical data so that doctors can look at
it. One important reason we do this is that in Georgia, as in other states, emergency medical
personnel cannot administer antidotes for anything without a doctor‘s permission. If there‘s no
doctor in the hot zone then the patient is unlikely to survive even if you get him to the hospital,
because it‘s a matter of minutes for some nerve agent exposures… so we need a virtual doctor
out there.
We went around the world looking for FDA approved field gear that we could use. We found
instruments to take blood pressure, EKGs, blood type, pulse, and so on. None of those things
really exist in one package. However, there are some signs that the military wants to bundle them
together. The idea is that all of that data trundles off to the web-page… our Marine is entering
the symptoms of the patient and other data through his Palm Pilot, and that also goes off to the
web-page. In our demonstration in November 2000 and also in March 2001 with the President,
we authorized treatment based on that data with doctors looking at the data and holding
telephone conversations.
Now the other thing that we found was that the first responders, including the military, said well
we‘ve been off to ”chem-bio‘ school and we had it drummed into us several times about this
agent and that agent, and about this symptom and that symptom, but we forget it all when we
went back home. So, during the Olympics they took an 8.5in x 11in sheet of paper and they put
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all of the symptoms they could find in their textbook down one side and all of the agents they
could find on the other, and they laminated it, put a grease pencil on it, and that was put in every
fire engine in the city. Of course, there were a few problems with that. For one, it doesn‘t have
medical validity because of the time course of exposure and all that kind of stuff. So we said to
ourselves, we can do something that‘s a little bit better than that. We provided what we call a
decision aid. When the Marine enters the symptoms into the Palm Pilot, it comes back and gives
the probability of what that person‘s been exposed to.
Now we‘ve also… in the other direction… joined these scenarios. We have what we call a
building viewer. When the fireman goes into the building, can we give him information he can
use? We load the building plans down through the Internet onto his Palm Pilot so that when he
goes in he has some idea of what the building looks like. We get those plans from the Fire
Department, which of course has to keep those kinds of records… not all digitized yet… but
coming along. Also, we can send him instructions on decontamination… he can get e-mail, and
so on. You can actually surf the Internet with your Palm Pilot and get whatever you need…
material data, handling sheets, whatever you need to help yourself. So we‘re tackling the
problem from both directions and we found that this works pretty well.
The next thing that the first responders said was that they needed sensors that would tell them
what they are dealing with. For example, is it a chemical or biological agent? We needed
something cheap. We can‘t afford the military sensors, and we don‘t necessarily want to learn
how to use a mass-spectrometer that costs about $90,000 and takes a person with a Ph.D. to
operate. So, we went to the environmental and food processing industries to look for sensor
technology. The technology that they came up with is a sensor that‘s about 4 cubic inches in size
and promises to get even smaller. It can sense closed vapor and in vapor phase and in aqueous
phase. The device consists of a glass slide that‘s etched using microelectronics and a laser light
source. It‘s the same laser that‘s in your CD-ROM player and costs about $12. We put a
chemically sensitive coating on that slide and we use an interferometer which compares the area
under the chemical coating with a control area. It is very, very sensitive in terms of detection.
This device can detect in a 0.5in by 1in slide configuration about 75 different things, with
concentration readings.
We now have a sensor that costs a couple hundred dollars that we can put all around the city. But
to keep track and make sense of these sensors we need some kind of geographic underlay. For
those of you who don‘t recognize it, this is the Atlanta skyline (Slide 10), and this is part of a
virtual GIS (Geographic Information System) that we have (Slide 11). From the Olympics effort
we have this pretty good database for Atlanta and other places that we can use as an underlay.
We‘re working on having it in 3D and we‘re working on the capability of being able to click on a
window and obtain information about the people are who live there and so forth in terms of
anything that‘s geographically referenced. Currently, we can tell you how many schools, how
many people, where they‘re all located within each one of those contours. And the philosophy is
that the fire chief shouldn‘t have to plot the plumes. That could all be done at the state command
center or county command center. Since he‘s on the Internet all he has to do is go to the right
web-page and pull up those projections from his laptop.
After September 11 they said, you‘ve done so well helping first responders why don‘t you try to
broaden what you‘re doing at Georgia Tech to other places and other missions. Consequently, we
have been acquiring additional technologies that are now in the mix for the military and the
civilian communities. So in closing, what we‘ve tried to do is to start from the bottom up to
184

develop technology, insert it and get some feedback from the users, to help them deal with these
incidents, which may involve a host of civilian agencies, as well as some military agencies.
We‘re also headed back into things like federal databases. How do we get them down to the fire
chief? We just did a medical experiment in one of our demonstrations because that was the
easiest path. It‘s harder to do a law enforcement scenario, or a decontamination scenario where
you need chemists around the country to help you. Hopefully, those things will become more
possible in the future.
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The Role of Discovery in Context-Building
Decision-Support Systems
Steven J. Gollery
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center (CADRC)
California Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly)
San Luis Obispo, CA

Introduction
There are many sources of on-line information available to those responsible for making
decisions in complex situations. However, most of that information is either intended for human
use or is available only in custom or proprietary formats. Both of these conditions reduce the
ability of computer software to perform automatic reasoning about this information. As a result,
the usefulness of on-line information in intelligent decision-support systems is currently limited
to the few sources that are implemented specifically for those systems. The vast mass of sources
that do not fit that description are virtually invisible.
Current practices for integrating multiple information sources have proven too costly to
implement and have produced inflexible systems. These practices, which are discussed further
below, cannot cope with the magnitude or the diversity of the available information.
This paper describes the TEGRID project, which demonstrates the use of a service oriented
architecture to enable a more flexible, loosely coupled system of interoperable information
sources and consumers.
Disaster Management Requires Information from Diverse Sources
To determine how best to manage disaster or emergency response, the decision-maker requires
access to information from many sources. These sources might include law enforcement
agencies, hospitals, ambulance services, the weather service, city traffic control, the National
Guard, and so on. Each of these sources is controlled by different organizations, some nongovernmental, some local, some state, and some federal; some organizations are civilian, some
military. A decision-support system that assists users in planning responses to ongoing
emergencies must incorporate information from as many of these sources as possible.
One often-used approach to the problem of inter-system communication is to create an interface
agreement (i.e., an exact definition of the format that will be used to communicate data and
information). Each system then creates a translation between its own internal data or information
model and the format defined by the interface agreement. While this approach is conceptually
simple, it poses problems at both the technical and the cultural levels.
It can be very difficult for multiple organizations to reach agreement on an interface format.
Such agreements take time and a great deal of focused effort. At the same time, it can be difficult
to arrive at common understandings of the information represented by each system. A single
model representing all the kinds of information available in all systems may be so extensive that
it becomes impractical to implement.
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By far the most problematic aspect of the interface agreement approach is its lack of flexibility
and extensibility. When any of the systems changes its internal model, this change may make the
interface agreement obsolete. In that case, the agreement would have to be renegotiated and
modifications would need to be made to all systems, with associated funding requirements. The
level of effort required to change an interface once it has been implemented across multiple
systems tends to create distributed systems that are brittle, static, and resistant to evolving
quickly to meet the changing needs of their users.
Current approaches to inter-system communication too often result in tightly coupled systems. In
extreme cases, the coupling becomes so tight that nothing can be changed in any individual
system without requiring equivalent changes in other systems. Over time, the coupling of such
systems tends to become tighter as more software is written based on assumptions about the
exact format of communicated data and information.
Adding more information sources to such a system can also be difficult. As each new system is
added, the communication among systems tends to become more complex. Each new revision of
the interface agreement becomes more difficult to define, since any changes to the interface
require changes to larger sections of the software. The result is a further slowing of growth and
change.
This gradual reduction in the amount of change possible in a given period of time is especially
injurious to decision-support systems. Decision-support systems, especially in the area of
emergency management, should be implemented in a timely manner in order to provide
assistance to their users as soon as possible. Furthermore, when users identify a requirement for
change to the system, it must be feasible for developers to implement that change quickly so that
new functionality is available when the decision-maker needs it.
These requirements, and the problems of the interface agreement approach, led us to consider a
different type of architecture for our demonstration system. That architecture must provide (at
least) two benefits over architectures that require tightly-coupled communications: first, the
architecture must support the rapid addition of new sources of information; and second, the
architecture must allow individual information sources to change their communication format
while requiring little or no reworking of the systems consuming this information.
The proposed solution involves the loose coupling provided by web services, combined with the
self-describing information model of the semantic web. Both of these concepts are discussed
further in the following section.
Service-Oriented Architectures and Web Services
For our demonstration system, we explored the feasibility of replacing the tight coupling of
earlier distributed systems with a more loosely-coupled architecture. We implemented a system
based on web service standards that allowed us to use a discovery process to construct the system
at run-time based on the information needs of the clients. The use of discovery enables each
participant in the system to build an awareness of the context in which it is operating. This
section defines these concepts, starting with the most basic: the service-oriented architecture.
In a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA), each information source is considered to be a separate
service, providing information to remote clients. Each service is developed and deployed by the
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organization that provides the information, eliminating the need for complex interface
agreements. Also, each service is remotely accessible, usually over the Internet. Services are
generally not constrained to work with a single distributed system. This helps to keep the degree
of coupling low, and allows the same service to be used in multiple contexts.
Web Services are a specialization of the more general Service-Oriented Architecture. The
definition of Web Service has been hard to pin down, but the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) has provided the following definition: —A Web service is a software application
identified by a URI, whose interfaces and bindings are capable of being defined, described, and
discovered as XML artifacts. A Web service supports direct interactions with other software
agents using XML-based messages exchanged via Internet-based protocols.“ (see web site at:
(http://www.w3.org/TR/wsa-reqs#IDAIO2IB)) Current implementations of web service
standards specialize this farther: most web services use HTTP (Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol) to
exchange messages defined in SOAP (Service Oriented Architecture Protocol). The SOAP
standard defines an XML language and a set of rules for serializing and de-serializing objects
and data, regardless of programming language, operating system, or hardware platform.
The description of web services is handled by WSDL (the Web Services Description Language),
while discovery is provided by UDDI (Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration). UDDI
defines an XML language for accessing a repository to register and locate web services
according to the attributes of the service. The repository may be one of the public registries
operated by Microsoft, IBM, or SAP. However, for most uses it is likely that participants will use
a community registry accessible only to authorized partners. This paper discusses some of the
limitations of WSDL and UDDI, below.
Why Discovery Matters in a Decision-Support System
As discussed earlier, in order to provide the broadest possible support for human decisionmaking, a decision-support system needs to provide all the information that is: (a) currently
available; and, (b) currently relevant. This generally requires bringing together information from
multiple sources.
Existing decision-support systems generally require that all potential sources of information be
identified when the system is being designed and implemented. This requirement stems from the
need to build concrete knowledge about each information source into the decision-support
system. The information may include the location of the source, its access protocol, the data or
information format, and the type of security used, among others.
The requirement that all sources of information be known prior to deployment prevents the
decision-support system from taking advantage of information whose source is not identified
(and may not even exist) while the system is being built. Most significantly, this requirement
prevents the system from solving the ”transient need‘ problem. This problem arises when an
unexpected situation requires a kind of information that is not present among the sources known
to the system. For example, the information may be useful to a decision maker for a short period
of time, but irrelevant after that point. Systems that can only use information sources that are
known to the designers of the system tend to lack the flexibility required to deal with changes to
the information environment and to the needs of the decision-maker.
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A system built around web services solves the ”unknown information source‘ problem by adding
the ability to discover services at run-time. If the service consumer can understand that a
particular service provides information that the consumer can use, in a form that the consumer
can process, then the consumer can use information from a previously-unknown source.
Some Limitations of Current Web Service Standards for Discovery
There are two important gaps in the ability of standard web services to discover and use
unknown services. First, the standard discovery protocol only allows consumers to search for
very specific types of services. In many cases, this amounts to a key-word search, which may
result in missed opportunities and mistaken connections. Second, the standard method of
defining service operations and parameters limits a would-be consumer to those services that
implement operations using the names and classes that the consumer expects.
The difficulty is that the current web service standard for defining services and operations (Web
Service Definition Language, or WSDL) does not include any information about the intent and
meaning of an operation or its parameters. The best that a client can do is to search for operations
based on the model that a given service implements, where the models are publicly defined either
by the consumer, the providers, or by an industry standards body. The client will miss services
that provide the same functionality but use different models.
For example: in the TEGRID demonstration project, we have created a definition of the
operations and parameters for a ”publish-and-subscribe‘ service that allows clients to ask for
information to be sent to them on topics of interest, and to send information regarding those
topics. This service definition is then placed in the TEGRID service registry as a model of a
service that the designers of publish-and-subscribe services may examine and implement. The
SubscriptionManager service is one such service. In a real service-oriented system, there might
be several services implementing the same model. Information about the SubscriptionManager is
then entered into the service registry, including the fact that the SubscriptionManager
implements the publish-and-subscribe model.
Participants in the TEGRID system that are interested in either sending or receiving information
must implement the consumer side of the publish-and-subscribe model. That is, these
participants must be able to discover those services that adhere to this specific model. In other
words, they must be able to invoke operations using exact names and constructing parameters
using class definitions that must be built-in to the client. Finally, the consumer must be able to
receive values of a given class and map those values to objects within the consumer's own
information model.
If another service were to provide the same functionality, but used different operation names and
different classes for the input and output values, consumers searching the registry for publishand-subscribe services would miss this equivalent service completely. The problem is that the
registry does not describe the purpose (or intent) of a publish-and-subscribe service. As a result,
consumers cannot find services based on a description of their own requirements, but only based
on keywords and model definitions. The same problem also prevents consumers from locating
new kinds of services (i.e., consumers are unable to describe their functional needs in a way that
allows the registry to match those needs to specific service providers).
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In short, using current web service standards, the ”discovery‘ process is limited in practical terms
to discovering service locations. Adding entirely new types of services after deployment is only
possible in limited circumstances. This in turn limits the ability of the client to draw information
from all available relevant sources, and moves the effort of defining usable service types back
from post-deployment to the development phase. Web service standards increase the flexibility
of distributed systems, but they do not take us as far in that direction as we would like.
These limitations do not mean that web services as they are defined today provide no value.
Many useful systems can be, will be, and are being built based on current standards. Service
models are being defined by consortiums and standards bodies for specific vertical markets.
These models will enable wide-spread interoperability. Service producers and consumers written
for those models have the potential to provide unprecedented levels of system-to-system
communication throughout an industry, resulting in significant increases in productivity.
Additionally, WSDL (the language used for defining service models) is designed to enable
automated generation of client and server interfaces. The effort of incorporating a new service
model defined in WSDL into a consumer is therefore generally very small, so that modifying a
consumer to access a new type of information server can be done quickly and at little cost. Many
(perhaps most) web service consumers will never have a need to dynamically locate sources of
entirely unknown kinds of information. For these consumers, the limitations of the current
methods of locating web services are simply irrelevant.
In order to provide full support for decision makers in areas where time is critical, on the other
hand, these limitations do matter. The goal is to be able to give decision makers access to the
information they need, when they need it, even when this involves types of information that were
not anticipated by the designers of the system. At the CADRC, we are engaged in ongoing
research exploring the use of semantic information to extend web services. We hope that such an
approach will eventually allow systems to become progressively more flexible and responsive to
the needs of their users. Some background on and explanation of the semantic approach is given
in the next section.
Semantic Web Services
Several years ago, Tim Berners-Lee (the originator of the World Wide Web) began to discuss his
vision of the future of the web. The web as it currently exists consists mainly of human-readable
information. The markup in web pages is dedicated almost entirely to presentation instructions.
This means that the only machine-processable content of most web pages is concerned with how
the page should look.
Berners-Lee envisioned a web whose contents would include a new kind of markup that would
enable software to reason about the meaning of the contents of a page. This would enable very
intelligent automated processing of information on the web. Essentially, it would turn the
contents of the web into an enormous knowledge base. Berners-Lee calls this vision of the future
the Semantic Web. Semantic and logic languages are being developed to support this vision. The
most influential of these languages is called RDF (Resource Definition Framework). RDF is
deceptively simple, but has very deep underpinnings in the constructs and theory of formal logic.
Another language related to the Semantic Web is DAML-OIL (DARPA Agent Markup
Language œ Ontology Inference Layer). DAML-OIL builds on RDF, adding more complex
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object-oriented concepts. DAML-OIL was submitted to the World Wide Web Consortium's
Semantic Web working group, as the basis for the standardized OWL language, which is
currently under development. It is likely that when OWL emerges from committee, it will bear a
strong resemblance to DAML-OIL, although there may be significant differences.
Although web services and the semantic web are being defined by two very different
communities, there is a growing realization of the potential synergy between the two. The basic
idea here is that web services are a powerful means to deliver semantic information, while
enhancing web service standards with semantic information will increase their flexibility and
their effectiveness. The combination of Web Services with the Semantic Web is referred to (not
surprisingly) as Semantic Web Services.
How Does Semantic Information Improve Service Discovery?
As discussed above, the current methods of discovering and invoking services and operations do
not deal with the meaning of either the operations themselves or the classes of the parameters
and return values (the input to and output from the operations). This limitation can be described
succinctly as the lack of semantic information.
The premise of the research project currently in progress at the CADRC is as follows: If service
definitions were to be expanded to include a formal description of the purpose of each operation,
as well as an ontology that relates the classes of objects being passed in and out to other classes
and concepts in the domain of knowledge, it would become possible for a would-be consumer to
make a more intelligent determination of the suitability of a given operation to the consumer‘s
own needs.
Semantic information concerning the service's domain of knowledge may also allow the
prospective consumer to map operation parameters and return values to the consumer's own
representation. This mapping is critical to the possibility of accessing services with unknown
operation models. In other words, the consumer needs to be able to determine what information
must be sent each operation, and what to do with the information received from the service.
Without the ability to create mappings to and from its own information model at run-time, a
consumer is again restricted to exactly those services that implement a service model that is built
into the consumer during design and development.
In a previous pilot project, CADRC developers defined several ontologies using DAML
(DARPA Agent Markup Language) and demonstrated the ability of a client program to
automatically merge ontologies from multiple services under controlled conditions. This
demonstration project also showed that users could extend the information model of a program at
execution time, and that inference rules written for a specific ontology could also operate on
instances of classes that the client had received from service provider, even though the classes
were not known to the developers that wrote the rules. A future project will extend this
investigation to include DAML-S (DAML Services), a vocabulary with semantics for defining
the capabilities of services. We hope to learn whether the use of DAML-S to define the
semantics of a service can enable a consumer to discover and utilize services without the need
for each service to implement a specific interface.
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The goal of adding semantic-level service descriptions is to enable consumers to locate services
based on each service's purpose, rather than the names of the service's operations or the types of
its parameters. This description of purpose is stated in a formal language that can be interpreted
by the client. Automated reasoning can then determine the relationships between each operation
and the definition of services needed by the client. Semantic description will allow service
discovery to become more flexible, and will eventually lead to systems that can evolve as more
services become available and the needs of the users of client program change over time.
The TEGRID Demonstration System
To demonstrate the use of web services and discovery in a decision-support system, the CADRC
implemented a system within the context of emergency management of the rolling power
outages experienced in many parts of California during the summer of 2001. This system is
called TEGRID (i.e., ”Taming the Electric Grid‘).
Based on knowledge acquisition performed under the auspices of the National Institute for Urban
Search and Rescue (NIUSR), and with the cooperation of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department
in the Fall of 2001, we identified several distinct entities that would be involved in planning and
executing responses to power outage situations. Among these: the local sheriff stations (LSS);
rapid response teams (RRT); the power supply organization (PSO); the traffic control
organization (TCO); and the emergency operations bureau (EOB). The remainder of this section
describes the responsibilities and actions of each of these major participants in the TEGRID
demonstration system.
In the demonstration scenario, the Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB) is responsible for
coordinating responses to the announcement of power outages. This coordination potentially
includes a wide variety of decisions and communications. For the purposes of the scenario, we
implemented only the assignment of Rapid Response Teams to provide support for local sheriff
stations at priority locations.
Since the focus of this demonstration was on constructing the system through discovery and
loosely-coupled communication through web services, we simulated the existence of several
information sources:
1. A database at each local sheriff station that contains current officer assignments,
equipment manifests and status, and priority infrastructure and intersections.
2 . Lists of Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) and their primary and alternative
assignments, maintained by the Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB).
3. Current power supply information, along with alerts about planned and current
power outages, maintained and disseminated by a Power Supply Organization
(PSO).
4. Traffic information, especially alternative route planning, supplied by the Traffic
Control Organization (TCO).
5. Incident reports, fed into the system from 911 emergency lines and other sources.
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Most of these information sources do exist, but are not (currently) available as web services.
With the possible exception of the alternative route information, creating web services for these
systems would be straightforward, given the cooperation of the agencies and organizations
involved.
In addition, we implemented two services that are not part of the problem statement but are
essential to the operation of the system. The first service is the Web Services Kiosk (WSK).
Currently, this is an implementation of the Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration
(UDDI) standard, but over time we expect this to evolve into an expanded service that will
provide advanced semantic-based discovery services and will be the key to future semantic web
services. The second infrastructure service is the Subscription Manager. This is our
implementation of a web service that provides the ability for entities in the system to register
their interests in information on specific topics, and to publish information that may be of interest
to other participants in the system. The information is published as XML documents so that
subscribers are not dependent on any static definition of the contents.
The TEGRID Demonstration Scenario: Initial Discovery Phase
The primary visible participants in the demonstration are the Emergency Operations Bureau
(EOB) and the two Local Sheriff Stations, Lomita and East Los Angeles. Each of them starts
with only one piece of information: the location of the Web Services Kiosk (WSK). The process
of discovery is similar regardless of the order in which the three primary participants are started,
but for the purposes of this discussion, we will assume that the EOB is started first.
The EOB queries the WSK for the location of a service that can provide publish-and-subscribe
functionality. This functionality is defined, as described above, through the use a publicly
accessible service model. The WSK finds the only match, which is the Subscription Manager,
and returns the Subscription Manager's location (its URI) to the EOB. The EOB also searches the
WSK for a service that can monitor power supply levels and send alerts when a power outage is
about to begin. The WSK returns the URI of the Power Supply Organization service.
Using the Subscription Manager, the EOB subscribes to notifications about the creation of any
Local Sheriff Station (LSS). The EOB also publishes a description of itself, in case there are
other elements of the system that have subscribed to the creation of EOB entities. Additionally,
the EOB subscribes to notifications of power outages.
Now we start one of the LSS clients œ Lomita, for instance. Lomita goes through the same
process of using its knowledge of the WSK to discover the Subscription Manager, and registers
its interest in receiving messages regarding the creation of EOBs. Lomita also publishes
information about itself. Since there is already a subscriber for notifications of LSS creation, the
Subscription Manager passes along Lomita's information to the EOB. The EOB adds the Lomita
information to its knowledge base, and replies with its own information. Now the EOB and the
Lomita station know each other's web location, which means that they can communicate directly
with each other, and the EOB has information about Lomita, particularly the RRTs assigned
there, and the station resources. When the East Los Angeles station is started, the same process
occurs, resulting in East Los Angeles and the EOB learning each other's web location, and the
EOB learning all the information that East Los Angeles has provided.
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As each participant has entered the system, several agents resident within each one have also
subscribed to information on various topics. We will see the effects of these subscriptions in a
later phase.
At this point, we have demonstrated the use of two different kinds of discovery. First, there is
registry-based discovery, which allowed all the participants to locate the Subscription Manager,
and the EOB to find the Power Supply service. Each participant has now created its own
awareness of the context in which it is operating, and has exchanged information with other
entities in the system. TEGRID has constructed itself in an ad hoc manner, based on available
information sources, and has established a loosely-coupled communication system. This is the
end of the discovery phase.
The TEGRID Demonstration Scenario: Operational Phase
The operational phase begins when the Power Supply Organization (PSO) determines that a
rolling power blackout is imminent (i.e., is planned to begin in fifteen minutes). The PSO
publishes that information to all subscribers, which in this case includes only the EOB.
On receiving the imminent power outage alert, the EOB immediately broadcasts the alert to all
Local Sheriff Stations. The EOB then uses its Station Monitor Agent to determine which LSSs
will experience the outage within their jurisdiction, using the information provided by each
station at the time of discovery. These LSSs receive a second alert at a higher priority level. In
this scenario, the only station directly affected is East Los Angeles. The EOB also alerts the
RRTs assigned to assist the affected stations, so that these RRTs will begin to prepare for
deployment. When an LSS receives a power outage alert, it assumes a state of readiness
consistent with whether the outage is within its jurisdiction or not.
The second stage in the operational phase occurs when the power outage actually occurs. This is
a repeat of the previous step, except that all elements move to a higher state of readiness. The
third stage of the operational phase begins with a report of a traffic accident within East Los
Angeles' jurisdiction, sent into the system by the Incident Report information source. The East
Los Angeles Sheriff Station determines that it does not have sufficient resources to cover the
traffic accident due to the power outage. East Los Angeles therefore requests additional
resources from the EOB.
The EOB service receives the request and uses its own Scheduling Agent to assign an RRT and
other equipment to the traffic accident. In addition, the EOB creates an Incident Agent to
monitor further messages relating to the accident.
The fourth (and final) stage of the operational phase begins with the RRT finding that the route
to the traffic accident is blocked by traffic due to the fact that many signals are not functioning
because there is no power in the area. The RRT requests assistance from the EOB in finding an
alternative route. The EOB Incident Agent queries the Web Service Kiosk for a service that
implements an alternative traffic route model. The WSK responds with the address of the Traffic
Control Service. The Incident Agent sends the request for assistance to the Traffic Control
Service, which utilizes its own Routing Agent to determine an alternative route to the traffic
accident. The Traffic Control Service sends this route as a reply to the EOB Incident Agent.
At this point, the Incident Agent displays the alternative route to the user of the EOB client
system. This allows a human being to examine this route and accept it, alter it, or ask for another
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route. Keeping a human in the loop is vital here and at many other places in the system, because
the human being will almost always be aware of information that is not available through the
system. With the user's acceptance, the alternative route is sent to the RRT, which also accepts it.
This concludes the demonstration scenario.
Aspects of the TEGRID Demonstration
The TEGRID demonstration system shows the ability of a system to configure itself based on the
available participants and their intents and interests. It also demonstrates the ability of looselycoupled systems to exchange object-oriented information when the communications protocol is
chosen for this purpose. We demonstrated further that participants in a distributed system can
extend their awareness of the information available to them, and do not need to rely on predefined knowledge of information sources.
On the negative side, we also proved to ourselves the limitations of existing web service
standards due to the lack of semantic information. Elements of TEGRID were not required to
know exactly what servers they would be using, but we could not eliminate totally the necessity
for each element to have knowledge of the interfaces provided by different kinds of services.
Future Directions
As indicated previously, future work will be focused in the area of adding semantic information
to the descriptions of services and to the ontology of a service. We will be examining the
suitability of the new DAML-Services language for this purpose, by defining representations of
the information needs of each participant, and determining whether DAML-S can be used to
locate services without an exact match.
We will also be exploring further the use of DAML as an ontology representation language, and
creating tools and techniques that will eventually allow systems built around the concept of the
semantic web to merge disparate ontologies into a single information model.
Other researchers working in similar areas can be found through articles listed below in the
reference section.
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Appendix A: Semantic Web Services and Network-Centric Systems
A recently announced goal of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is a move to
what has been dubbed ”net-centricity‘ or ”network-centric‘. This goal is directly related to the
enterprise architecture known as the ”Global Information Grid‘ (GIG). As John Osterholz, the
director of architecture and interoperability in the Department of Defense‘s CIO office recently
stated: —We believe ultimately that the key to managing data overload is making commanders
responsible for pulling the data that they need into their decision space rather than having some
galactic, on-line genius decide what they need“. (Osterholz‘s statement was reported on the
following web site: http://www.gcn.com/21_29/management/20098-1.html.)
This vision has a deep correlation with the goals of the project described in this paper. In order
for each commander (or any other human or software agent) to pull the data (information) that
suits his, her, or its current needs, most existing systems would require the user to identify an
exact set of information sources. But in a distributed system of the size envisioned by the
Department of Defense, it is unlikely that any individual would be able to be aware of all the
potential information sources within this network-centric system.
Clearly, a form of automated discovery is necessary for the success of net-centricity. There may
be a temptation to repeat past practices and create a (very large) number of standard service
models, so that service providers can search registries for service providers implementing those
models. If this occurs, commanders using specific client software programs will be restricted to
accessing information providers whose models are built into the software. This will be
problematic if the commander is in a fluid situation that might benefit from the input of
unplanned types of information.
A far more flexible solution will include the addition of semantic descriptions of service
capabilities to the discovery system. Client software will then be able to describe the information
needs of the user in order to locate appropriate information sources. As the user's needs change,
he or she will be able to direct the client software to seek out new services to provide new kinds
of information. The result will be the right information delivered to the right person at the right
time.
Web services in general also address two other problems that continue to obstruct progress in
moving toward transformation of the Department of Defense‘s information technology systems:
interoperability; and ,legacy systems. Web services help to solve both problems by putting a
web-based interface on legacy systems. This interface is by definition interoperable with web
service clients, which may include other systems that could use the information contained in the
legacy system. Adding a web service interface to a legacy system is far more cost-effective than
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re-engineering or replacing the system, and in the case of client/server systems, constructing a
web service interface can generally be performed over a short period of time, contrasting with
the major effort involved in developing replacement systems. Finally, in the case where multiple
legacy systems are planned to be replaced by a single new system in the future, the web service
interface can serve as a portal that allows clients to access information from the legacy system
now, while forwarding requests to the new system as it comes on-line, without rewriting the web
service client.
Appendix B: Organizations and Standards
Resource Description Framework (RDF)
http://www.w3.org/RDF/
DAML Organization
www.daml.org
The source for information on the DARPA Agent Markup Language
Semantic Web Working Group of the World Wide Web Consortium
http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/
Web Services Working Group of World Wide Web Consortium
http://www.w3.org/2002/ws/
UDDI
http://www.uddi.org/
WSDL
http://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl

208

DEMONSTRATION
A system with discovery, reasoning, and learning capabilities.
[ONR Workshop (2002): Wednesday, Sep.18 at 1 pm]

The TEGRID Semantic Web Application
Steven Gollery, Senior Software Engineer
Jens Pohl, Ph.D., Executive Director
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, California
Introduction
Over the past several years there has been an increasing recognition of the shortcomings of
message-passing data-processing systems that compute data without understanding, and the
vastly superior potential capabilities of information-centric systems that incorporate an internal
information model with sufficient context to support a useful level of automatic reasoning.
The key difference between a data-processing and an information-centric environment is the
ability to embed in the information-centric software some understanding of the information
being processed. The term information-centric refers to the representation of information in the
computer, not to the way it is actually stored in a digital machine. This notion of understanding
can be achieved in software through the representational medium of an ontological framework of
objects with characteristics and interrelationships (i.e., an internal information model). How
these objects, characteristics and relationships are actually stored at the lowest level of bits in the
computer is immaterial to the ability of the computer to undertake reasoning tasks. The
conversion of these bits into data and the transformation of data into information, knowledge and
context takes place at higher levels, and is ultimately made possible by the skillful construction
of a network of richly described objects and their relationships that represent those physical and
conceptual aspects of the real world that the computer is required to reason about.
In a distributed environment such information-centric systems interoperate by exchanging
ontology-based information instead of data expressed in standardized formats. The use of
ontologies is designed to provide a context that enhances the ability of the software to reason
about information received from outside sources. In the past, approaches to inter-system
communication have relied on agreements to use pre-defined formats for data representation.
Each participant in the communication then implemented translation from the communication
format to its own internal data or information model. While relatively simple to construct, this
approach led to distributed systems that are brittle, static, and resistant to change.
It is the premise of the TEGRID (Taming the Electric Grid) proof-of-concept demonstration that,
for large scale ontology-based systems to be practical, we must allow for dynamic ontology
definitions instead of static, pre-defined standards. The need for ontology models that can change
after deployment can be most clearly seen when we consider providing information on the World
Wide Web as a set of web services augmented with ontologies. In that case, we need to allow
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client programs to discover the ontologies of services at run-time, enabling opportunistic access
to remote information. As clients incorporate new ontologies into their own internal information
models, the clients build context that enables them to reason on the information they receive
from other systems. The flexible information model of such systems allows them to evolve over
time as new information needs and new information sources are found.
The TEGRID Demonstration Context
Since mid-2001 the Emergency Operations Bureau of the Los Angeles Sheriff‘s Department has
been assigned the additional task of coordinating the response to expected rolling electric power
blackouts, as California‘s demand for electric power came perilously close to exceeding
availability. While both the power outage areas and individual blackout periods are predefined in
terms of a large number of power grid units that are distributed throughout the Los Angeles
County, the emergency events that are likely to be triggered by blackout conditions (e.g., multivehicle accidents, carbon monoxide poisoning in enclosed parking garages, fires, criminal
activities, and other disturbances) are less determinate.
The TEGRID proof-of-concept system has been designed to assist the Los Angeles Sheriff‘s
Department by addressing this potentially chaotic situation in an autonomously evolving, just-intime manner. TEGRID does not exist as a pre-configured system of tightly bound components
that know about the existence of each other, have predefined connections, and predetermined
capabilities. In fact at the beginning of the demonstration TEGRID, as a system, does not really
exist at all. What does exist is a set of cooperating Semantic Web Services, based on standard
Web Service specifications (e.g., SOAP, UDDI, WSDL, and XML) enhanced by the ability of
sharing semantic-level descriptions of their own internal information models.
In essence TEGRID involves sharing information among a number of separate organizations,
including local police stations, the Emergency Operations Bureau, a power supply management
and monitoring organization, and a traffic control system. The proof-of-concept relies on a set of
assumptions about the existing resources available from each of the organizations involved.
1. That each local sheriff‘s station has a database that includes (at least): current
officer assignments; equipment manifests and status; and, priority infrastructure and
intersections.
2. That the Emergency Operations Bureau has a list of Rapid Response Teams and
their primary and alternative assignments.
3. That there exists some kind of Power Supply Organization that has a database of
recent history of power consumption, plus the ability to provide a real-time feed of
current power levels.
4. That there exists some kind of Traffic Control Organization that has some method
of determining acceptable alternative routes for reaching a particular destination
from a given starting location.
Another underlying assumption is that all of these organizations have Internet connections and
either have an existing web site or are willing to establish one. TEGRID builds on these existing
information and data sources to construct a web service infrastructure that allows informationsharing and automated decision-support.
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Since the proof-of-concept system does not have access to live databases, it simulates them,
using sample data to implement the demonstration scenario. There are also some potential
applications that must exist in order to support the scenario, but are not part of TEGRID itself.
For example, there is a requirement that new incidents (e.g., traffic accidents) would be reported
to the local sheriff‘s stations before they are able to propagate through the system. Such a
reporting application is assumed to exist, and has been simulated in order to produce the dynamic
behavior called for in the demonstration scenario.
TEGRID features several kinds of web service providers. Each of these implements a set of
operations that allows exchange of the information that makes the functioning of the system
possible. These operations such as subscription, information transfer, warning and alert
generation, discovery, and assignment, are the minimum necessary to provide the functionality
described in the demonstration. More operations can be easily added as TEGRID‘s capabilities
increase in the future.
In addition, TEGRID includes software agents with automatic reasoning capabilities. Some of
these agents could conceptually be seen as services. For instance, the Station Monitor Agent is
able to publish alerts that the local stations can subscribe to, and at the same time the Station
Monitor Agent is able to subscribe to notifications of planned power outages. The relationship
between agents and services is perhaps a fertile field for further investigation: When is it more
useful to implement functionality as an agent, and when as a service? Are the two orthogonal? Is
it reasonable to think that the same set of functions might be an agent from one point of view, but
a service from another? Does an agent consume services, provide services, or both? Since it
seems likely that the answers to these questions depend on the nature of the individual agent, the
definition of a conceptual framework for making such determinations might be a productive
future goal.
The Fundamental Web Service Elements
Within the Internet context of web services, TEGRID builds on a number of standard protocols
and elements. These elements are combined into an executing software entity, capable of seeking
and discovering existing web services, extending its own information model through the
information model of any discovered web service, and automatically reasoning about the state of
its internal information model. As shown in Fig.1, this entity or Cyber-Spider consists of three
principal components: a web server; a semantic web service; and, an information-centric
application.
The web server, utilizing standard Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), serves as the gateway
through which the Cyber-Spider gains access to other existing web services. Web servers
primarily provide access to Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) data sources and perform only
simple operations that enable access to externally programmed functionality. However, these
simple operations currently form the building blocks of the World Wide Web.
The second component of a Cyber-Spider is a semantic web service (i.e., a web service with an
internal information model). A web service is accessed through a web server utilizing standard
protocols (e.g., UDDI, SOAP, WSDL, SML) and is capable of providing programmed
functionality. However, clients to a standard web service are usually restricted to those services
that implement specific predefined interfaces. The implementation of web services in the Internet
environment allows organizations to provide access to applications that accept and return
complex objects. Web service standards also include a limited form of registration and
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discovery, which provide the ability to ”advertise‘ a set of services in such a way that prospective
client programs can find services that meet their needs. The addition of an internal information
model in a semantic web service allows the storage of semantic level descriptions (i.e.,
information) and the performance of limited operations on these semantic descriptions. In other
words, the semantic web server component of a Cyber-Spider is capable of reasoning.

Fig.1: Anatomy of a Cyber-Spider

Fig.2: Cast of TEGRID players

The third component of a Cyber-Spider is one or more information-centric applications. These
applications are designed to take advantage of the resources provided by a number of semantic
web services, enabling them to reason about the usefulness of each service and support more
sophisticated discovery strategies. Moreover, the application component is able to construct
relationships among the information models of different services, with the ability to integrate
services without requiring agreement on a common information model.
With these three components Cyber-Spiders are at least minimally equipped to operate in an
Internet environment as autonomous software entities, capable of: discovering needed services;
accepting services from external offerers; providing services to external requesters; gaining
context through an internal information model; automatically reasoning about available
information; extending their information model during execution; extending their service
capabilities during execution; and, learning from their collaborations.
The TEGRID Players
The cast of players in the current TEGRID proof-of-concept demonstration includes six players
or existing web services (Fig.2): the Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB) of the Los Angeles
Sheriff‘s Department; several Local Sheriff Stations (LSS); a Power Supply Organization
(PSO); a Traffic Control Organization (TCO); several Rapid Response Teams (RRT); and, a
Los Angeles County Web Services Kiosk (WSK).
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Fundamental to each player are three notions. First, each player operates as an autonomous entity
within an environment of other players. Most, but not all of the other players are also
autonomous. This requires the autonomous players to be able to discover the capabilities of other
players. Second, each autonomous player has a sense of intent to accomplish one or more
objectives. Such objectives may range from the desire to achieve a goal (e.g., maintain situation
awareness, coordinate the response to a time critical situation, or undertake a predetermined
course of action following the occurrence of a particular event) to the willingness to provide one
or more services to other players. Third, each player (whether autonomous or not) is willing to at
least cooperate with the other players. In some cases the level of cooperation will extend to a
collaborative partnership in which the partnering players contribute to the accomplishment of a
common objective. In other cases the cooperation may be limited to one player providing a
service to another player, without any understanding or interest in the reason for the service
request.
To operate successfully in such an autonomous Internet-based environment a Cyber-Spider
player should be endowed with the following capabilities:
1. Subscribe to information from external sources
(e.g., alerts, ontology extensions).
2. Accept subscriptions from external clients.
3. Dynamically change its subscription profile.
4. Extend its internal information representation.
5. Extend its own service capabilities.
6. Generate new agents for its own use.
7. Describe its own service capabilities to external clients.
8. Seek, evaluate and utilize services offered by external clients.
9. Provide services to external clients.
10. Describe its own (intent) nature to external clients.
The Cyber-Spiders in TEGRID are currently capable of demonstrating eight of these ten
desirable capabilities. The ability of a Cyber-Spider to dynamically change its subscription
profile, while technically a fairly simple matter, has not been implemented because it is not used
in the demonstration scenario. The ability of a Cyber-Spider to describe its own nature to
external clients, on the other hand, is technically a much more difficult proposition. It will
require a Cyber-Spider to have an understanding of its personality as a collective product of its
internal information model and the relationship of that model with the external world. At best
this must be considered a challenging research area that is beyond the current capabilities of
information-centric software systems.
The TEGRID Agents
Most of the reasoning capabilities available in TEGRID are performed by software agents that
are components of the players (e.g., Cyber-Spiders). In other words, agents are predefined clients
within player systems (i.e., information-centric applications) and perform internal functions that
are necessary for the particular player to deliver its services and/or accomplish its intent. The
following agents (i.e., collaborative tools) are available in the current TEGRID implementation:
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Name of Agent

Owner

Description of Agent Capabilities

Risk Agent

EOB

Identifies high risk entities in the jurisdictional
region of an activated LSS.

Deployment Agent

EOB

Determines whether RRT support is required
for a particular activated LSS.

Power Level Agent

PSO

Determines if electric power demand has
exceeded supply.

Situation Agent

EOB

Prepares and updates the ”EOB Situation
Status Report‘.

Station Monitor Agent

EOB

Identifies all LSSs that will experience power
blackouts during the current and next blackout
cycle.

Status Agent

LSS

Prepares and updates the ”LSS Situation
Status Report‘.

Local Station Agent

LSS

Determines whether sufficient local resources
are available to deal with current conditions.

Scheduling Agent

EOB

Assigns RRTs and equipment to situations
requiring RRT involvement.

Incident Agent

EOB

Monitors the response to a particular situation
supported by one or more RRTs.

Routing Agent

TCO

Determines alternative routes to a particular
situation location.

Demonstration Objectives
Stated succinctly, the objective of the TEGRID scenario is to demonstrate the discovery,
extensibility, collaboration, automatic reasoning, and tool creation capabilities of a distributed,
just-in-time, self-configuring, collaborative multi-agent system in which a number of loosely
coupled Web Services associate opportunistically and cooperatively to collectively provide
decision assistance in a crisis management situation. Specifically, these capabilities are defined
as follows:
Discovery:

Ability of an executing software entity to orient itself in a virtual
cyberspace environment and discover other software services.
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Extensibility:

Ability of an executing software entity to extend its information
model by gaining access to portions of the information model of
another executing software entity.

Collaboration:

Ability of several Web Services to collaboratively assist each other
and human users during time critical decision making processes.

Reasoning:

Ability of a software agent to automatically reason about events in
near real time under time critical conditions.

Tool Creation:

Ability of a Web Service to create an agent to perform specific
situation monitoring and reporting functions.

Players‘ Intent
The TEGRID players or Cyber-Spiders are initialized with intent or willingness to cooperate
based on their role and operational responsibilities, as follows:
To be immediately informed of imminent power
blackout conditions, to coordinate all assistance to LSSs, to maintain situation
awareness, and to take over local command responsibilities when conditions
require actions that cross the jurisdictional boundaries of two or more LSSs.

EOB (Emergency Operations Bureau):

To activate a predefined response plan as soon as it
receives notification (from the EOB) that a power blackout condition is
imminent within its jurisdiction, to respond to new emergency missions in its
jurisdictional area, to provide RRTs to the EOB, and to request assistance
from the EOB.

LSS (Local Sheriff Station):

To share information relating to the current
status of power demand and availability with subscribers, to provide
subscribers with information relating to a predefined rolling power blackout
schedule on request, and to alert subscribers whenever the schedule is
intended to be implemented.

PSO (Power Supply Organization):

To share information relating to historical traffic
flows under typical conditions with subscribers, to provide subscribers with
information relating to traffic control capabilities (e.g., types and location of
traffic signals, sensors, and web-cameras), and to provide subscribers with
alternate traffic routes on request.

TCO (Traffic Control Organization):

To share information relating to its current mission and
location with subscribers, to execute missions requested by the EOB, and to
provide assistance to any assigned LSS, and to request assistance from the
EOB.

RRT (Rapid Response Team):

The TEGRID Demonstration Scenario
Armed with their individual intent and intrinsic Cyber-Spider capabilities (i.e., ability to:
discover useful web services; subscribe to information and accept subscriptions from external
clients; extend their internal information models; describe and provide services to external
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clients; seek, evaluate and utilize services offered by external clients; and, extend their own
service capabilities by generating new agents) the players commence their partly intentional and
mostly opportunistic interactions.
Orientation
The players orient themselves in the virtual cyberspace environment by accessing one or
more directories of available services and registering an information subscription profile
with those services that they believe to be related to their intent (Fig.3).
Accesses the WSK (Los Angeles County Web
Services Kiosk) based on its predefined authorization level, and:

EOB (Emergency Operations Bureau):

Subscribes to any service changes in the WSK.
Finds the PSO address which it was seeking.
Discovers the TCO.
Discovers all of the LSSs.

Fig.3: Orientation and discovery

Fig.4: Information subscription

Subscription
The players access the services that they require to achieve their intent, register
appropriate subscription profiles, and query for information that they believe to have a
need for (Fig.4).
Registers a subscription profile with each LSS
(Local Sheriff Station) that includes all current police unit locations,
mission completion events, new mission events, and any information
changes relating to the availability of its RRTs (Rapid Response Teams).

EOB (Emergency Operations Bureau):
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Queries each LSS (Local Sheriff Station) for all information relating to its
RRTs (Rapid Response Teams) and extends its information model.
Registers a subscription profile with each RRT (Rapid Response Team)
that includes its current location and mission.
Registers a subscription profile with the PSO (Power Supply
Organization) that includes the current status of electric power demand
and availability, and any change in its intention to implement the
predefined rolling power blackout schedule.
Registers a subscription profile with the TCO (Traffic Control
Organization) that includes any change in the status of traffic signals,
sensors, and web-cameras.

Fig.5: Power supply ”Warning‘

Fig.6: Power outage ”Alert‘

Each LSS responds to the EOB (Emergency Operations
Bureau) registration by registering a corresponding subscription profile
with the EOB that includes the current mission and location of its RRTs
(Rapid Response Teams), any EOB requests and orders to this LSS, and
changes in the current 'situation status report‘ maintained by the EOB.

LSS (Local Sheriff Station):

Each LSS (Local Sheriff Station) registers a subscription profile with its
RRTs (Rapid Response Teams) that includes the current mission and
location of the RRT, mission completion events, and new mission events
(this duplication of its EOB (Emergency Operations Bureau) subscription
profile allows the LSS to verify the accuracy of this portion of the
”situation status report‘ maintained by the EOB).
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Registers a subscription profile with the PSO
(Power Supply Organization) to include the location of all current power
blackout areas.

TCO (Traffic Control Organization):

Registers a subscription profiles with the EOB (Emergency
Operations Bureau) that includes any requests or orders to this particular
RRT (Rapid Response Team), and any changes in conditions that impact
the current mission and location of this RRT.

RRT (Rapid Response Team):

Registers a subscription profile with its home base LSS (Local Sheriff
Station) that includes any request for information, and any ”situation status
report‘ maintained by this LSS.
Power Outage Notification
The PSO (Power Supply Organization) alerts its subscribers that a rolling power blackout
condition is imminent (i.e., will commence per predefined schedule within 15 minutes)
(Fig.5).
Utilizes its Power Level Agent to continuously
monitor the relationship between power demand and supply. The PSO
determines that demand is close to exceeding supply and sends an Alert to
all appropriate subscribers.

PSO (Power Supply Organization):

Receives an Alert from the PSO (Power Supply
Organization) that the predefined rolling power blackout schedule will be
implemented within 15 minutes.

EOB (Emergency Operations Bureau):

Utilizes its Station Monitor Agent to identify all LSSs (Local Sheriff
Stations) that will experience power blackouts in their jurisdiction.
Warns all LSSs (Local Sheriff Stations) of imminent power blackout
condition.
Alerts all LSSs (Local Sheriff Stations) in whose jurisdictions blackouts
will occur and requests them to commence immediate implementation of
their respective ”blackout response plans‘.
Warns the RRTs (Rapid Response Teams) assigned to assist the LSSs
(Local Sheriff Stations) in whose jurisdictions the first set of blackouts are
scheduled to occur, to prepare for potential deployment.
Utilizes its Risk Agent to identify all high risk entities in the jurisdictions
of the activated LSSs (Local Sheriff Stations). Utilizes its Deployment
Agent to determine whether RRT (Rapid Response Team) involvement is
anticipated under normal conditions.
Each LSS assumes ”alert‘ status. The LSSs in whose
jurisdictions the first set of blackouts is scheduled to occur, prepare for
deployment.

LSS (Local Sheriff Station):
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The RRTs notified by the EOB (Emergency Operations
Bureau) assume ”alert‘ status in preparation for potential deployment.

RRT (Rapid Response Team):

Power Outage Implementation
The PSO (Power Supply Organization) alerts its subscribers that the predefined rolling
power blackout schedule has been implemented (Fig.6).
Utilizes its Power Level Agent to determine that
demand has exceeded the availability of electric power.

PSO (Power Supply Organization):

Receives an Alert from the PSO (Power Supply
Organization) indicating that the predefined rolling power blackout
schedule has been implemented.

EOB (Emergency Operations Bureau):

Utilizes its Situation Agent to prepare the first version of the ”EOB
Situation Status Report‘.
Alerts all LSSs (Local Sheriff Stations) in whose jurisdictions the next
scheduled set of blackouts will occur, to prepare for potential deployment.
Warns the RRTs (Rapid Response Teams) assigned to assist the LSSs
(Local Sheriff Stations) in whose jurisdictions the next set of blackouts are
scheduled to occur, to prepare for potential deployment.
All activated LSSs utilize their Status Agent to prepare the
first version of their ”LSS Situation Status Report‘.

LSS (Local Sheriff Station):

The LSSs (Local Sheriff Stations) in whose jurisdictions the next set of
blackouts is scheduled to occur, prepare for deployment.
Traffic Accident in Power Outage Area
A multi-car traffic accident occurs in a blackout area located within the jurisdiction of a
particular LSS (Local Sheriff Station) (Fig.7).
Receives an Alert from a LSS (Local Sheriff
Station) that a multi-car traffic accident has occurred on State Highway 5
south of Harbor Freeway.

EOB (Emergency Operations Bureau):

Utilizes its Local Station Agent to determine that it has
insufficient resources to deal with the multi-car traffic accident.

LSS (Local Sheriff Station):

Receives a request for assistance from the LSS
(Local Sheriff Station) to deal with the multi-car traffic accident.

EOB (Emergency Operations Bureau):

Utilizes its Scheduling Agent to assign a RRT (Rapid Response Team)
and equipment to the multi-car traffic accident.
Creates an Incident Agent to monitor the response to the multi-car traffic
accident.
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The new Incident Agent subscribes to the LSS (Local Sheriff Station) in
whose jurisdiction the multi-car traffic accident has occurred (to obtain all
information about this accident from now on).

Fig.7: Traffic accident ”Alert‘

Fig.8: Routing assistance request

Routing Assistance Required
The dispatched RRT (Rapid Response Team) cannot reach the multi-car traffic accident
due to traffic congestion and requests assistance in determining an alternative route
(Fig.8) to the accident.
Sends alert to the EOB (Emergency Operations Bureau)
and requests assistance in determining an alternative route to the traffic
accident.

RRT (Rapid Response Team):

Utilizes its Incident Agent to determine an
alternative route. The Incident Agent accesses the WSK (Los Angeles
County Web Services Kiosk) and discovers the TCO (Traffic Control
Organization). It then registers a subscription profile with the TCO that
includes routing information, and requests assistance in determining an
alternative route to the traffic accident.

EOB (Emergency Operations Bureau):

Receives the request for assistance from the EOB‘s
(Emergency Operations Bureau) Incident Agent and utilizes its Routing
Agent to determine an alternative route to the traffic accident.

TCO (Traffic Control Organization):

Sends the alternate route to the EOB‘s Incident Agent..
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Responds to the RRT (Rapid Response Team) by
sending it the alternate route to the traffic accident.

EOB (Emergency Operations Bureau):

Significance of the TEGRID Demonstration
The TEGRID proof-of-concept project was undertaken by the Collaborative Agent Design
Research Center (CADRC) at Cal Poly (San Luis Obispo) as a small internally funded research
endeavor with three objectives. The first objective was to explore the main capabilities that
would be required of web service type entities (i.e., Cyber-Spiders) serving as largely
autonomous decision-support components in a self-configuring, just-in-time, intelligent decisionassistance toolkit of collaborating software agents. Second, to determine if the currently
available information-centric software technology could support at least basic (i.e., meaningful
and useful) implementations of these required capabilities. And, third, to build a working
experimental system that could serve as a test bed for longer term research studies focused on the
behavioral characteristics of self-configuring intelligent systems in general, and the ability of
such systems to deal with specific kinds of dynamic and complex problem situations.
The principal capabilities that are required by a Cyber-Spider to support the desired selfconfiguring, just-in-time, intelligent decision-support behavior have been identified and
demonstrated in the TEGRID test bed environment, at least at a base level of functionality. These
capabilities include the ability to: discover desired existing external services; accept and utilize
services from external offerers; provide services to external requesters; gain understanding
through the context provided by an internal information model; automatically reason about
available information within the context of the internal information model; extend the internal
information model during execution; spontaneously generate new agents during execution as the
need for new capabilities arises; and, learn from the collaborations that occur within the
cyberspace environment.
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Abstract
Key information management goals for Naval (SSG, 2000) and Joint (JV2020, 2002)
collaborative warfighting include the development of integrated net-centric architectures
that enable collaboration among dispersed human decision makers to achieve knowledge
dominance and decision superiority during mission planning, preparation, and execution.
In particular, the objective is to transform decision-making and execution into faster,
more adaptive, and more knowledgeable processes. Reachback processes, which will
permit warfighters to have immediate contact and consultation with remote mission
experts, can help meet these objectives. These processes can be facilitated by mission
support centers, which will use decision-aiding tools to quickly respond to mission needs.
In this invited paper, we describe a functional architecture for decision support activities
in reachback processes that integrates several methodologies, including taxonomic
reasoning, which extends the mixed-initiative case retrieval paradigm that can help users
to quickly retrieve relevant mission experience for their decision-making tasks. This
architecture has not yet been implemented; we suggest components for its design.
Keywords: Reachback processes, decision support systems, information-centric
architecture, case-based reasoning, process models, knowledge management, local
lessons learned processes

1. Transformational Reachback Processes
A transformational process is one that can significantly enhance the capabilities of an individual,
group, or organization. Typically, it frees those involved to focus on issues associated with its
implementation, rather than on how to modify an implementation of the previous process. For
example, the introduction of the transcontinental railroad provided revolutionary opportunities
for transporting materials and goods that previously were not possible between distant locations.
We define reachback processes as a distributed process for supporting information superiority
that achieves real-time mission execution support for remote detachments/units. This definition
fits the example we discuss in Section 1.2. These processes typically include:
-

a small forward-deployed HQ (operations),
a larger rear-deployed HQ (support),
real-time connectivity between them (e.g., satellite, voice, VTC), and
real-time communications between the rear-deployed HQ and subject matter experts.
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Reachback processes have been used by many commercial organizations to provide diagnostic
support to their field technicians (e.g., Xerox (Everett & Bobrow, 2000)) or customers (e.g.,
General Electric (Cheetham et al., 2001)). Navy examples also exist, including a MK 41 VLS
troubleshooter that was fielded at the Navy‘s Fleet Technical Support Centers (Grahovac et al.,
1996). It permitted on-ship personnel to solve maintenance tasks by consulting with remote,
ground-based experts, thus occasionally saving the costs of flying those experts to the ship.
Transformational reachback processes enable organizations to provide new services. In
particular, they can support the real-time sharing of expertise during mission execution.
1.1 Motivation
Reachback processes are knowledge management (KM) processes; they focus on sharing
information with beneficiaries in a just-in-time context. DoD visions provide strong motivation
for developing and nurturing these processes. For example, Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020, 2002) is
a Joint Chiefs of Staff concept for the future warfighting ambitions of US joint forces. It extends
JV 2010 with recent lessons learned, including the importance of information operations across
all warfighting processes. In particular, JV 2020 stresses the need for full spectrum dominance,
including the need for information and decision superiority, and highlights both technological
and human-centric issues. It also predicts that the continued development and proliferation of
information technology advances will substantially change the conduct of military operations,
and the US must employ such technologies where they can benefit warfighting goals. Thus,
reachback processes fit the JV 2020 concept; they employ technology to provide remote units
with information (e.g., on situation assessment and recommended responses) that can be used to
significantly enhance operational decision processes.
Likewise, FORCEnet (SSG, 2000), which is proposed to be the Navy‘s catalyst for significant
transformation, also strongly motivates the creation of military reachback processes. FORCEnet
is an integrated and adaptable net-centric architecture that will enable dispersed human decision
makers to leverage military capabilities to achieve knowledge dominance during mission
planning, preparation, and execution. One of its stated goals is to enable collaborative decisionmaking. Clearly, reachback processes for decision support is integral to FORCEnet.
1.2 Example
Figure 1 summarizes the fundamental reachback process of the Joint Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Knowledge Technology Operational Demonstration (JEOD-KTOD), an Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) that commenced in 2002. In this process, the goal
is to provide deployed EOD teams with access to just-in-time operational information (e.g.,
identifications of explosive devices, suggested neutralization procedures) to assist with their
mission (EOD, 2002). It assumes that an EOD technician will relay situation information to
Mobile Clients, each of which will be manned by other team members. This client will in turn
relay this information to the deployed command‘s Situation Server, which will be connected by
WAN to a Joint EOD Mission Support Center (MSC), whose role is to coordinate, task, track,
measure, and maximize warfighter effectiveness by collaborating on all task/mission facets.
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Finally, this MSC will have access to mission-relevant contacts —back home“, including subject
matter experts (SMEs). Given the real-time situation information, SMEs are expected to provide
their expertise to assist with remote mission execution. Thus, this process is reminiscent of how
field (e.g., copy machine) technicians consult with remote senior experts during troubleshooting.

Another important aspect of this reachback process is that, through connection with EOD
training schools, it will potentially improve EOD training procedures. In addition, students will

Figure 1: The reachback process envisioned for the JEOD-KTOD ACTD.

benefit from experiencing reachback processes prior to deployment.
Several software and hardware components will support this collaborative decision-making
process, including a variety of sensors, IETMs (Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals), and
wearable computing devices. In addition, the MSC will have access to a library of documents
(e.g., doctrine, TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), AARs (After Action Reports) from
previous EOD missions), and relevant databases to assist with mission tasks.
1.3 A Decision Support Need
The scenario presented in Section 1.2 is somewhat idealistic for at least two reasons. First, SMEs
will not always be available. Second, experts will not always have immediate solutions ready for
the deployed teams. Thus, a key component of this and other reachback processes is a decision
support system (DSS) that can assist users with providing timely expertise. In this scenario, the
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DSS will be deployed at the MSC and the Situation Servers. Clearly, their capabilities will be
crucial to ensure that reachback processes successfully support a wide range of missions and
situations.
The JEOD-KTOD ACTD is developing a DSS that will integrate doctrine, (interactive digital)
TTPs, training, and operations into a coherent operational picture (based on task, perspective,
and situation) via a common language. Rather than discuss specifics of this ACTD‘s DSS,
whose details are sensitive, we focus instead on a more general, research-focused framework for
DSS tools in military reachback processes. In particular, we argue that decision support tools for
reachback processes should include, among others, the following generic sub-processes:
1 . Situation formulation: This mixed-initiative process for accumulating situation
information should be situation-driven. This information can be used to guide the DSS‘s
reasoning techniques and to index data collected by the continuous learning process for
efficient retrieval and reuse.
2 . Situation elaboration: This process automatically extends the situation by using a
combination of inferencing techniques, ontologies, and sensor data.
3. Situation identification: The DSS should help characterize a situation according to known
categories (e.g., type of explosive device). This requires a categorization hierarchy (e.g.,
implicitly, thru a rule base) and/or a set of previously encountered/categorized situations,
where the most similar situation(s) can be used to predict the current situation‘s category.
4. Response recommendation: This should select or formulate a response to the situation,
once identified, that decision makers can quickly implement or adapt. This approach
may, in many circumstances, significantly reduce the time required to develop responses.
5. Continuous learning: This should incrementally populate repositories with <situation,
response, outcome> triplets, which can be used for situation identification and response.
Also, whenever available TTPs are found to be incomplete or incorrect, the DSS should
collect and share lessons with users in a just-in-time information retrieval context,
In addition, the DDS should employ a mixed-initiative control strategy in which the system aids
the user (e.g., by providing inferencing results to assist with situation analysis) while the user
retains all critical decision-making control.
In summary, we advocate a DSS that uses KM methodologies, which integrate relevant
technologies and content, to assist with decision-making. This list is incomplete because we
focus only on technologies of our interest. In Section 2, we present a reachback DSS
architecture for these sub-processes and discuss methodologies for supporting them. We
highlight potentially useful research and development ideas for DSS system designers.
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2. Functional DSS Architecture
Our architecture is inspired by the information-centric view of decision support systems (Pohl,
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Figure 2: Agent layers for the envisioned Decision Support System.

2001). Briefly, this view notes that stove-piped software solutions greatly limit opportunities for
interoperability, and that attempts to achieve interoperability using a data-centric information
systems environment are generally flawed. A primary cause for this failure is that these systems
cannot incorporate context (i.e., situational) into their reasoning processes. In contrast,
information-centric systems —embed in the software an understanding of the information being
processed“ through the thoughtful selection and manipulation of structured information
representations. In particular, information-centric architectures typically consist of interacting
modules that provide services for clients, where each service module has access to an ontology
that permits them to communicate information (i.e., the linking of data) rather than more limited
data. Typically, in the DSS this involves the following process components:
-

Human user(s) (agents)
Agent software (tools that provide (e.g., reasoning) services)
Data sources
Core ontology (provides context)

Information-centric methodologies can potentially accelerate the transition from data-processing
to intelligent information management systems by linking these components, such as by
extracting information from content through context interpretation so that relevant information
can be brought to the attention of the human and software agents. For example, in the EOD
context, the human agents would include the deployed detachment teams, MSC personnel, and
SMEs. The software agents would support the processes discussed in Section 1.3. Data would
include sensor-obtained and related information that define the current situation. Finally, the
ontology would represent the mission processes and TTPs used to implement them.
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With this view in mind, the following subsections describe an information-centric methodology
for designing a DSS for a mission reachback processes. Figure 2 summarizes a multiagent
architecture for this DSS, inspired in part by the RETSINA architecture (Sycara et al., 2002),
while Figure 3 clarifies some of the functional relationships between selected agents. Selected
components of this conceptual architecture will be highlighted in the following subsections,
which are organized according to the suggested DSS sub-processes outlined in Section 1.3. Table
1 summarizes the methodologies and artifacts suggested for these sub-processes.
2.1 Situation Formulation
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Data
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Figure 3: Partial functional architecture for the envisioned Decision Support System.

Table 1: Methodologies and artifacts in support of the decision sub-processes.
Decision Process Supporting Methodologies
Knowledge Artifacts
Situation formulation Conversational CBR, taxonomic reasoning Experiences, ontologies
Situation elaboration Information gathering
METLs,
METLs, TMK models, lessons
Situation identification Machine learning (ML), CBR, data fusion Experiences
Response recommendation Conversational CBR, planning
Multi-media
Multi
-media sequences
Continuous learning ML, CBR
Experiences, METLs,
METLs, lessons
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Focusing on the remotely deployed user (e.g., the EOD detachment) and MSC DSS users, we
assume that the former will have a more limited bandwidth capacity and would benefit greatly
from using interaction modalities other than typed text. We also assume that, as shown in Figure
3, both types of users can provide situation information, which are collected via a Situation
Formulator. Many methodologies have been used for capturing situation data. In this
subsection, we discuss a case-based reasoning methodology (CBR) that we have extended.
CBR (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994) is a problem solving methodology (Watson, 1999) that focuses on
reusing stored problem solutions to help solve new, similar problems. CBR is defined by a
sequence of tasks, listed below, that can each be implemented using a variety of techniques:
1. Request: Elicit the situation (i.e., problem) description from the user.
2 . Retrieve: Compare a given situation with previously stored cases (e.g., <situation,
response, outcome> triplets) to fetch those with best-matching situations.
3. Reuse: Select/compose responses (i.e., solutions) from the retrieved case(s).
4. Revise: Adapt the initial solution to meet the current situation‘s needs.
5. Review: Apply user-provided feedback on the other tasks‘ results (e.g., Revision).
6. Retain: Store, for use in subsequent problem-solving attempts, a new case composed of
the current problem, solution, and outcome.
While most of the tasks are simplifications of the tasks described by Aamodt and Plaza (1994),
Tasks 1 and 5 were motivated by work on mixed-initiative case retrieval systems (e.g., Aha &
Muñoz-Avila, 2001), which have been used in diagnosis and related commercial applications
since approximately 1990. For example, Inference Corporation sold CBR development shells
and provided services for help-desk and e-commerce applications to over 650 corporate clients.
Some other companies that develop CBR shells or apply CBR methodologies (e.g., CaseBank
Technologies, empolis, Kaidara) continue to perform well.
An extension of Inference‘s methodology, which we refer to as conversational CBR (CCBR), is
potentially useful for designing the Situation Formulator (Figure 2). Cases in CCBR typically
contain (1) situations/problems composed of a text summary and a set of <question, answer>
pairs (i.e., conditions) and (2) a response/solution that is represented in any combination of
modalities (e.g., imagery, text, streaming audio). CCBR involves a simple mixed-initiative
dialogue that begins when the user provides an initial, typically incomplete, situation description.
The system responds by prompting questions, and the user is expected to provide an answer to
one of them. This procedure iterates, each time providing additional details concerning the
situation. In addition to dynamically re-ranking questions to ask, the system also displays
responses corresponding to the best-matching situations among its set of stored cases, and the
user can, at any time, decided to implement one of these (recommended) responses.
Several interaction modalities have been investigated for CCBR and related methodologies. For
example, CARET‘s (Shimazu et al., 1994) GUI permits users to enter situation information by
clicking on images of a process, diagram, or interface layout, while Giampapa and Sycara (2001)
describe a voice interpretation front-end to NaCoDAE (Aha & Breslow, 1997). More recently,
CCBR has been used in mobile portals/PDAs (Smyth, 2002; Ito et al., 2001) (e.g., to acquire
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situation information for e-commerce applications). Thus, we have some confidence of this
methodology‘s use in mission deployment situations.
Metrics for evaluating CCBR systems include:
1. Decision recommendation utility: The recommended responses should be high in quality.
2. Cognitive effort: Users should be able to easily determine which questions to answer, and
how to answer them.
3 . Problem-solving time: Users should not have to answer many questions to obtain a
satisfactory response suggestion.
The objective is to maximize 1 and minimize 2 and 3. Unfortunately, most CCBR systems fare
poorly on these metrics; their commercial success typically relies on expert (e.g., help-desk staff)
rather than novice users. Thus, we introduced a taxonomic reasoning strategy that strongly
constrains the system‘s question-ranking behavior (Gupta, 2001), based on the observation that
<question, answer> pairs in most CCBR cases were often related by subsumption (i.e.,
concerned the same information at a different level of detail). For example, one such pair might
convey information that the mission type was an EOD component of a Direct Action (DA)
mission while another might specify this further (e.g., Counter-terrorism mission). Without the
system‘s knowledge of these relationships, the user would always have to supply answers to both
questions for the system to work properly (i.e., recommend useful responses). This negatively
impacts results for the metrics listed above.
Our solution is to explicate the relations between conditions by creating a separate taxonomy for
each set of conditions related by subsumption, where —parent“ conditions are linked to their
—children“ (i.e., immediately more specific) conditions. By exploiting the taxonomies, the
dialogue process uses the initial situation to infer which conditions are true. The taxonomic
approach then constrains the prompted questions to include only those that are in the child
conditions. This downward traversal process iterates as more specific information concerning
the situation is provided, until a leaf node of each active taxonomy is reached.
The taxonomic CCBR approach has several benefits. First, significant improvements on the
metrics summarized above can be obtained in comparison with CCBR processes that are
ignorant of condition relations (Gupta et al., 2002). Second, this process permits situations in
cases to be represented by only their most specific conditions, which greatly simplifies the
knowledge engineering (i.e., case authoring) process. In addition, the approach is adaptive to
different expertise levels; it permits experts to provide initial situation data that is highly specific,
thus reducing the number of conditions that they must provide before obtaining a useful
response. In contrast, novices may start by providing more abstract conditions, which will
require more conditions to precisely define the situation until close-matching cases can be found
(if any). Finally, we (Aha & Gupta, 2002) obtained further improvements by adding causal links
between taxonomies, where each link denotes that one taxonomy‘s conditions should not be
considered until the questions in its —precedent“ taxonomy have been answered.
Taxonomic CCBR approaches require taxonomies. We are pursuing a multi-year project in
which we have made substantial, though initial, progress on developing information extraction
approaches (from structured documents) for populating these taxonomies. Our approach involves
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a large number of tasks, including acronym identification, semantic parsing, and concept
identification. Although our efforts are not yet complete, we have shown that, if these condition
taxonomies can be constructed, then they support excellent mixed-initiative reasoning behavior.
Furthermore, we have shown that they actually decrease, rather than increase, overall knowledge
engineering requirements for most applications (Gupta et al., 2002).
In summary, case-based approaches for mixed-initiative control are one option for consideration
in the design of decision support systems for reachback processes. They have been the basis of
commercially successful diagnosis systems, they have been integrated with several information
modalities that can be applied to reachback processes, and recent research has improved them
according to evaluation metrics of interest. While this section focused on their potential role in
Situation Formulation, later sections discuss how they can potentially facilitate other components
of the DSS functional architecture (Figure 3).
2.2 Situation Elaboration
Situation elaboration involves exploring a process‘s context, which includes the mission being
performed, its trace (i.e., how the mission is being performed; the sequence of steps), the current
mission execution step being performed, and its task(s). The DSS situation identification and
response recommendation processes require this information to provide context-relevant
recommendations. Thus, the Process Recognizer (Figure 3) must identify a mission‘s context
from its execution trace to inform the subsequent sub-processes (i.e., identification and
response). Also, it can be used to augment the situation description, as we will discuss.
Generic situation information is provided in standard military documents, such as doctrine,
TTPs, and related (e.g., Naval Warfare) publications that describe essential mission
organizations, steps, and resources. However, more specific mission planning guidance exists in
the form of Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs), which describe, hierarchically, the set of
tasks to be performed in a given mission. Tasks in METLs are extracted from the Universal
Joint Task List (UJTL, 2002) and service-specific (e.g., tactical) extensions, such as the
Universal Naval Task List (UNTL, 2002). The UJTL is a hierarchical, standardized task list that
describes requirements for planning, conducting, evaluating, and assessing joint and
multinational missions. It primarily focuses on the strategic and operational levels. The UNTL,
which combines the UJTL with the Naval Tactical Task List (NTTL), is a hierarchical master
menu of Naval tasks, conditions (i.e., concerning variables in the environment that can effect the
performance of a given task), and performance measures that provides a common language and
structure for the development of Naval METLs (NMETLs).
The Process Recognizer could exploit these METLs for situation elaboration. However, these
task lists are limited: they identify what is to be performed, in terms common to all services, but
they do not address how a task is to be performed (found in Joint or Service doctrine), nor who is
to perform the task. (These issues are instead addressed by other resources, including CONOPS,
conditions, measures, and doctrine.) We seek an approach for modeling context that addresses all
three issues. One possible choice is to use Task-Method-Knowledge (TMK) models (Murdock
& Goel, 2001), which represent task hierarchies, and methods for decomposing tasks. A TMK
model can represent multiple execution traces and explicitly identify task parameters (e.g.,
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Figure 4: The TMK model on the left encodes a simplified process for EOD participation in a NEO. The figure
on the right shows an adapted version of the model that reflects a possible change in doctrine based on additional
mission experience. Differences between the two models are noted in red.

participants, locations, targets). Figure 4 shows an example with two versions of a simplified
EOD mission, where tasks are denoted as boxes, parameters (specifically, participants) are
denoted as oblique parallelograms, and methods are denoted as rounded boxes containing statetransition diagrams. In this figure, the EOD/NEO task has a single method that decomposes it
into two subtasks: preparing the site and processing the evacuees. Those subtasks each have a
method that further decomposes them into primitive tasks. The participants are arranged
according to organizational structure (for example, the NEO EOD Unit is part of both EOD and
the NEO Force). Because methods can contain both loops and branches, they can support many
alternative traces, but not necessarily all possible traces. For example, the Search Baggage task
in the Original Model may be followed by the Impound Baggage task, another Search Baggage
task, or by the method‘s end (as denoted by the three arrows emanating from the box connected
to Search Baggage in the method for Process Evacuees). Also, tasks contain additional
information on how they interrelate (e.g., Find Containment Areas directly enables Impound
Baggage).
The Process Recognizer could use TMK representations of METLs to elaborate the mission
context (i.e., as performed by the Situation Elaborator in Figure 3); it could use them to actively
recognize which trace is being executed, thus anticipating what subsequent tasks will be
executed. These anticipated tasks could then be used to help focus the situation identification and
response recommendation sub-processes. Some automated situation elaboration techniques have
been incorporated into CCBR systems. For example, Carrick et al.‘s (1999) system triggers precreated situation elaboration plans upon receiving partial situations, while Aha et al. (1998)
describe a model-based approach for inferring situation data automatically. Also, CCBR systems,
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which have previously been used only for diagnosis tasks, have been extended for use in mission
planning tasks (e.g., Abi-Zeid et al., 1999; Muñoz-Avila et al., 1999).
As with taxonomic CBR, a key concern with using TMK models is knowledge (i.e., model)
acquisition. In a recent JEOD-KTOD contract, Dynamic Research Corporation extended task
lists for EOD-specific METLs of land mine warfare missions. They encoded tasks using the
DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML, 2002), which is a WWW text markup language that
enables the encoding of entities and relations (e.g., tasks and their assigned units). A future
version of DAML (i.e., that has mature tools for editing ontologies) could be used to represent
the ontologies necessary for DSS tools in mission reachback processes. This approach could
potentially be used to encode context information for information-centric mission support
systems and to encode TMK models of EOD processes.
TMK models can be used to incorporate METL and doctrine adaptations. We discuss this further
in Section 2.5.
2.3 Situation Identification
The Situation Identifier, which will receive situation data encoded in multiple types of media
(e.g., text, photography, graphics, audio/video), will use data fusion techniques (performed by
the Data Fuser in Figure 3) to permit subsequent reasoning (Goebel, 2001). This process will
depend on using ontologies to interpret and relate the contributions of each data source.
The Situation Identifier could use a combination of one or more of the following three
approaches. First, situations can be categorized, for subsequent response purposes, using an
expert system containing a set of categorization rules, or by an alterative approach that maps
situations to identifications. Although this approach is popular and straightforward, its
knowledge acquisition and engineering costs are high.
Second, if the experts can more easily provide situation-identification experiences, then
experiences could be collected and a mapping could be induced automatically using a supervised
rule-induction algorithm (Mitchell, 1997; Fürnkranz, 1999). If successful, this approach could
alleviate the need for SMEs to provide the rules, leaving this task to the system. However,
although rule-induction algorithms have reached a high-level of maturity, and have even been
extended to work with expressive representations such as versions of first-order logic, they are
rarely applied to significantly complex problems with abundant relational structure (e.g.,
temporal, organizational). Thus, this approach would probably need significant extension for use
in mission planning applications.
A third approach, naturally, is to not generalize the experiences, but to instead use similarity
computations (between the current situation and stored <situation, identification> —cases“) to
map situations to identifications. This has the benefit of not requiring abstractions (i.e., rules) of
the experiences, but introduces the problem of creating the similarity functions, and associated
indexing structures, to support an efficient and accurate retrieval process. As mentioned earlier,
this is a focal interest of CBR systems. However, only a few existing commercial CBR tools
(e.g., empolis‘ orenge architecture) and research systems (e.g., the FIRE Analogy Server
(Forbus, 2001)) can process data represented in relational format, which we anticipate will be the
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representation of choice for encoding situations. Nonetheless, there is significant, ongoing
interest in developing CBR systems that can process object-oriented (Bergmann & Stahl, 1998)
and relational structures, and their capabilities have quickly increased in recent years.
2.4 Response Recommendation
Like situation identification, the DSS response recommendation task could require working with
multiple media types (e.g., streaming audio/video, imagery, text, graphics). Responses may vary
from retrieving potentially relevant information for the user (e.g., procedures for safely
detonating an unknown explosive device) to queries for additional situation data. As explained
in Section 2.1, the CCBR approach is designed to support situation elicitation tasks of this type,
and could be potentially useful for producing a recommendation.
For example, one mission objective, in the context of an EOD Neutralization task, might be to
retrieve an audio/video stream segment that presents how an expert would neutralize a similar
explosive device. While some CBR systems have been used to retrieve audio/video streams in
which experts provided advice on how to perform mission tasks (Johnson et al., 2000), these
videos had to be retrieved by manually searching a hierarchical task structure, and individual
segments of videos (e.g., that focused on specific subtasks) were not themselves retrievable. A
far more flexible capability is one that permits the retrieval of arbitrary audio/video sub-streams.
Few CCBR efforts have focused on using a large variety of media. However, CCBR systems can
be extended to include multimedia information. For example, one commercial product that
supports this capability is StreamSage (2002), which permits the retrieval of indexed intervals
within an audio/video sequence. This is particularly useful if the sequence is long (e.g., an hour
or more), and many topics are covered in the stream (e.g., in videos capturing the expertise of
departing officers or employees). StreamSage, which automatically indexes audio/video streams
for subsequent retrieval of useful segments, currently uses a limiting, simple keyword search
approach for sequence retrieval. We are exploring an integration of StreamSage with our CCBR
tools to support response recommendation in which the latter provides situation information to
StreamSage. In this way, the CCBR tool would elicit indexing information required by
StreamSage, thus guiding the user in this process.
2.5 Continuous Learning
The objectives for continuous learning are to add missing, mission-relevant information to the
DSS that can be used in subsequent missions, to serve as a key source of information when
experts are not available, and to provide a means for adapting the doctrine and mission execution
processes. In this subsection, we discuss three types of information that could be targets for the
learning process: mission experiences, METLs, and lessons.
Mission experiences, captured as cases, could be employed in the situation elaboration, situation
identification, and response recommendation processes, provided that the DSS is given mission
execution performance results and is designed to monitor, capture, and properly index user
interaction behaviors. For example, in a situation elaboration process, learning could focus on
identifying information sought by a user and reuse it when encountering similar contexts. If the
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system recognizes that a user regularly requests or obtains certain types of situation data during
Direct Action missions, then in future DA missions, the acquisition of this data could be
automated, if feasible, or the DSS could remind the user that they requested it previous, similar
circumstances. During situation identification, if the user provides feedback on the mapping of a
situation to a successful identification, then this information could be cached to improve this
mapping in future missions. Failed identification attempts could also be useful, especially if it
conflicts with the user‘s conclusion for a subsequent identification attempt. In this circumstance,
the system may be designed to warn the user. Finally, in response recommendation, a similar
approach could guide the user towards successes and away from failures incurred in previous
response attempts.
METLs could also be updated over time, with the potential benefit to both ensure they are
current and to provide users with insights into how previous teams executed the same type of
mission in similar situations. Assuming a TMK model representation, then additional tasks,
mission traces, and conditions that govern the selection of task decompositions could be learned
for mission METLs by updating these models (i.e., by observing and storing decision-making
behaviors). For example, if a user conducts a mission using a non-standard process (i.e.,
METL) that involves a novel task sequence, then it may be recorded with the evolving METL so
that it is available for inspection and consideration in future missions. Incremental adaptation in
response to novel demands has been a central theme of TMK research (e.g., Stroulia & Goel,
1995; Murdock & Goel, 2001). The contrast between the two models in Figure 4 illustrates
METL adaptation. The left-hand model represents standard procedure (EOD, 2002), while the
right-hand model depicts the results of the following hypothetical scenario.
Suppose a forward command element, while preparing an evacuation site, first searches for
explosive hazards and then finds some areas for searching baggage. However, they decide to not
yet locate an appropriate area to contain suspect baggage, and instead the evacuation control
center begins immediately processing evacuees. While searching baggage they encounter a
suspect item and then search for a containment area. Once found, they impound the baggage,
and continue with the baggage search. After the NEO is complete, an analysis might conclude
that the decision to delay finding a containment area was correct under the circumstances and
that doctrine should be revised to accommodate this alternative sequence of actions. The righthand model in Figure 4 reflects this change; the Find Containment Areas task can now be
invoked from either the method for Prepare Site or from the method for Process Evacuees.
Other modifications could be made to the model that would also accommodate this particular
sequence of actions (e.g., one could include a Search Baggage action in the method for Prepare
Site). Information in the model can be used to select sensible revisions. For example, because
Find Containment Areas directly enables Impound Baggage, it is more reasonable to place the
former immediately prior to the latter than it is to move a separate task such as Search Baggage.
Thus TMK models can enable a DSS to recommend specific model revisions given a new action
sequence (i.e., mission execution trace).
The DSS must also be able to explain its decision to the user for it to be acceptable. Towards
this goal, decision rationale needs to be captured for subsequent inspection, and this is one
objective of the Continual Learner (Figure 3). In particular, the characterization of situations
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under which one mission trace should be chosen rather than another (at a decision point) can be
difficult, requiring a topology of situations to frame the learning process.
A third and perhaps most important focus of a continuous learning process is that of identifying,
capturing, and sharing lessons, which are experiences that, if known and used, could
significantly impact future mission performance variables. In mission reachback processes,
lessons could refer to discoveries in which the available doctrine, TTPs, or other information
sources were found to be lacking either because they were incomplete or incorrect. For
example, the doctrine for neutralizing an ordnance might become outdated, and not explain that a
new feature for identifying certain ordnance could provide key information on how to disarm it.
Rather than change the doctrine, which could take time and could also be risky (e.g., interfere
with procedures for neutralizing unchanged types of ordnance), a lesson could be learned that,
under similar future situations, alerts the EOD team to the new, distinguishing features of the
ordnance that they should consider during neutralization attempts. With this goal in mind, we
developed a representation for lessons and a monitored distribution approach in which an
embedded lesson repository is proactively and automatically searched throughout the DSS
session, where lessons that closely match the current situational context (e.g., task, mission trace)
are brought to the user‘s attention (Aha et al., 2001; Weber & Aha, 2002a). This approach for
capturing and sharing lessons avoids some of the cultural problems encountered by organizationwide lessons learned efforts (e.g., NLLS, JCLL), in which many good lessons are not recorded
due to the negative career implications with sharing them. Rather, as with other successful
lessons learned processes, lessons recorded and shared in this context would remain with the
command that executes the mission. In general, this type of local lessons learned process
reduces concerns of sharing lessons outside a Community of Practice (CoP), and focuses on
sharing with other members in the CoP rather than through vertical chains of command.
3. Needs
In this paper, we outlined some suggestions for designing decision support systems for mission
reachback processes. Few such systems are currently deployed in the military, and those that do
exist are still evolving. In Section 1.3, we argued that these systems should support five key subprocesses. In Section 2, we suggested a functional architecture for supporting them, along with
specific suggestions for implementing some of these functions.
Several advances must occur prior to the development and deployment of reachback DSS
systems with these characteristics. For example, while CCBR systems have performed well for
diagnosis tasks and we know how to design them to work with voice input and other modalities,
their dialogue capabilities are limited. However, some recent research has begun investigating
the use of formal dialogue grammars for CCBR systems (Bridge, 2002), which should lead to
analysis of how to design appropriate dialogues for mission reachback purposes. Another hurdle
is the continued design and analysis of induction algorithms for TMK models, or similar process
models that can be used to represent METLs and other mission-context information. Next,
DAML, a significant contribution to developing semantic WWW services, was born only
recently and will require more sophisticated ontology development and maintenance tools. Also,
guided elicitation tools, such as the Lesson Elicitation Tool (Weber & Aha, 2002b), are needed
to help capture information to support continuous learning objectives. Additional development

236

requirements, both technological and otherwise, also exist, including conducting cognitive task
analyses for designing the interfaces of these decision support tools.
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Abstract. Intelligent multi-agent decision support systems depend heavily on ontologies to
perform their functionalities. This paper addresses the building, maintaining and reusing of ontologies in a
cost-effective manner. We advocate a round-trip engineering methodology towards this goal by first using
Pragati‘s Multi-ViewPoint Clustering Analysis approach to analyze existing ontologies. Results from this
analysis identifies reusable components which will populate the model fragment repository of Pragati‘s
Façade Creation Toolkit. Such an infrastructure will allow ontological engineers to extend and/or recast
their ontologies for different applications in a cost-effective manner.

I.

Motivation

Intelligent decision support systems often utilize multiple software agents for
performing various tasks. Software agents depend heavily upon knowledge representation
schemas specified through an ontology in order to perform their reasoning tasks
efficiently. Agent reasoning and collaboration takes place in the context of such an
ontology. The bulk of the effort in building such multi-agent systems lies in specifying
the underlying ontology in an optimal manner. As ontologies become large, the humanoriented solution for recasting ontologies does not scale up. In practice, the design issues
in an ontology often gets influenced by the need to solve the problem at hand in an
optimal fashion, instead of trying to formulate an ontology in generic terms keeping in
mind its reuse potential for other projects. That is, the level of detail for an entity
definition, its placement in the ontological hierarchy reflecting its relationships to other
entities in the ontology, all get influenced by the overall problem solving goals for the
agent(s) that will use the ontology in a given context, instead of being generally
applicable. Even though ontological engineers can often provide insight into the types of
modifications needed to render the old framework reusable for the new problem, as
ontologies grow, the human-oriented solution is not cost-effective. The cost of
understanding the complexities in the current ontology, recasting the new problem in the
old framework, and then deciding what changes should take place in the old ontology to
effect a natural problem formulation, is often an expensive proposition. The frequency
with which old ontologies need to be recast as well as the extent to which they need to be
recast, warrants that a high level approach be taken towards semi-automating some of the
ontology redesign tasks. Justification for building such an environment lies in the cost
savings due to amortization of ontology design for multi-agent systems over several
different projects.
Tools and techniques are needed for automating the process of ontology redesign
for new projects. Smart software analysis infrastructures are required for analyzing
existing systems that can expose potential reusable regions. Our approach is based on a
round-trip software engineering methodology that first identifies and extracts candidate
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reusable regions from software systems. This technology then dovetails into another
framework that allows an ontological designer to extract relevant ontological fragments
and build larger ontologies based on his/her requirements.
In this paper we first describe the basic aspects of defining an ontology and
provide some example ontologies of varying complexity. This will be followed by a short
description of the Multi-ViewPoint Clustering Analysis (MVP-CA) tool that helps expose
ontological engineering concerns as well as aids the user in extraction of reusable
software regions from axiomatized ontologies. Finally we provide a high-level view of
the Façade Creation Tool kit (FCT) that provides the user the flexible perspectives on an
existing ontology, given the revelations made by the MVP-CA tool. It further allows the
ontological engineer to morph the ontologies as facades for adaptation and utilization in
the current application environment.

II.

Background on Ontologies

An ontology is an explicit formal specification of terms in a domain and the
relations among them. Terms are defined in the context of concepts that arise in a
particular domain of discourse. Conceptualization of terms depends both on the objects of
interest in the operational environment, as well as their intended usage in the operational
environment. Thus, the level of granularity at which the concepts get defined as well as
their inter relationships with other objects of interest in the environment all get influenced
by the intrinsic characteristics of the objects as well as the operational characteristics of
the environment in which they will be used.
The need for ontology arises from the fact that ontologies enable formalisms to be
applied on the semantics of concepts so that automated reasoning can proceed with those
concepts to enable the desired functionalities in any system. Also, for systems operating
with multiple agents, interoperability and collaboration among them can be made
possible if there exists a common formal lingua between these systems to communicate
with each other meaningfully.
The basis for formulating an ontology lies primarily in defining the concept
classes for the system œ based on the commonalities across the characteristics of the
objects of interest. One needs to be careful in how we define these classes as they need to
have enough ontological distinctions among them in order to facilitate establishment of a
meaningful hierarchy across the concepts. For the concept classes that do not have a
hierarchical relationship to other classes, interdependencies and associations among
concepts can be captured as a network of interrelationships. The guiding principles for
optimizing the ontological design should lie in observing and adhering to the following
few tenets:
B parsimonious design of concept classes
B crispness in the distinctions across concepts
B richness in the associations across concepts
We will briefly provide some example ontologies next that vary in complexity
progressively. They are meant to expose the reader to above aspects involved in ontology
design.
At a very simple conceptual level, we can succinctly capture the relevant aspects
of a blocks world represented in Figure 1, through the following ontology. We basically
need only a set of two concept classes: {block, table}. The set of instances of these
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concepts are {a, b, c, d, e: block; T: table}. The relationships which need to be defined to
capture the environment specifics are the following: {on(d,c), on(a,d), on(T,a), on(b,e),
on(T,b), clear(c), clear(e)}.
A more useful and well-studied example of an ontology lies in the taxonomic
classification of species in application areas, such as, biology, botany, etc. The
classification ontology shown in Figure 2 is based on well-understood distinctions across
various animal types. Such an ontology facilitates the classification and study of the
behavioral characteristics of the different species in the animal kingdom.
Figure 3 provides an example ontology fragment for various military unit
specialty types, such as, services unit, logistics unit, etc. Under the airborne specialty
unit, for the helicopter we see a forking of the classification according to whether one is
talking about the helicopter unit in an attack mode (e.g. for tactical operations) or a lift
mode (eg. for logistics operations). The definition of heavy, medium and light for the
same helicopter will be different given the two functionalities. Thus, we see how the
operational characteristics of the environment can play a major role in defining our
interrelationships for the objects of interest in the environment.
The reality is that no single ontology is correct for all applications. Even though
the choice of ontological distinctions and concept placements are made with respect to a
projected usage of the ontology, in reality, actual usage reveals more optimal ways of
organization of the ontology. If we are willing to accept this reality, it follows that
ontological engineering is an open-ended task. We need tools which can render
ontologies adaptive and open to different types of application demands.

III.

Multi-ViewPoint Clustering Analysis Technology

Pragati‘s Multi-ViewPoint Clustering Analysis (MVP-CA) tool facilitates
analysis of semi-structured software systems (such as knowledge bases) by clustering
meaningful information entities (such as KB rules), into clusters that share significant
common properties [Mehrotra & Bobrovnikoff (2002)]. It exposes ontology developers to
the usage of the ontology by clustering the information units that exercise/use the
ontology in a given practical context. In its current state, MVP-CA tool can accept many
different types of axiomatized ontologies in the form of knowledge bases or decision
support systems.
The MVP-CA tool consists of three stages: parsing, cluster generation, and cluster
analysis. In the parsing phase, a front-end parser translates a knowledge base‘s axioms
from their original form into a language-independent representation. The user can specify
numerous rule and pattern transformations in this stage to eliminate noise in the data. The
cluster generation phase applies a hierarchical agglomerative clustering algorithm to the
transformed rules. During each iteration, the two most similar clusters merge to form a
new cluster. The order of merging forms a hierarchy of clusters. Similarity between rules
is defined by a set of heuristic distance metrics [Mehrotra and Wild 1995] that the user
chooses based on the nature of the task performed by the rule base (e.g., classification,
diagnosis, control, etc.). These heuristic-based distance metrics have evolved from our
experiences with different types of knowledge bases. In the cluster analysis phase, the
user interacts with the tool to pinpoint the relevant clusters from the generated pool of
clusters. A cluster‘s relevance depends entirely on the objective of the analysis. However,
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the tool does provide some automatic support for common analysis goals, such as
flagging clusters whose rules contain very similar clauses.
In its primary role as a comprehension aid, MVP-CA provides support for zeroing
in on clusters that provide insight into the important conceptual regions in the knowledge
base. In order to identify such seed concepts, the tool generates different types of
information about patterns and clusters. The user can utilize this information to assess the
quality and relevance of the clusters. Graphical representations of the clustering process,
such as dendrograms, further aid the user in establishing links across various concept
terms in the knowledge base. In addition, the tool provides several views of the clusters at
the pattern, rule, and cluster levels to aid the user in identifying the relevant clusters. We
currently have a rich repertoire of automatic detection routines for flagging clusters that
are relevant according to common analysis goals.
Clustering of knowledge bases into groups of semantically-related rules/axioms
reveals relationship of terms in the context of their usage and also exposes prototypical
patterns of usage for the terms in the knowledge base. Multiple ways of clustering the
system, based on different objective criteria for grouping, aids in understanding and
analyzing the system from different perspectives. Our contention is that no single
clustering is sufficient to understand complex systems œ multiple viewpoints of the
domain provide different perspectives of the system.

IV.

Analysis Insights through MVP-CA Technology

In our experiences of analyzing axiomatized ontologies through the MVP-CA tool we
have discovered the following major issues which complicate the maintenance and reuse
of ontologies [e.g. Mehrotra et.al (1999)].
Level of Abstraction of Concepts:
In general we have noticed that either concepts are too specialized in the core
ontology which precludes its usage in different contexts or they are too generalized so
that their meaning gets overloaded due to the different contexts in which they get used.
Overspecialization of concepts in the core precludes users from seeing the forest
for the trees. For example, if different types of cars, such as, Ford Taurus, Toyota Camry,
Honda Accord, etc. are declared as concept classes in the core, one needs a generalized
concept of an automobile to capture the commonalities among them. Clustering aids us in
abstracting or generalizing such concepts in the core so that they become reusable for
future development efforts.
An opposite extreme of the above case is when a concept is declared as being too
general. This often leads to an open interpretation problem when comprehending or
extending the knowledge base, because the concept changes its meaning depending on
the context of its usage. An example of such a concept class is Move. It is too general a
concept and more than likely, it needs to be specialized to Move-Into, Move-To, MoveOut-Of, Move-Through, etc. in order to differentiate across its many varied uses.
B
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Figure 1: Simple Ontology for a Blocks World
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Figure 2: Taxonomic Classification Ontology: Animal World
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The decision on the right granularity in the formulation of a particular concept is
very much dependent on the projected usage patterns for that concept and is often a
judgment call. Clustering through the MVP-CA tool allows one to analyze the concept in
its operational environment and study its placement in the generalization hierarchy.
Competing axes of distinctions for concepts:
During our analysis we have often found very orthogonal characteristics
possessed by a single concept that gives rise to competing axes of distinctions for
placement of the concept. It is often a judgment call based on the projected usage of the
ontology, as to which choice is the best one to adopt. For example, in a clothing store, the
classification of clothes can be done on the gender axis or type axis. For an optimal
layout of clothes in the store the classification is likely to be based along the gender axis,
that is men‘s vs. women‘s. However, the same store, when interfacing with a
manufacturing line would organize the items according to the clothes types, that is, pants,
shirts, etc.
A very similar problem emerges for choosing the right branch for placement of a
concept on the ontological hierarchy. In Figure 3 we have exposed this problem with the
placement of helicopter in the lift or attack branch. The properties that need to be defined
for the helicopter will change depending on the branch in which it gets placed. The
ultimate litmus test for the right placement of such a term will lie in the nature of the
application which will use it.
Clustering exposes the —vicinity“ terms for a concept, that is, terms that naturally
group together due to the nature of the application area in which the concept gets used.
We have exposed such opportunities for regrouping and realigning of concepts in the
IMMACCS system [Mehrotra (2001), Mehrotra and Bobrovnikoff(2001)] last year.
B

Context of Usage:
The context in which a concept gets used determines its semantic import. This
determines the attributes or properties that the concept needs for its definition. Concept
terms that exhibit polysemy is especially notorious because they can have overloaded
meanings if they have not been differentiated appropriately in the ontology. A layman‘s
example of polysemy is a word like contract which means physical change in the physics
world, but in a legal setting it has the semantic import of a legal document. Another such
term is culture which has an overloaded meaning depending on whether one is in the
societal context or a biological experiment.
In our experiences with the MVP-CA tool, we have often found usage of lexical
reversals on composite words to convey different connotations on the concept. For
example, PortalOpen and OpenPortal use the same base concepts Open and Portal, but
the first one maybe used in a passive manner to define a state of the system as having an
open portal, whereas the second one may be used to provide a more proactive spin on the
concept œ that is, the act of opening up a portal. Such multiple over loadings on the
meaning of terms often makes a knowledge base opaque from the comprehension
standpoint. However, we cannot discourage their usage, because there is often only a
limited repertoire of base concepts with which we can convey our meaning. What is
needed are tools to help distinguish the various aspects of usage of similarly named
B
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concepts. One of the major barriers to the reusability of knowledge bases lies in the
inability to identify existing concepts that are relevant to the current task. Often, terms
have been coined in the knowledge base with a particular usage in mind and the
documentation fails to expose the nuances underlying a term‘s intended meaning(s). The
problem gets worse when terms represent multiple concepts, as it is sometimes difficult
to distinguish between overloaded meanings. Clustering can help expose the usage of
such terms by showing them in the various contexts in which they occur.
Presence of composite concept terms:
Since it is common practice to join single concept terms to provide variations on a
base concept, if the distinctions are not made obvious, or are not documented sufficiently
clearly, often the usage of these terms are left to the interpretation of the reader.
Especially notorious are terms that are lexically and semantically close, such as, Move
and Move-Into lexically distant but semantically close, such as, Move-Into and Enter
complementary terms, such as, Move-From and Move-To. In our experience analyzing
the spatial slice of Cycorp's Integrated Knowledge Base (IKB)[CYCORP (2002)],
clustering exposed many composite terms. One such term, objectFoundInLocation, can
take on very different meanings depending on (a) the type of object to be found, (b) the
type of place in which one is trying to find the object, and (c) the precise type of —find“
that defines success. Thus, the object can be as small as a fly stuck in a cobweb or a large
country inside a continent. The object could be considered as found by simply being
—near“ the location, or —in-among“ several other objects, or, alternatively, it might be
required to —touch“ the desired location. Even though the essence of —find“ is common to
the axioms using this concept, one needs to be aware of the types of the surrounding
terms that are brought to bear for extending the knowledge base in a given context.
The clusters generated by the MVP-CA tool expose the user to axioms that utilize a
concept in not only structurally similar manner, but also have similar semantic import.
Exposing them in this manner provides an opportunity for building —intermediate“ (i.e.,
virtual) concept nodes to aid both comprehension and retrieval of knowledge base (KB)
concepts. In Figure 4 we show the different aspects of usage of objectFoundInLocation
B

Figure 4: Intermediate concepts surrounding Cyc term

through the intermediate concepts œ positional, partonomic, geographic, fluids and group
247

membership. The terms that bunch together under the intermediate concepts imply
sharing of similar contexts of usage. These concept nodes can be used to build hierarchies
and can serve as guiding or latch points for efficient retrieval during further development
of the software system.
Presence of common patterns of usage of terms:
Clusters of structurally similar axioms signal prototypical usage patterns for
concept(s). Identification of such regions in the software can be a valuable guide for
future extensions of the knowledge base, as well as provide us opportunities for
identifying generic, reusable regions in the software. Exposing common functionalities,
as well as overlapping contexts across clusters of axioms, reveals opportunities for
creation of higher order predicates for axioms, such as macro predicates in Cyc, and
templates for groups of axioms [Mehrotra (2202)]. Often the need for these higher-level
abstractions can be revealed only ex post facto, that is, after there are enough assertions
in the knowledge base to warrant the formation of a higher order axiom. These important
knowledge representational issues can impact the long-term utility and quality assurance
of the knowledge base.
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) cannot always be expected to axiomatize their
knowledge with existential and universal quantifiers. Often, it is more comfortable for
them to express rules in the domain with grounded formulas. These representations can
subsequently be analyzed for templating opportunities. MVP-CA clustering can aid the
creation of knowledge entry templates by clustering similarly structured grounded
axioms. These axiom clusters can then be abstracted to create more sophisticated axioms
at a higher conceptual level. Templates set off the static or constant portions of the code
from the parameterizable or variable portions of the code in the context of a collection of
structurally similar axioms. This sort of scaffolding can help more general axioms to
emerge and can help alleviate the knowledge acquisition bottleneck for KB formation by
allowing knowledge to be entered at the SME‘s conceptual comfort level.
Figure 5 shows an example of a possible template that was exposed by clustering
B

Figure 5: Template formation
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Cyc‘s spatial slice. The two axioms, ConvexHullFn and InteriorFn shown at the top of
the figure, are representative of a set of axioms in the abstract spatial relationship cluster
that return the same value when invoked. The structural similarity across the axioms is
very evident, and can be exploited by formation of the template UniqueFn, shown at the

Figure 6: Snapshot of the Templating Infrastructure of the MVP-CA Tool

bottom of Figure 5.
Another example of template formation is shown as a snapshot of templating
infrastructure from the MVP-CA tool in Figure 6. The template is formed automatically
from the tool by performing rule differencing operation on a selected rule set. The cluster
selected in Figure 6 shows how different types of tasks, Enable, Prevent and Maintain
have relationship with the predicate TaskHasPurpose defined on them. Several types of
similarities in the ontology space can be exposed, templated and documented in the
current MVP-CA infrastructure. A subset of these findings can be selected for model
fragment creation in the Façade Creation Toolkit infrastructure that we discuss next.

V.

Façade Creation Tool Technology

The Façade Creation Toolkit (FCT), currently under development at Pragati, is aimed
at providing an environment for addressing the creation and reuse of ontologies given the
various expositions from the MVP-CA tool [Mehrotra et.al (2002)]. In particular, this
tool enables an ontology designer to specialize and combine portions of existing
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ontologies into façades. Starting from a set of functional requirements specified in
natural but restricted English, the FCT guides the user through the entire process of
creating a new ontology. The tool provides a significant level of cognitive support for
façade construction; however, the user always has the final control.
A façade is a new ontology which is built by modifying pieces of existing ontologies.
A model fragment is an embodiment of a —usage pattern“ that can be reused in creating
new ontologies or façades. A model fragment is therefore a higher level abstraction of
patterns that has been extracted through analysis of existing ontologies. Like full
ontologies, model fragments and facades are composed of entities and relationships and
are displayed by FCT as UML class diagrams. The MF repository consists of model
fragments. The user has the final choice of which model fragment addresses his/her
needs in the best possible way and would require the least specialization. FCT represents
ontologies as UML class diagrams; therefore the MFs are presented in this form.
In its current form the FCT is user-driven from the point of view of selection,
specialization and merging of ontologies. The current FCT allows a user to build and
modify agent ontologies via a natural-language-based high-level specification of the
domain as shown in Figure 7. Currently the high-level specification language captures the
agent interest succinctly in terms of a functional requirement expressed in natural
language. A template-based approach is used at this point to map the requirements onto
attribute-value pairs in the templates. Based on the attribute set extracted via the natural
language system, the FCT presents various model fragments (MFs) from the MF
repository.
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The methodology of constructing a new ontology on an existing one is as follows:
B The file containing the user‘s functional requirements (expressed in natural
language) are displayed in the requirements pane. The user selects a functional
requirement for the envisioned façade.

Figure 7: The FCT interface, displaying natural language requirements (top left), ontology

requirements (called templates here, middle left), and a model fragment (top right). The
Ontology window (bottom) is used to construct façades.

B

B

B
B
B

The templates pane displays all the NL templates matching the selected
requirement. (Often multiple templates will match a given requirement œ
based on different interpretations of the same information). The user chooses
the most appropriate template.
The Model Fragments (MF) capable of fulfilling the current requirements is
then displayed (the system automatically specializes the fragments based on
the text of the functional requirement). The user selects the MF that best
addresses his/her current need.
The selected MF fragment is displayed in a separate workspace. The user can
perform a number of operations on the selected MF: editing the entities;
merging with previously selected MFs; editing the relationships in the MFs.
The user repeats the above steps for each of the requirements.
Once all the requirements have been satisfied, the resulting ontology built in
the workspace can be saved.
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In its current form the FCT is user-driven from the point of view of selection,
specialization and merging of ontologies. The current FCT allows a user to build and
modify agent ontologies via a natural-language-based high-level specification of the
domain as shown in Figure 7. Currently the high-level specification language captures the
agent interest succinctly in terms of a functional requirement expressed in natural
language. A template-based approach is used at this point to map the requirements onto
attribute-value pairs in the templates. Based on the attribute set extracted via the natural
language system, the FCT presents various model fragments (MFs) from the MF
repository. FCT has been recently adapted to import ontology fragments from
Embarcadero‘s Describe packages in the form of model fragments. These fragments can
be exported to the Describe package as well after modification.

VI.

Proposed Round-Trip Software Engineering Methodology
Natural Language
Requirements

• ....

Model Fragments
Repository

.

• ....

Cluster Analysis

.
Model Fragments
• . . Module
..
Selection
.
Matched Model
Fragments
Filters

Specialization - Merging Module

MVP-CA
Clustering Tool

Filters

Metrics

Parser

XMI Import/Export Module
SILS

CIAT

IMMACCS

OTIS

Ontologies & Facades

SEAWAY

Figure 8: Architecture of the Integrated Toolset œ MVP-CA and FCT for Roundtrip Engineering

Our proposed framework for maintenance and reuse of ontologies is depicted in
Figure 8. The right-hand-side provides the infrastructure for MVP-CA tool. It is
envisioned that analysis results from the MVP-CA tool can be captured as model
fragments in the model fragment repository of the FCT framework. Several types of
similarities in the ontology space can be revealed from the MVP-CA tool and captured in
the FCT framework with a view to selecting a subset of them for MF creation. We hope
that the output of the clustering tool can become essentially recommendations for new
ontological elements. FCT‘s strength lies in enabling one to break away from the past
usage and tailor the objects to the new setting/application. The connection between the
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past and the future vision lies then in the model fragments that we propose to the user for
a given requirement. There is a judgment call issue here in how we decide when such
discoveries need to be flagged as reusable. A parallel knowledge representation research
issue is how we represent the reusable aspects of the fragment. Both of these are open
research issues.
We hope that clustering can pull in the different behaviors of the objects through
their role and association relationships. As far as possible, if the behavior of objects can
be captured in the form of generic role and association declarations, we can try to
formulate different criteria for model fragment formation. Extracting model fragments
from existing ontologies as well as creating new ones through observed analysis/design
patterns is a feature we would like to explore through the FCT. Joining of the two
technologies, MVP-CA and FCT can be viewed as a step towards providing the
framework within which hard-core reusability issues can be studied.

VII. Conclusions
Based on our experiences in analyzing ontologies, in this paper we have
proposed a joint infrastructure to leverage off of two technologies œ the Multi-ViewPoint
Clustering Analysis Tool as well the Façade Creation Toolkit. MVP-CA technology
provides an environment to —mine“ for reusable and generalizeable components in the
form of model fragments from existing axiomatized ontologies, whereas the Façade
Creation Toolkit enables the adaptation and utilization of these model fragments in the
form of facades in the target application domain. An interactive and informed approach is
proposed for ontology development, maintenance and reuse, so that ontologies can be
created in an adaptive manner and the cost of developing multi-agent systems can be
reduced substantially.
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Abstract
Data, information, and knowledge are becoming increasingly common terms in the literature of
the software industry. This terminology originated some time ago in the disciplines of cognitive
science and artificial intelligence to reference three closely related but distinct concepts.
Traditionally, mainstream software engineering has lumped all three concepts together as data
and has only recently begun to distinguish between them. Unfortunately, the popular desire to
distinguish between data, information, and knowledge within the mainstream has blurred the
individual meanings of the words to the point where there is no longer a clear-cut distinction
between them for most people. This problem is compounded by the fact that the abstract nature
of the associated concepts provides wide latitude for their application.
The goal of this paper is to make these abstract concepts more concrete by providing examples of
their usage taken directly from the design and implementation of the Shipboard Integration of
Logistics Systems (SILS), an ONR project sponsored by Dr. Phillip Abraham. This paper does
not claim or intend to provide definitive definitions of these terms; rather it seeks to provide a
cognitive framework for thinking about these concepts from which observations and conclusions
can be made about the differences and relationships between the individual concepts.

Keywords
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Introduction
The Shipboard Integration of Logistics Systems (SILS) is a concept developed by Dr. Phillip
Abraham of ONR. SILS can be explained as integrating shipboard and supporting shore side
systems for information sharing as an enabling platform for the development of key technologies
geared towards providing much more efficient and timely logistics. This in turn provides higher
levels of mission readiness that are sustainable over longer periods. Examples of these
technologies include: intelligent software agents, predictive failure technologies, distance
support, and self-sensing diagnostic capabilities. Many of these technologies require information
sharing to derive, share, and apply the dynamically growing bodies of knowledge that they
embody to the problem of naval logistics.
The SILS concept is manifest in the design of a series of decision support systems based on the
Integrated Collaborative Decision Model (ICDM); a collection of guiding principles,
architectural components, and tools developed by the Collaborative Agent Design Research
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Center for the implementation of agent based decision support systems.
follows:

These systems are as

1. The Collaborative Agent-based Control and Help System (COACH) assists naval
servicemen in the performance of time critical repairs.
2. The Ordnance Tracking and Information System (OTIS) assists ordnance officers in the
planning, tracking, and implementation of ordnance movements aboard aircraft carriers.
3. The Mission Readiness Analysis Toolkit (MRAT) assists the commanding officer of
Navy ships and their department heads in assessing and preparing the readiness of their
ship for combat.
This paper begins by providing some background information covering the concept of an
ontology and the progressive evolution of a single ontological model framework developed in
the context of the three SILS decision support systems: COACH, OTIS, and MRAT. The
conventions employed in the text and figures of the paper are also provided. This is followed by
a description of the overarching framework that distinguishes and relates the concepts of data,
information, and knowledge in the context of SILS. Next, successive sections provide general
descriptions of data, information, and knowledge, and introduce the corresponding top-level
model elements, derived directly from the abstract conceptualization that the framework provides
for each. Then an example is provided that describes the application of the generalized SILS
model to represent and reason about a specific real world problem. The paper concludes by
making observations about the nature of data, information, and knowledge by utilizing the
presented model and example as an environment for their contemplation.

Background
An ontology is a conceptual model of the world that can be used to create virtual emulations of it
within the bounds of the application domains of a particular system. Concepts in common
between these three ICDM systems are all implemented with the same ontological elements. To
this common core, non-overlapping extensions that address the concepts unique to an individual
system are added. Information sharing amongst systems is accomplished most efficiently and
accurately with common ontological elements. By sharing common ontological elements,
translation is not required for these systems to exchange information, which results in a more
efficient exchange without ambiguity or loss of information.
COACH presented the ontology development team with a domain that potentially included all
the equipment in the U.S. Navy. The team looked to apply the concepts espoused by Martin
Fowler in his book Analysis Patterns, reusable object models (Fowler 1997a) to develop models
independent of any particular piece of equipment that could be extended at runtime by users in
the field to deal with new types of military equipment or variations on existing types as they
were introduced. A key feature of the COACH model was the use of a knowledge instance
model to allow the ontology to be extended at runtime. With OTIS, the team found a large
percentage of the precompiled class model from COACH could be reused, given a knowledge
instance model to tailor it to the domain of ordnance handling aboard U.S. Navy aircraft carriers.
During the implementation of the OTIS model, the concepts developed for the COACH model
evolved resulting in a formalized split between the operational level of the model and the
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knowledge level. With SILS, the team was again able to reuse large portions of the evolving
generic ontology. SILS introduced a new aspect in that it is primarily driven by external system
data inputs. This resulted in the formalized incorporation of the concept of data in the model
framework. The concepts associated with the OTIS operational level also evolved to result in a
model framework that formally distinguishes the individual concepts of data, information, and
knowledge.
This paper assumes but does not require a rudimentary knowledge of the basic concepts of
object-oriented modeling. A good introduction to this subject can be found in Inside the Object
Model by David Papurt (Papurt 1995). All the figures in this paper use a small subset of the
graphical object-oriented notations defined by the Unified Modeling Language (UML). A brief
overview of the UML notations employed in this paper is provided in Figure 1. Pertinent
characteristics of the different constructs are described as the constructs are introduced
throughout the document. A concise summary of UML can be found in UML Distilled by
Martin Fowler (Fowler 1997b). The UML based figures in this document provide only the
minimum level of detail necessary to understand the concepts under discussion, and therefore
they leave off many of the details typical in UML diagrams such as role names and multiplicity
constraints. This paper capitalizes and italicizes ontological class names and quotes object
instance names.
Generalization

Class Name

class

inheritance

Specialization

Class 1

association
role 1

role 2

Class 2

Association Class

self association

object
object name:Class Name

linked object:Class Name

object link
Figure 1. UML Notions Employed in this Paper
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SILS Model Framework
The SILS Model Framework, depicted in Figure 2, provides top-level concepts and a structure
for the development and implementation of ontologies intended to model the core problem
domain for the encompassing decision support system. It is rooted in a higher-level system
framework that provides structural representation for those elements of decision support system
implementation that are independent of any particular domain. Examples include concepts such
as User, Access Permission, and Session. Sessions are used to partition Domain Objects into
disjoint worlds (sets) to support such things as training scenarios and what if experiments
independent from the primary operational picture, but within the same conceptual and physical
system environment. All objects used to represent the core problem domain of the system are
Domain Objects, which serves as the common base class that roots the SILS Model Framework
and captures all relationships with the external context provided by the SILS System Framework.
Domain Object

references

Data Object

Information Object

type

Knowledge Object

subtypes
super types

Figure 2. Model Framework

In addition to external context, Domain Object supports those characteristics of the
representation (ontology) and implementation (object model) shared by all objects within the
problem domain representation. The model defines three types of Domain Object: Data Object,
Information Object, and Knowledge Object, which respectively model the distinct real world
concepts of data, information, and knowledge within the virtual context of a SILS system
implementation. The model defines three associations to capture the key relationships between
these concepts.
All Information Objects have an association with at least one Knowledge Object that defines the
logical type or types of the Information Object. This will be referred to as the knowledge level
type of the Information Object to distinguish it from the standard classification mechanism
indicated by the closed arrow in a UML diagram. Information Objects use their knowledge level
type in conjunction with the standard classification mechanism to augment the fixed meta-model
provided by the object oriented implementation environment. Using this approach the
knowledge level serves as a dynamic meta-model that supports meta-level relationships, and
allows for dynamic and multiple classification schemes that support runtime extensions. The
subtype supertype association is used to compose Knowledge Objects into classification
taxonomies upon which much reasoning can take place. Data objects are used to hold
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standardized reference data defined by the US Department of Defense (DOD) or imported from
external systems. Domain Objects may associate Data Objects in order to supplement the
information carried by their attributes. In this manner, the associated data may be elevated to the
level of information.

SILS Data Model
Data consists of words or numbers without relationships; thereby, requiring the context to be
inferred to provide meaning. A random stream of words or numbers can be thought of as raw
data while a fixed sequence of words and numbers can be thought of as structured data.
Structured data is the primary building block upon which information is built; however, the data
must be structured to correspond to the real world entities within the domain in order to build
information. Given structured data corresponding to entities within the domain, the transition to
information is made by adding the relationships between entities to pin down the situational
context to such an extent that no inferences are required to provide meaning. These ideas are
discussed in depth in (Pohl 2000). Data is the primary means by which information and
knowledge are communicated as the software systems, agents, or human beings participating in
the communication typically have differing ontologies. Differing ontologies necessitates the use
of inferences by the sender to decide what to send and by the receiver to translate it into his
internal ontology from which he makes sense of the world in which he lives.
Data Object

APL Item
- NSN :
- quantity :

Model Library Entry
-

model :
height :
length :
width :

Figure 3. Data Model Fragment

The SILS Data Model Fragment shows two specializations of Data Object: APL Item and Model
Library Entry. Data Object is an element of the SILS Model Framework that is depicted in
Figure 2. APL Item represents an entry in the Allowance Parts List for a Navy Ship. This list
specifies the type, by National Stock Number (NSN) and quantity of the spare parts to be carried
aboard ship. When represented as data a human or software agent must already know what ship
the APL corresponds too, perhaps by assuming it references the ship upon which the data server
is resident. By linking a specific APL Item to a specific ship, perhaps by using the Domain
Object reference association, an inference need not be made. Model Library Entry is a line item
in a standardized US Army Catalog of vehicle and equipment dimensions. An experienced
human operator knows that models map to National Stock Numbers (NSNs) and could therefore
use a Model to NSN Map Entry Data Object (not shown) to correlate APL Item objects to Model
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Library Entry objects in order to access the dimensions of an APL Item. By associating APL
Item objects to Model Library Entry objects the dimensions of an APL Item could be directly
obtained without the inferences and data joins previously required; thereby, providing
information rather than data in this instance.

SILS Information Model
This section describes the simplified top-level fragment of the SILS Object Model for
representing information that is depicted in Figure 4. Information consists of structured data
with relationships defined by an explicit conceptualization known as an ontology. The
relationships provide context and thus meaning. Information is declarative in nature and thus
associated with the present and the past.
Information Object

target

Asset

Action

resources

Specific Allocation

Material Asset

Active Asset

sub actions

outcomes

responsible party

Observation side effects
triggers
dependent observations

parts

Agent

Human Asset

Figure 4. Information Model Fragment

This model fragment expands the concept of information in the context of SILS by defining
concrete specializations of Information Object. Information Object is an element of the SILS
Model Framework that is depicted in Figure 2. Key to understanding the SILS Information
Model is the concept that each Information Object has a knowledge level type that provides it
with logical meaning as discussed in SILS Model Framework section.
The SILS Information Model Fragment defines three primary types of Information Object: Asset,
Action, and Observation. An Action is used to represent the performance of a Protocol as
indicated by the associated knowledge level type to a Protocol Knowledge Object. Key attributes
of Action (not shown) are the start time and end time, which may be actual or planned depending
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on the value of the status attribute of Action. An Action may be further decomposed in to sub
actions as indicated by the association with itself.
An Asset is used to represent concrete entities within the domain the logical type of which is
indicated by the knowledge level type association to an Asset Type. Two types of Asset are
defined: Material Asset and Active Asset. Material Assets associate with Asset Types that define
things such as ships, guns, uniforms, petroleum products, and types of food. A Material Asset
may contain parts, which are themselves Material Assets as indicated by the association with
itself. Active Assets are things that may act to change the environment. Two types of Active
Asset are defined: Human Asset, which may be a Person or an Organization, and Agent, which
corresponds to a software-based entity.
An Observation is used to represent the occurrence of some Phenomenon within the domain as
indicated by the associated knowledge level type to a Phenomenon Knowledge Object. Note that
an Observation is an Action and therefore has all the characteristics and relationships indicated
for an Action. An Observation may indicate the Observations upon which it depends by the
association with itself. This is useful for inferred Observations as it allows the Observations
upon which an inference was based to be recorded. If one or more of the dependent
Observations are invalidated, it may be an indication that the inferred Observation needs to be
invalidated as well.
Now that the individual object types defined in the SILS Information Model Fragment have been
described, meaningful descriptions of the associated relationships can be provided. Looking
again at Action it can be seen that an Action may optionally (note that association multiplicities
are not depicted here for the sake of compactness) be performed on an Asset, and may indicate
resources used or allocated, depending on the value of the Action type attribute, during or for the
execution of the Action. Resources are associated by means of an association class, which
allows attributes to be tied to the association itself. This allows, for example, the representation
of the allocation of an Asset to an Action for a block of time that differs from the block of time
over which the Action occurs. Associations also indicate the Active Object: Person,
Organization, or Agent responsible for performing it. With the addition of these relationships,
one can see how the individual sets of structured data represented by Action and Asset are
elevated to the level of information.
The transformation to information becomes even more apparent when the associations between
Action and Observation are examined. Action triggers allow the Observations that prompted the
Action to be recorded. For example, an Observation of the phenomenon ”broken‘ on generator
number two can be recorded as the trigger for an Action using the Protocol ”diagnose generator‘.
Side effects and results can also be indicated. Continuing on the previous example it can be
indicated that the Action to diagnose the generator resulted in ship power circuit number 4 being
shut down from 4 to 5 o‘clock as indicated by an Observation with start time 4 and end time 5 on
the Asset ”power circuit number 4‘ of the Phenomenon ”shut down‘. Finally, a result could be
indicated by a result association (link) to an Observation of the ”generator main bearing‘ of the
Phenomenon ”requires replacement‘.
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SILS Knowledge Model
This section describes the simplified top-level fragment of the SILS Object Model for
representing knowledge that is depicted in Figure 5. Knowledge Object is an element of the
SILS Model Framework that is depicted in Figure 2. Knowledge consists of information-based
inferences that are predictive in nature and thus associated with the future.
This model fragment expands the concept of knowledge in the context of SILS by defining three
concrete specializations of Knowledge Object: Asset Type, Protocol, and Phenomenon that serve
as the respective targets of knowledge level type associations for the Information Objects: Asset,
Action, and Observation.
supertypes

Knowledge Object

subtypes

- name :
- description :

target types

Asset Type

target types

Protocol
resource types

possible outcomes
possible side effects

Phenomenon

possible triggers
possible symtoms

Parts

General Allocation

Probability

Steps

Confidence Factor

Figure 5. Knowledge Model Fragment

A Protocol is used to represent standard procedures or processes independent of the Actions that
employ them. It may be further decomposed into steps as indicated by the association with itself
through the steps collection class. Protocol steps, which are also Protocol objects, mirror the sub
actions of Action, but cannot be implemented with self-association, which requires referenced
objects to be unique. Every Action, including sub actions, is unique while the same Protocol
could be used repeatedly to build up a higher-level Protocol. For instance, the Protocol ”rotate
tires‘ may use the unique Protocol ”remove wheel‘ four times. If the Action object that
represents the execution of the ”rotate tires‘ Protocol is decomposed in the same manner (typical
but not required), it would associate as sub actions four unique Actions, performed at different
times or by different people, that all reference the same ”remove wheel‘ Protocol. Protocol uses
the target types association to indicate the applicable Asset Types. The Asset Types required to
implement it are indicated by the General Allocation association class, which provides attributes
to indicate quantity and time.
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An Asset Type is used to represent the types of concrete entities within the domain. Just as a
specific Material Asset object may contain specific parts, a particular Asset Type may contain a
collection of part types. Similar to the situation with Protocol, Asset Type cannot use selfassociation to indicate part types due to the uniqueness constraint on associations; however, since
part order does not matter only one entry per type of part along with an indication of quantity is
required.
Another point of interest involves the absence of classes derived from Asset Type in the
knowledge model in contrast to the derivation tree off Asset in the information model which
contains four classes: Material Asset, Active Asset, Human Asset, and Agent. The
implementation paradigm employed by the SILS Model does not utilize the inheritance
mechanisms provided by object oriented implementation languages as the primary classification
mechanism for Information Objects. The language provided mechanism is used only to add the
attributes or associations required by the implementation. Logical classification for Information
Objects is provided by constrained associations to object instances in the knowledge level.
While logical classification for Knowledge Objects is implemented by linking object instances
using the subtypes supertypes association of Knowledge Object.
A Phenomenon is used to represent things that can be observed within the domain. Just as an
Observation may indicate dependent Observations though self-association, Phenomenon objects
may indicate symptomatic information. For example, radio (Asset Type) ”does not work‘
(Phenomenon) could be symptomatically linked to battery (Asset Type) ”is dead‘ (Phenomenon).
As with Asset Type and Protocol, a more complex self-association mechanism is employed for
Phenomenon in the knowledge model than for Observation in the information model, but for a
different reason. In the information model the Observations used to infer another Observation
may be noted. In the knowledge model, it is the probability that one Phenomenon infers another
that is being noted. In this case, uniqueness is not an issue so an association class is employed to
add a probabilistic attribute such as a confidence factor to the symptomatic links between
Phenomenon objects. This type of probabilistic association is common to the knowledge model.
Protocol and Phenomenon have similar relationships to those between Action and Observation in
the information model. Where associations between Action and Observation provide triggers,
side effects, and outcomes, associations between Protocol and Phenomenon provide possible
triggers, possible side effects, and possible outcomes. All of these knowledge model
associations utilize an association class to provide probabilistic measures of the individual
possibilities. This paper presents a simplified model for the sake of brevity and understanding.
The actual SILS model provides additional representational machinery for grouping outcomes
side effects, and triggers in order to indicate things like the outcome will be X half of the time or
Y and Z the other half of the time.

Object Instance Example
This section presents a simple example intended to clarify the concepts presented thus far. The
first step in tailoring the SILS object model to a particular domain is to develop a knowledge
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instance model from the knowledge model classes. Rather than providing a knowledge instance
model fragment from one of the SILS systems: COACH, OTIS, or MRAT, this example will
apply the SILS model to the domain of medical diagnosis, which a broader audience can easily
relate too.
First, a phenomenological taxonomy is developed using the subtypes super types association of
inherent to all Knowledge Objects. Note that the classes in the SILS object models are not
reasoned on directly, but rather serve as templates for creating instances upon which reasoning
may occur. A simple taxonomy and the knowledge model classes from which it was derived are
shown in Figure 6. This hierarchy shows that an ”Infection‘ is a type of ”illness‘ and that an
”Infection‘ may be either a ”Bacterial Infection‘ or a ”Viral Infection‘. In order to demonstrate
the ability for reasoning on the taxonomic structures common to the representation of
knowledge, consider a presence Observation (an Observation can record the presence or absence
of a Phenomenon) posted for a person named John (information model Human Asset instance) on
the ”Infection‘ Phenomenon. Also, consider an absence Observation posted for a person named
Jane on the same Phenomenon. Presence observations propagate up the tree so that an intelligent
agent can easily conclude that not only does John have an infection he has an illness as well and
all that it entails; however it is not know it the infection is bacterial or viral. Similarly, absence
observations propagate down the tree. In the context of the example, it is observed that Jane
does not have an ”Infection‘ so one can say Jane does not have a ”Bacterial Infection‘ or ”Viral
Infection‘ as well; however, at this point is cannot be determined whether or not she has an
”illness‘.
Knowledge Object supertypes

illness:Phenomenon

subtypes
Infection:Phenomenon

Phenomenon

Bacterial Infection:Phenomenon

Viral Infecton:Phenomenon

Figure 6. Phenomenological Hierarchy

The next step is to tie these phenomena to symptomatic information. Note that a symptom is
also a Phenomenon that may be resident is some taxonomy. In this example, ”Infection‘ is linked
to ”High Fever‘ and ”Viral Infection‘ is linked to ”Sore Muscles‘ as show in Figure 7. The
probabilistic information associated with the links and the role names has been left off for
simplicity‘s sake. Note that since a ”Viral infection‘ is also an ”Infection‘ as indicated by the
super types subtypes links depicted in Figure 6. This relationship indicates that that a ”Viral
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Infection‘ shares the characteristics of an ”Infection‘ or in this particular case also has ”High
Fever‘ as a symptom, but adds new characteristics, the symptom of ”Sore Muscles‘ in this case,
which are not characteristics of the Phenomenon ”Infection‘.
To finish the knowledge instance model portion of the example that tailors the SILS Object
Model to a limited portion of the domain of medical diagnosis, the representative Protocol
Phenomenon

Infection:Phenomenon

possible symtoms

Viral Infection:Phenomenon

High Fever:Phenomenon

Sore Muscles:Phenomenon

Figure 7. Symptomatic Links

objects: ”Measure Body Temperature‘ and ”Check for Sore Muscles‘ are defined. The
Phenomenon ”Illness‘ is linked as a trigger to the Protocol ”Measure Body Temperature‘, and the
Phenomenon ”Infection‘ is linked as a trigger to the Protocol ”Check for Sore Muscles‘ as shown
in Figure 8. As before, the super type subtype link between Phenomenon objects ”illness‘ and
”Infection‘ indicate that the Protocol ”Check for High Fever‘ is triggered by the Phenomenon
”Infection‘ as well as ”illness‘; however, only the Phenomenon ”Infection‘ is a trigger for the
Protocol ”Check for Sore Muscles‘.
Check for High Fever:Protocol

Protocol
illness:Phenomenon
possible triggers

Phenomenon

Check for Sore Muscles:Protocol

Infection:Phenomenon

Figure 8. Protocol Triggers

With a knowledge instance model defined, the SILS Information Model can be used to record
information and reason on this limited domain of medical diagnosis. First, the example records
an observation that the Person, where Person is a SILS Information Model specialization of
Human Asset, Mike Zang has indicated that he is feeling ill as shown in Figure 9.
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Operational Level Knowledge Level
Mike Zang:Person

target

type

:Observation

illness:Phenomenon

responsible party

Figure 9. Illness Observation

A person named John Smith then measures the body temperature of Mike, prompted by the
triggering Phenomenon of ”illness‘ for the Protocol ”Measure Body Temperature‘ in the
knowledge instance model of the example, as shown in Figure 8. The outcome of this Action is
the Observation by John Smith that Mike Zang has a ”High Fever‘. These information postings
are shown in Figure 10.
Operational Level
Mike Zang:Person

:Observation

target

target
target
trigger
John Smith:Person
responsible party
responsible party

Knowledge Level
type illness:Phenomenon

:Action

type

Measure Body Temperature:Protocol

outcome
:Observation

type

High Fever:Phenomenon

Figure 10. High Fever Observation

”High Fever‘ is indicated as a symptom of ”Infection‘ (see Figure 7), a trigger (see Figure 8) that
prompts John Smith to make an Observation of ”Infection‘ then perform the Action of ”Check for
Sore Muscles‘ on Mike with the outcome Observation that Mike does indeed have ”Sore
Muscles‘. These information postings are shown in Figure 11.

Operational Level
Mike Zang:Person

Knowledge Level

target
target

:Observation

responsible party
target
trigger
John Smith:Person
responsible party
responsible party

type Infection:Phenomenon

:Action

type

Check For Sore Muscles:Protocol

outcome
:Observation

type

Sore Muscles:Phenomenon

Figure 11. Sore Muscles Observation
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Using the symptomatic knowledge that ”High Fever‘ and ”Sore Muscles‘ indicate a ”Viral
Infection‘ (shown in Figure 7), a ”Medical Diagnostic‘ Agent posts an Observation that it thinks
Mike Zang has a ”Viral Infection‘, as shown in Figure 12.

Operational Level
Mike Zang:Person

target
target
target

:Observation

type High Fever:Phenomenon

dependent observation
:Observation

Medical Diagnostic:Agent

Knowledge Level

type

Sore Muscles:Phenomenon

dependent observation
:Observation
type

Viral Infection:Phenomenon

responsible party
Figure 12. Agent Diagnosis of Viral Infection

Observations
While some standard characteristics of the individual concepts of data, information, and
knowledge have been provided, it can still be difficult for one to precisely pin down the
differences. This is partially due to the fact that their nature can vary due to the context in which
the terms are applied. The clean separation of data, information, and knowledge within the SILS
Object Model provides an excellent environment to glean insightful observations about the
nature of these concepts in the context of SILS that may carry over to other environments as
well. This section concludes the paper by listing and describing some of the observations made
by the author as his team developed the SILS model and he worked to describe it in the previous
sections of this paper. The reader is encouraged to play with the model by extending it or
making up example instances to see what additional observations can be derived.
Knowledge is derived from information. As Actions are resourced through associations to
Assets, the corresponding Asset Types can be associated to the Protocol of the Action or the
probabilities of the existing link can be modified using Bayes Law for example. In this manner,
knowledge can be learned by observing operational information.
Information is dependent on knowledge for meaning. An Action or Observation is
meaningless without the associated Protocol or Phenomenon. One could imply that something
was done in the case of an Action with no knowledge level type but what was done could not be
implied. Similarly one could imply that something was seen, measured, or inferred in the case of
an Observation with no knowledge level type but what that something was could not be implied.
Information is a simplified reflection of knowledge. One can see the close parallels between
the information and knowledge model fragments. While it appears the information model
fragment has more classes, one must remember that the knowledge level of the model acts as a
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meta-level for information. While there is only one Action class on the operational side of the
model there are a practically limitless number of Protocols with which Action objects may
associate.
Knowledge exhibits more complex associations than information. This observation is
exhibited in two ways. First, self associations in the knowledge model must typically be
implemented with reference objects or association lists as they may often associate the same
object more than once, while the self associations in the information model can use the standard
set implementation, as it is rarely the case that an information object needs to associate with
itself. Second, associations between knowledge objects are typically probabilistic while those
between information objects are direct.
Knowledge is more dependent on the domain than information. Actions, Observations, and
Assets apply to just about any domain one can think of while the corresponding knowledge level
entities Protocol, Phenomenon, and Asset Type can vary drastically from one domain to another.
Information recorded in error should be invalidated rather than destroyed or modified.
This becomes evident when using the model. Consider the medical diagnosis example. Once
the ”viral infection‘ diagnosis has been made it is likely this will be linked as a trigger for some
sort of treatment Action. If the diagnosis turns out to be wrong it cannot simply be modified to
point to a new Protocol or even destroyed, as the reasoning behind the treatment must be
retained to justify the treatment that could now be incorrect given the new information.
Invalid knowledge should be temporally modified or destroyed. This only applies to
temporal systems that allow one to go back in time. Take the diagnostic example again.
Diagnoses are made based on the knowledge of the times, which can change dramatically over
time particularly in the area of medical diagnostics. This can be dealt with if all knowledge level
objects and association classes have activation and deactivation dates, for example. In this
manner, one can correctly judge past decisions based on the knowledge available at the time the
decisions were made.
New information refines knowledge. This is evident in the probabilistic associations of the
knowledge level. If a certain Protocol provides the option of two different types of tool with
which to implement it, every time an Action records the use of tool X instead of tool Y, the
probability that associates the type of tool X to the Protocol increases while that associated with
the type of tool Y decreases.
New knowledge allows a more precise specification of information. Consider again the
medical diagnosis example. The Protocol ”Measure Body Temperature‘ could be extended with
new knowledge that partitions ”Measure Body Temperature‘ into ”Measure Body Temperature
Orally‘, and ”Measure Body Temperature Aurally‘ each of which has different margins for error.
Using one of these new knowledge level Protocols, the example action on ”Measure Body
Temperature‘ could be more precisely specified.
New information is easily identified whereas new knowledge is not. New information is
always unique by definition. But consider for example a user of the model wishing to post an
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observation that his car engine is ”busted‘; he does not find an existing ”busted‘ Phenomenon and
therefore adds a new one. However the Phenomenon ”broken‘ did exist. Are ”broken‘ and
”busted‘ the same? It is hard to say although a detailed study of the associated knowledge could
help. For example, do they apply to the same set of Asset Types? This is a difficult issue to
solve particularly if the associated system requires support for knowledge level extensions by the
end users.
Information does not combine like knowledge. Information by definition is unique so that if
two equally large collections of information are combined the result is simply twice the amount
of information. Combining knowledge is much more complicated as it first involves identifying
identical pieces of knowledge, particularly if dynamic extensions have been allowed, and then
involves the combining of the probabilistic data associated with knowledge level associations.
Data referenced by information becomes information. Since an Information Object is placed
in context by the associations it exhibits, data references by it will be placed in the same or
similar context and are therefore raised to the level of information.
Standardized Data is more appropriately linked to Knowledge than to Information. The
standardized reference data employed by the DOD and other organizations capture general not
specific characteristics. Consider the Model Library Entry example, an example entry might
provide dimensions for a model of vehicle, say a humvee in the ambulance configuration. A
humvee is not a specific Asset (operational level) as in Mike‘s humvee but an Asset Type
(knowledge level).References
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